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Abstract 
Abstract of the thesis entitled: 
BRINGING THE PORTS AND PORT DIPLOMACY BACK-IN: 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE ROLE OF HONG KONG, MACAO AND SHANGHAI 
IN CONTEMPORARY EU-CHINA RELATIONS 
Submitted by CHAN, Wai Shun 
For the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics at Lancaster University in June 2020 
  
This thesis aims to bring back the prism of port-cities and port diplomacy to understanding the 
contemporary relationship between the EU and China. By drawing various concepts from 
international politics, port studies and political geography, the thesis highlights the crucial role 
played by port-cities as a vector of economic and political power, via their role as an interface 
between the “port host”, in the thesis China, and port visitors, in the thesis the European Union. 
The suggested framework will then be applied to analyse the contemporary EU-China relations 
through three selected case studies: Hong Kong, where the first European colony was 
established in 1842; Macao, where the first European settlement was established in 1557; and 
Shanghai, where the first batch of treaty ports opened by the Europeans without turning 
Shanghai as a colony of one nation. At the end of the thesis, the thesis will discuss a new 
academic concept, namely the civilian sea power, and how the academic concept is applicable 
to contemporary diplomatic studies and international politics. 
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Chapter 1: The Neglected Port-cities and Port Diplomacy in 
Contemporary EU-China Relations 
Ports have always been the centres of Europe-China relation since the 16th century when the 
Portuguese fleets arrived China by sea, although diplomatic exchanges between European 
princes and Chinese imperial court could be traced by to 1246 when John of Plano Carpini 
served as an envoy of the Roman Catholic Church and secular European rulers seeking for a 
peace settlement with Mongolians at the Karakorum. With the primary objective of seeking 
trading privileges and rights to settlement at the Chinese coast, the Portuguese imperial court 
sent a formal ambassadorial mission accredited to Ming imperial court firstly in 1520. By 1557, 
the Ming imperial court acknowledged the Portuguese settlement in Macao, in exchange of 500 
taels of silver as ground rent to the imperial court (Wills 1998; Fairbank 1969b). Subsequently, 
Macao became one of the most important hubs in the Portuguese maritime trading network 
which covered from Nagasaki in Japan, via Canton in China and Malacca in Malayan Peninsula, 
to Goa in India. Since then, Portuguese and other Europeans tied their commercial and political 
interests in China, as well as in Asia, with the maritime network built in the region. Constructing 
maritime trading posts, establishing colonies and treaty ports, and protecting and competing for 
sea lanes of communication became essential naval and diplomatic moves shared among all 
European states in China and Asia. 
However, either the governance of trading ports or the practice of diplomacy in China was 
compatible with traditional European practices as well as contemporary standards. Rather than 
operating under the principles of free trade and fair competition as contemporary international 
trade standards suggested, the commercial relations between European states and imperial 
China was once based on the China-led tributary system and differential treatments1. European 
merchants were only allowed to trade at Canton, where the government officially recognised 
as the only trading port for Europeans. In addition, European merchants were only allowed to 
trade with Gong Hong (literally meant public guild), an association formed by a group of 
specific Chinese merchants who were recognised by the government to conduct international 
trade on their behalf. The Canton System, on the one hand, put imperial China in a superior 
position in Europe-China trade relations such that bilateral trade was only allowed at the 
government’s disposal and closely monitored by the government’s agents. On the other hand, 
in order to get access to the right to trade and the right to settlement, European traders were 
required to pay tributes and ground rent (like the case of Macao mentioned in the last paragraph) 
to local and central authorities -  and sometimes briberies to local officials were needed so as 
to facilitate transactions or better treatments2. 
Unsatisfied with the Canton System and limited trading rights in China, European powers 
(mainly the British) decided to exercise their maritime power and waged war against the 
Manchurian imperial court, with the excuse of Chinese unilateral trade (and opium) ban in 1839. 
The First Anglo-Chinese War, or commonly known as the First Opium War, resulted in a severe 
defeat of the Manchurian army and navy from Canton to Nanking. In 1842, the British court 
and the Manchurian court agreed on a peace settlement and the first Anglo-Chinese treaty, i.e. 
the Treaty of Nanking, was signed. Although the Treaty of Nanking was an unequal treaty by 
contemporary standards in international law, it indeed “modernised” Chinese hierarchical 
 
1 During the early years of Europe-China trade, most of the European powers practiced mercantilism 
which limited the exposure of other competitors in the region, and they sometimes fought for the 
control of trading posts and seaports. However, the situation slowly changed with the introduction of 
treaty port system. 
2 According to research conducted by Fairbank and Teng, most of the tributes, custom duties and goods 
had never flown to the central administration but shared by local authorities of Canton and Heungshan, 
as well as the procurator of Macao. See Fairbank and Teng (1941) and Fairbank (1969b). 
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tributary practice by the introduction of Westphalian practice, which the latter assumed 
sovereign equality and formalistic rules of the exchange. Formal diplomatic rules like 
diplomatic immunity and diplomatic community were introduced between British and Qing 
officials (Article 1, 2 and 11 of the Treaty of Nanking). To reflect the concept of “sovereign 
equality”, the most-favoured-nation clause was introduced in the Treaty of Bogue, a 
supplementary treaty associated to the Treaty of Nanking, to guarantee that British nationals 
would enjoy privileges granted by the Qing government to other foreign countries (Article 8 of 
the Treaty of Bogue). 
Accompanied by the introduction of Westphalian diplomatic practice to imperial China, the 
Treaty of Nanking and the Treaty of Bogue also introduced the colonial and treaty port system 
to replace the China-led tributary system. Renowned sinologist J. K. Fairbank summarised the 
difference between the Canton System and the treaty port system by highlighting the 
characteristics of the treaty port system as “opium traffic, extraterritoriality, the treaty tariff, 
and the most-favoured-nation clause” (Fairbank 1969b:3). Instead of relying on the Gong Hong 
as a faithful broker or a government-recognised administrator of tributary trade between China 
and Europe at the port or trading post, port governance and commercial relations were defined 
by bilateral international treaties between the Manchurian imperial court and different 
European powers. For example, the Treaty of Nanking and the Treaty of Bogue granted the 
British government to negotiate a fixed tariff with the Manchurian court (Article 10 of the 
Treaty of Nanking). British merchants were no longer bounded by the Gong Hong or being 
assigned to trade at a specific trading post, but traded freely with various merchants at various 
ports under the one-off agreed tariff to central authority but not local authorities or Gong Hong 
(Article 5 of the Treaty of Nanking). Extraterritorial rights were granted to British nationals 
and company representatives such that they could only be brought British court and tried under 
British legal system regardless where they were being caught within the port or other Chinese 
territories (Article 6 and Article 9 of the Treaty of Bogue). 
The “opening up” 3  of Hong Kong and Shanghai as a Crown Colony and a treaty port 
respectively under the two Sino-British bilateral treaties turned a new page of Europe-China 
relations. In terms of trading and logistics network, both Europeans and Americans either 
completely ignored the non-treaty ports in China or viewed them as less significant and 
secondary to their national interests (van Dyke 2012; Ho 2012). In terms of the 
institutionalisation of the treaty port system, 23 open ports were established from Shin King to 
Hainan in less than 30 years (Dennys 1867). Macao, where the first European settlement was 
located and created by the Portuguese merchants, was also turned from a tributary port to a 
treaty port after the ratification of the Sino-Portuguese Treaty of Peking in 1887. The end of 
Macao as a tributary port also signified the end of the tributary system in governing Europe-
China diplomatic and trade relations. The new treaty port system, no matter in the form of 
European colonies or opened ports established by bilateral treaties, occupied the central gravity 
of Europe-China relations. 
The treaty port system continued to govern diplomatic and commercial relations between 
Europe and China, regardless of the transition of sovereign power from the Manchurian 
imperial court to the Chinese nationalist government (Kuomintang government). It only came 
to an end when the Allies decided to re-negotiate their diplomatic relations with China in 1943. 
Extraterritorial rights in China were ceased, sovereign titles of colonies and administrative 
rights of treaty ports were reverted back to the Chinese Nationalist Government4. However, two 
 
3 The term is commonly used to describe British colonization of Hong Kong in elementary school 
textbook before the handover. 
4 The relinquishment of these rights was concluded in two bilateral treaties between China and Britain 
(the Sino-British Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extra-Territorial Rights in China), and between 
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pioneer ports established by Europe, i.e. Hong Kong and Macao, remained as colonies of 
Britain and Portugal respectively. As a result, although the majority of treaty ports were 
reverted back to China, the treaty port system somehow continued to exist at the Southeast coast 
of China after 1943. 
Interestingly, the transition of sovereign power seemed to have little effect over European 
control in Hong Kong and Macao. Shortly after the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) drove the 
Nationalist Government out of Canton, they decided to stop at the boundaries but not attempt 
to “liberate” Hong Kong and Macao. Instead, it was suggested that the Chinese Community 
Party (CCP) had a secret pact with London as early as 1945 in relation to the future of Hong 
Kong as a British administered colony, in exchange of CCP legal (but underground) existence 
in Hong Kong and British early recognition of the regime in 1950. (Yu 2015). For the case of 
Macao, although the anti-Communist Salazar government did not have formal diplomatic ties 
nor negotiations with Beijing after 1949, various scholars suggested that Macao was de facto 
controlled by China while de jure remained at a Portuguese colony (Jiang 1992:213 – 224; Tam 
1994:260 – 262; Chan 2003:498; Fernandes 1997:50; Mendes 2013:15). Such perception was 
further strengthened after the Chinese successful sabotage of Portuguese colonial governance 
of Macao in 1966. A secret pact was signed between Beijing and Lisbon in 1979 which both 
parties acknowledged Macao as a “Chinese territory under Portuguese administration” (Jiang 
1992:213 – 224; Tam 1994:260 – 262; Chan 2003:498). While the new Chinese state 
established in 1949 did not give up her claim over the sovereignty of Hong Kong and Macao, 
the European presence was deliberately kept for the sake of national interests, or using the then-
Premier Zhou Enlai quote on CCP’s strategy towards Hong Kong: “long-term consideration, 
full utilisation”. 
Beijing’s flexibility in granting differential treatments toward local communities and 
administration was not entirely surprising as there were many similar cases since the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). For instance, in dealing with ethnic 
minorities in China, Beijing established various Ethnic Autonomous Regions (EARs) for 
“major ethnic minority groups” such as Tibetans, Mongolians, Zhuang, Hui, and Uyghur. In 
order to implement certain capitalist reforms under socialist governance, Beijing established 
various special economic zones (SEZs) such as Shenzhen and Zhuhai. To further liberate 
international trade and promote foreign investment opportunities, Beijing also introduced 
various pilot free trade zones (FTZ) in key ports such as Shanghai and Tianjin. Except for EAR 
which the location was largely determined the natural living location of the ethnic minorities 
concerned, it was observed that many differential treatment policies at local governance were 
located at civilian ports or hinterland of those ports. For example, Shenzhen and Zhuhai were 
picked as the first batch of SEZs could always be attributed to their proximity to Hong Kong 
and Macao; Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangdong, Fujian were selected as the first two batches of 
Pilot FTZ, and they were coincidentally major trading ports in the past. Of course, Hong Kong 
and Macao, owing to their colonial history, practiced “One Country, Two Systems” (OCTS) 
after Beijing resumed their sovereign titles and administrative power in 1997 and 1999 
respectively. 
While there were ample researches on the important role of coastal cities and ports in Chinese 
economic modernisation and commercial internationalisation (Yeung and Hu 1992), only a 
handful of researches had linked such importance of coastal cities and ports to Chinese foreign 
policy mechanism. Zheng (1994) first applied the concept of “perforated sovereignty” to 
capture the dynamics between provincial governments and the central government in the area 
 
China and the United States (the Sino-American Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extra-Territorial 
Rights in China) on 11 January 1943. 
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of foreign trade. Unlike Western scholars like Kenneth Lieberthal (1992) or Susan Shirk (2007) 
who highlighted the fragmentation or fragility of the central government after the 
decentralisation policy in post-Mao period, Zheng and later scholars such as Chen Zhimin 
(2017) or Li Mingjiang (2014) appreciated such decentralisation that it might open up new 
possibilities for an effective Chinese foreign policy to her neighbours who shared international 
land borders or maritime space. Amongst those handful academic projects which appreciated 
the role of coastal cities and ports in Chinese foreign policy mechanism, the “geopolitical” 
characteristics of these coastal cities and ports which received differential treatments from 
Beijing were underexplored, if not totally ignored. The meaning of “geopolitical” 
characteristics, the thesis argued, was twofold: first, unlike ordinary cities, ports and port-cities 
were unique geographical space which connected the territorial space of “the host” to the 
maritime space where “visitors” came in; second, such geographical uniqueness of ports and 
port-cities was further “politicalised” by both the host, i.e. Beijing in the context of this thesis, 
through her differential treatments to the visitors, and the visitors, the European Union in the 
context of this thesis, through various means such as the utilisation of colonial legacy or the 
development of new diplomatic programmes.  
The mere silence over the role of ports and port-cities might be explained in different 
perspectives. The first reason is discursive as any differential treatments at ports or port-cities 
in China could potentially be associated with the old-fashioned treaty port system – a political 
taboo for both the West and the East. From the Western perspectives, the treaty port system 
signified the power-lust European empires engaged themselves in severe competition on 
overseas colonies and sea lanes of communication, and the end-game of such imperial 
expansion was that two dreadful wars in the early years of the 20th century. The end of World 
War II not only marked the end of extraterritorial rights enjoyed by the West in China but also 
demonised colonisation and the establishment of overseas treaty port as a legitimate and viable 
foreign policy option. Territorial integrity, sovereign equality, and the prohibition of the threat 
of the use of force became the peremptory norms (jus cogen) of post-war international order, 
and any treaties conflicting with these norms would be automatically voided and terminated5. 
The old-fashioned treaty port system was therefore legally prohibited and morally unacceptable 
among Western societies. In fact, it could always be contrasted to “international chartered city”, 
an emerging idea first proposed by Nobel Memorial Prize laureate in Economics Paul Romer 
(2009) in his TED talk to end poverty in the developing world. His idea, to some extent, was 
similar to the treaty port system which the developing country outsourced the fate of a city to a 
developed trustee nation, and also received a similar critique of “politically incorrect” and “neo-
colonialism” (Mallaby 2010). In the context of contemporary China, while Beijing was willing 
to grant differential treatment to local regimes for the sake of economic development and 
progressive reform, she was also sensitive to the nationalistic red line at a popular level such 
that Beijing would not turn the orchestrated nationalism as a support to her legitimacy but not 
a burden (Gries 2004; Wang 2012). In addition, any differential treatment, no matter in the form 
of FTZ or OCTS, should never challenge the imagination of “One Sovereign” (Tok 2013) and 
the legitimacy of CCP as the sole sovereign representative of the Chinese nation. As a result, 
the old-fashioned treaty port system was a historic spectacle to remind the Chinese society 
against “the Century of Humiliation” (Wang 2012). The colonial legacy of ports and port-cities 
should be handled with care. For instance, popular discourse satirised the Shanghai FTZ as a 
kind of “New Concession” (Mei 2013), a term usually referenced to the Shanghai International 
Settlement, should never be welcomed as a narrative to describe Shanghai’s differential 
 
5 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, 1969. The version of treaty the thesis 
referred is accessed at the United Nations Treaty Collection 
(https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/volume 1155/volume-1155-i-18232-english.pdf), accessed on 
30 Jan 2019. 
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treatment towards foreign business partners. Colonial legacy of ports and port-cities, was either 
utilised or muted by Beijing to protect her national interest. 
The second perspective of the mere silence over the role of ports and port-cities in Sino-
European relations was ontological, as the categorisation of existing literature could not fit in 
the “geopolitical reality” of Sino-European relations or the “academic normality” of 
international relations studies and port studies. The geopolitical reality of Sino-European 
relations was rather straightforward: the lack of direct maritime boundary shared between China 
and the European Union and the absence of European naval presence in Chinese maritime space. 
Such geopolitical reality undermined the study of port-cities and port diplomacy in Sino-
European relations, albeit the growing European maritime interests from “Suez to Shanghai” 
(Rogers 2009; Seidler 204; Simon 2009; 2014a; 2014b). In addition, the conclusion made was 
rather pessimistic: either the European Union had a minimal role in Asian maritime space owing 
to the lack of political will and military presence (Seidler 2014), or the European Union required 
commitment of Member States and/or allies which had a naval presence in the region (Simon 
2014a; 2014b). This conclusion was rather normal from the epistemic lens of traditional 
geostrategy, as the primary focus was about the deployment of hard naval power and naval port 
system, with the ultimate pursuit of maritime domination (Gray 1995; Rodger 1996; Smith and 
Pinder 1997). The concept of port-cities and civilian port system, which was a product of 
extensive trading activities and commercial relations, apparently did not fit in the lens of 
traditional geopolitics. On the other hand, traditional port studies emphasised on ports’ 
economic governance and the contribution of the civilian port system in global logistics and 
transactions (Slack 1993; Oliver and Slack 2006). Compared to traditional geostrategy which 
focused on “high politics”, i.e. political factors, formal diplomacy and strategic locations, 
traditional port studies tended to focus on “low politics”, economic factors and business 
transactions and spatial arrangement (Fleming and Hayuth 1994; Ducruet and Lee 2006; 
Ducruet 2007). However, ports and port-cities in China to some extent were rather unique in 
both the past and present. Historically, the modern port system and port-cities were only 
introduced to the Chinese coast in the form of treaty ports – a “negotiated” outcome of 
diplomatic actions and political decisions between the West and the East. While the treaty port 
system in China largely ended after 1943 (except for Hong Kong and Macao), the external 
influence could never be undermined especially many major commercial ports in China were 
indeed the successors of former treaty ports or colonies created during the period of “European 
Scramble for China”, such as Qingdao (former German colony), Lushun (former Russia and 
Japanese colony), Tianjin (a treaty port opened under the Treaty of Peking). Such colonial or 
treaty port legacy could potentially become important diplomatic resources for European port 
diplomacy to China, if not an important aspect to (re-)define Sino-European relations. 
Nevertheless, since traditional port studies did not deal with “high politics” such as port 
diplomacy and traditional geostrategy did not deal with civilian ports, these “port resources” 
were generally put aside in their respective analysis. 
However, contemporary thoughts on geopolitics and security studies were more critical to 
traditional approaches in handling the dichotomy of “high politics” and “low politics” and that 
of security and economics (Buzan, Wæ ver and de Wilde 1997; Al-Rodhan 2007; Al-Rodhan 
2009; Buzan and Hansen 2009; Germond 2015). Characteristics of new security challenges 
were multi-level (global, regional, national, transnational) and multi-sectoral (territorial, 
political, economic, societal), and a recalibration of security threats, national interests, and 
diplomatic responses was needed for contemporary IR theories and security studies. One 
implication of such recalibration was that the original no (geo-)security concerns thesis over 
EU-China relations as a result of no geographical contact was no longer valid. In addition, the 
rise of new security agenda and global political structure also created new academic 
opportunities to reconcile maritime studies which was high politics-oriented and gave heavier 
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weight to political motivations than economics and social forces; and port studies which 
focused more on low politics and appreciated the importance of economic and social 
interactions in defining port system and port actions. One example of such organic combination 
was a recent proposed EU foreign policy initiative “Connecting Europe and Asia – Building 
Blocks for an EU Strategy” (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2018). 
The primary objective of the dissertation, therefore, was to explore, and eventually, made a 
contribution to bridging this research gap in the study of EU-China relations. Through a 
comparative study on three major port-cities, namely Hong Kong, Macao and Shanghai, which 
were established by European Powers as colonies or treaty ports during the imperial period of 
China, the thesis aimed to develop an analytical framework that combined the strength of 
maritime studies and port studies, and shed light on a neglected part of EU-China relations, i.e. 
the understudied “port diplomacy” between the European Union and China. 
The remaining introductory chapter would be divided into three main sections. The first section 
would outline the definitions of major elements of the thesis. Three elements would be 
addressed in this section: the concept of (treaty) ports and port system, the typology of EU-
China relations and the definition of port diplomacy. This second section would review the 
existing literature on international relations and political economy, which led to major research 
puzzles of this thesis. Two specific areas of literature would be reviewed: 1) the role of sub-
state actors in the existing literature of international politics and political economy; 2) the role 
the European Union as a structural power/normative power. The final section would state the 
proposed research questions and hypotheses, the methodological setting and the respective 
limitations of the chosen methodology. 
Defining the Key Elements of the Thesis: (Treaty) Port System, EU-China 
Relations and Port Diplomacy 
This section would offer the definitions of major elements involved in the formulation of the 
academic framework: (treaty) port system, EU-China relations, and port diplomacy. 
(Treaty) Port System 
The definition of port looked plain enough and seemed to require no further elaboration or 
refinement for most people. It was commonly understood as a geographical “entity” that was 
“attached to a sea, ocean or river by connecting waterway” and “equipped infrastructure and 
technical facilities” for specific purposes and specialised load types (Roa, Pena, Amante and 
Goretti 2013:1056). Port economist Paul Tourret (2007) defined port as “a set of moles, basins, 
and docks, which prove to treat all kinds of ships and goods.” (cited in Hlali and Hammami 
2017:120) Focusing on the socio-economic functions of civilian ports, port economist Bauchet 
(1992; 1998) gave three vital functions of a port, namely the shelter of ships, the passage of 
goods and the transformation of goods (cited in Hlali and Hammami 2017:120). From a spatial 
perspective, Vigarie (2004; cited in Hlali and Hammami 2017:122) defines port as “a contact 
area between two organised spaces for the transport of goods and passengers.” The port space 
therefore was an independent geographical space that serves as the intersection of land space 
and maritime space, and is continuously modified equipment attached to it, flows of goods and 
passengers to and from it and impacted by various instruments and policies (ibid.). Built on the 
ideas of Tourret, Bauchet and Vigarie, Hlali and Hammami (2017:120) concluded that a seaport 
was “a multidimensional system combined between economical function, infrastructure system, 
geographical space and trade.” 
While the spatial-functional understanding of port was useful and would be further discussed 
its relevance a few lines later, the thesis also viewed port not only from the spatial-functional 
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lens but also from the political-legal lens. The Geneva Convention and Statue on the 
International Regime of Maritime Ports and Protocol of Signature roughly defined maritime 
ports as “ports which are normally frequented by sea-going vessels and used for foreign trade.” 
(Article 1 of the Statue on the International Regime of Maritime Ports, 1923) Yet, such 
definition may not fully reflect the legal or institutional complexity of a port. In fact, in modern 
days ports and port-related activities could be governed and managed under government 
authority, a public corporation or a public-private partnership6. The degree of power enjoyed 
by various stakeholders of the port, ranging from government departments to foreign vessels 
called to the port, was varied in accordance with domestic constitution, political culture, policy, 
and legal practice.  Therefore, even though the major functions of a (sea)port may be similar 
among each other, the difference in geographical spaces that it was connected, the legal 
framework that it was embedded in and the institutional practice that it enjoyed in the past and 
present-day, might contribute the difference in the designated role of a port and the diplomatic 
resources that it could contribute – one of the central arguments of this thesis suggested and 
wished to put to the analysis of contemporary EU-China relations. 
The additional political-legal layer of understanding was especially relevant to ports and port-
cities related to China. As mentioned in the last section, many major ports and port-cities in 
China were former treaty ports established by Western powers during the “Scramble for China” 
period. While renowned historian and sinologist John K. Fairbank (1969b) highlighted the 
characteristics of Chinese treaty ports as extraterritorial rights and one-off treaty-fixed tariff, 
these two elements required further elaboration to fit into the contemporary context. Of course, 
extraterritorial rights were no longer applicable in contemporary China, yet differential or 
preferential treatments did exist in some ports and port-cities. These treatments were ranging 
from negative differential treatments such as levelling off privileges enjoyed by local 
communities or restrictions imposed to foreign communities, to positive differential treatments 
such as granting tax holidays to foreign legal personalities or direct consultation with foreign 
firms or chambers of commerce – and all these treatments were localised within the port 
boundaries. The second element involved a legalised framework and political commitment to 
those differential treatments. In the case of treaty ports, the legal framework was the bilateral 
treaties signed between the respective European power and the imperial Chinese court, while 
the political commitment included direct foreign governance (the colony) or indirect foreign 
influence (the treaty ports) allowed in managing the treat ports. In modern days, these 
commitments could include bilateral declarations on the future governance of a port, domestic 
legislation to consolidate those differential treatments, and an extensive political consultation 
network between local authorities and foreign business communities. 
In fact, this model of development became increasingly popular among developing countries 
in Asia as well as less affluent states in Europe, and was partly attributed to China’s recent Belt 
and Road Initiative. The original Chinese port development model such as the SEZ model in 
Shenzhen and Guangzhou to the FTZ model in Shanghai was further exported along the 21st 
Century Maritime Silk Road. One typical example in Europe was the acquisition of Piraeus, a 
strategic seaport located between the Mediterranean Sea and the Aegean Sea. Since the Chinese 
state-owned enterprise, China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company (COSCO), acquired the 
 
6 For instance, the port Hong Kong is owned by the government and any port-related development and 
ship-related activities are governed under the Marine Department of Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region In the case of Singapore, the port development and ship-related activities are 
governed under the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore, a public corporation established under 
the Maritime and Port Authority Act of 1996 and a government sponsored merger of various maritime 
and port related departments and authorities.  For a case of public-private partnership, port Hambantota 
of Sri Lanka is owned by Sri Lanka Port Authority yet majority of the operation of the port 
development (about 70% of the port asset) is leased to China Merchants Port Holding for 99 years. 
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majority of ownership of Port Piraeus, it was reported that the company had utilised the 
concession agreement as a lobbying weapon against the Greek government, so as to get her 
approval of the new Piraeus development plan (Georgiopoulos 2018). Another commonly 
known example of such arrangement was in Sri Lanka, where the Colombo government signed 
a concession agreement with China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited, a partially 
state-owned enterprise listed in Hong Kong, on the construction and management of Port 
Hambantota. The agreement, however, was eventually turned to an exclusive lease for 99 years 
to the company, and the local authorities had granted the company and its partners 15,000 acres 
of land for an industrial park and tax concessions to develop the port (Aneez and Sirilal 2017; 
Schultz 2018). Compared to traditional treaty ports established through colonisation, European 
imperialism, and international law, these newly established ports maintained substantial 
characteristics of treaty port, which were active incorporation of foreign entities to port 
governance, extensive foreign influence in economics and port policy-making, and preferential 
treatment towards foreign entities. The discrepancy was the absence of “an international treaty” 
to consolidate these characteristics into a single legal document. Rather, these ports were built 
upon domestic legislation with a strong commitment to communicating to the foreign parties, 
or in form of business contracts between state-linked entities. Such incomparability, however, 
was inevitable as the legal context has changed. 
To summarise the elaboration above, the thesis wished to highlight that a modernised “treaty” 
port system was in the making from China to Europe. Instead of a stringent international legal 
form of a treaty which was out-of-favoured by both the East and the West, the new (treaty) port 
system developed in China and slowly exported to the rest of the world including the following 
characteristics: 
1. Unique and independent legislation was created as the foundation of the port, regardless it 
is in the form of national legislation, business contracts or international treaty and 
declaration; 
2. Such legal commitment addressed not only the domestic audience but also the international 
audience; 
3. Such legal commitment would generate preferential rights and/or differential treatments 
towards foreign entities within a certain place, i.e. the port, compared to the rest of national 
territory; and 
4. Both domestic and foreign authorities, whether they were public or private entities, were 
committed to honour the legal commitment and politically involved in the creation and 
maintenance of port institutions. 
The major merit of such conceptualisation of the new (treaty) ports and the port system was 
that it highlighted the political-legal features of ports and port-cities, especially in China and 
less developed countries. The appreciation of the political-legal features of the contemporary 
port system, to some extent, opened up a possible discussion of port diplomacy at civilian ports 
– a concept being caged by traditional geostrategy or the discourse of gunboat diplomacy. In 
fact, through acknowledging the existence of domestic and foreign political commitment in 
maintaining the port institutions and legal framework, it also unlocked the possibility of civilian 
ports in contributing bilateral relations between two political entities, in the context of this 
thesis the political entities were the European Union and China. 
EU-China Relations 
The second foundational element to be defined and further elaborated was the operational 
domain of contemporary EU-China relations. Similar to the (treaty) port system, EU-China 
relations had changed a lot since the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), an intergovernmental organisation founded in 1951, and the PRC, a communist state 
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founded in 1949. Changes in EU-China relations involved two different dimensions. First, in 
terms of institutional arrangement, the foreign policy capacity of the European Union had 
changed a lot since the Treaty of Paris, with more new actors and new levels of interactions 
were created between the European Union and China. Second, in terms of substantial political 
changes, the changing domestic and international environment since the end of World War II 
had continuously shaped the political interests and opportunity sets of Beijing and Brussels, 
resulting in different expectations and policy objectives throughout the contemporary era. This 
section would focus on the first dimension and the second dimension would be addressed in the 
next chapter. Table 1.1 summarised the evolution of EU-China relations from the end of World 
War II to contemporary days: 
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Time Period Level of 
interactions 
Main actors 
involved in the EU 
Major types of 
relations 
1949 – 1975 National level ECSC Member 
States 
Recognition/Non-




to-state level of 
political and 
diplomatic relations 
1975 – 1992 European level European 
Commission 
Collective 





National level EC Member States Independent state-
to-state level of 
political and 
diplomatic relations 











rights and security 
dialogues 
National level EU Member States Europeanised state-
to-state level of 
political and 
diplomatic relations 
2009 – European level The European Union Economic and 




global governance;  
 
Political, human 
rights and security 
dialogues 
Sub-regional level Selective group of 
EU Member States 
Regional economic 
cooperation 
National level EU Member States Europeanised state-
to-state level of 
political and 
diplomatic relations 
Table 1.1. The institutional evolution of EU-China relations since 1949 
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Instead of having stable foreign policy machinery by their Chinese counterpart after 1949, the 
gradual integration among European states had changed their domestic institutions in foreign 
policymaking. For instance, compared to centralised foreign policy machinery controlled by 
the CCP, decision and implementation capacity was dispersed to multiple levels from European 
collective actions to individual state responses. The first phase of Sino-European relations was 
largely conducted by state-to-state basis. With the establishment of the PRC in 1949, European 
states were struggled to recognise, or not to recognise, the new communist regime in China. 
Instead of a European consensus, ECSC Member States individually developed its state-to-state 
level of diplomatic recognition and political relations with Beijing. Taking the founding EU 
trio, i.e. France, Germany, and Italy, as an example, they recognised China and established 
diplomatic relations in 1964, 1970 and 1972 respectively – and the United Kingdom and 
Scandinavian countries recognised China as early as in 1950s. In fact, except for the 
management of the custom union and common commercial policy, the ECSC and EC had little 
impact on nation-states’ foreign policy. Apart from the lack of an institutionalised platform, 
diverse national interests to the old and new China and the impact of Cold War bipolarity were 
also seen as major reasons of the lack in uniform European foreign policy towards China, 
leaving the interactions uncoordinated and secondary to European relations with Washington 
and Moscow (Yahuda 2008; Vogt 2012). 
The first recognised European level of Sino-European interactions was established in May 1975 
when Christopher Soames, the Vice President and Commissioner for External Relations of the 
European Commission, visited China and marked the beginning of diplomatic relations 
between Brussels and Beijing. Indeed, shortly after PRC’s succession of the seat of China in 
the United Nations in 1971, the majority of the EC Member States recognised PRC and 
established formal diplomatic relations 7 . While the foreign policy arms of the European 
Community were underdeveloped in 1970s and 1980s, the EC, especially the EEC, served as 
an independent platform in parallel to the development of state-to-state relations. Two trade 
agreements were signed in 1978 and 1985 respectively and a joint committee at European level 
was formed as a result of the 1978 trade agreement. An ambassadorial level of delegation office 
of the European Commission was opened in Beijing in 1988, which remained as one of the two 
EU ambassadorial offices in the Chinese territory8. The growing EU-China relations came to a 
haul in 1989 as a collective response from the West to the Tiananmen Incident. Instead, 
European-wide sanctions were applied to China including arms embargo which was still valid 
nowadays. 
The year 1992 was a remarkable year for the evolution of EU-China relations. At global level, 
the end of Cold War reconfigured the bipolarity to US-dominant liberal world order. The 
weakened influence from Moscow, as well as a stronger Western Europe, allowed both Eastern 
and Western European states to develop their foreign policies out of the shadow of Washington 
and Moscow. At European level, the Maastricht Treaty defined the Three-Pillar Structure of 
the newly established European Union, including an intergovernmental pillar of Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). At bilateral level, the European Union lifted most of its 
sanctions against China which were imposed after the Tiananmen Incident, and a new bilateral 
political dialogue was established. Since then, more sectoral cooperation and dialogues have 
been introduced, such the human rights dialogue (first in 1995), industrial policy dialogue 
(2003), climate change consultations (2006) between the EU, as a supranational entity, and 
 
7 The only exception was the Republic of Ireland which recognised China in 1979, 4 years after EC 
decided to recognise PRC as a legitimate successor of “China”.  
8 The second ambassadorial office of the European Union in China was the EU Office in Hong Kong 
and Macao, which is, in terms of organizational structure and financial budget, independent from the 
EU Office of China and Mongolia. 
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China, as a nation-state. In addition, while at high politics such as diplomatic representation, 
security policy, and military deployment EU Member States maintained a certain degree of 
autonomy, individual foreign policies were coordinated under the CFSP framework and became 
“Europeanised” (Tonra 2001; Wong 2006; Muller 2013; Agnantopoulos 2010; Wong and Hill 
2011; Michalski 2013). The implication of Europeanised foreign policies at Member State level 
is that the creation of the EU with an intergovernmental CFSP (and the subsequent European 
Defence and Security Policy) practically gave birth of the blueprint of a European foreign 
policy, on the other hand methodologically in evaluating EU foreign policy to the third party 
such as China, foreign actions conducted by the EU and EU Member States could be evaluated 
simultaneously so as to capture the best representation of European foreign policy.  
The most updated phase of EU-China relations, in terms of institutionalisation at various levels, 
could be seen from 2009. The directions of institutionalisation were in twofold: first, the Treaty 
of Lisbon unified the original three-pillar structure into a single legal personality, giving the 
EU as a whole the only international legal entity to represent Europe in both high politics and 
low politics. The launch of (failed) negotiations on a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA) in 2007 and the subsequent upgrade to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2013 
not only reflected Brussels commitment to developing a multifaceted relationship with Beijing, 
but also a signal of a consolidated European interest and policy towards China. As seen from 
the recent communication prepared for the new stage of EU strategy towards China, the 
European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security 
Policy bluntly demand a “full unity” of the EU and its Member States in dealing with China, 
including “all Member States, individually and within sub-regional cooperation frameworks” 
(European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy 2019:2). In fact, such demand from the European Commission and the High 
Representative reflected the second direction of the institutionalisation of EU-China relations, 
which was the creation of sub-regional regime such as the “16+1 format” mentioned in the joint 
communication (ibid.). The “16+1 format” was a sub-regional initiative proposed by Beijing in 
2012 which covered 16 existing and future EU Member States and served as a part of the Belt 
and Road Initiative to promote Chinese business, economic and social cooperation with Central 
and East European (CEE) countries (Song 2017; Vangeli 2017; 2018). Since the initiative 
involved both EU and non-EU Member States, EU central authorities did not have a major role 
on this Beijing-led platform but an observer to it. Also, rather than a genuine multilateral 
platform among China and CEE states, the programmes were largely bilateral and the CEE 
states respond to Chinese programmes and received Chinese investment individually (Grieger 
2018). Of course, the state-to-state level of interactions between EU Member States remained, 
especially after the Euro-debt Crisis as there were an observable disintegration and polarisation 
of national interests towards China among EU Member States (Fox and Godement 2009; 
Godement, Parello-Plesner and Richard 2011; Godement and Stanzel 2015).  
The above summary looked good for most of the IR scholars. However, the thesis wished to 
suggest a neglected level of analysis, i.e. the sub-national level. Since 1992, the European Union 
had established various local offices in China. A Commission Office in Hong Kong was 
established in 1993 which represented European Commission presence in Hong Kong and 
Macao. In addition, an Economic and Trade Office was established at Taipei in 2003 to deal 
with EU-Taiwan relations. As the naming of the offices already suggested, EU primary interests 
at the sub-national level were mainly trade and commerce, a policy competence exclusively 
controlled by the European Commission. Nonetheless, as part of its financial and external 
relations reform, the EU had upgraded its financial commitment to some of its sub-national 
offices including that of Hong Kong and Macao in 2006 (Council of the European Union 2006). 
Compared to the previous budget structure, the new reform approved since 2006 had 
strengthened the capacity of EU Office in Hong Kong and Macao in terms of administrative 
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and financial capacity. Apart from being administrative independent from EU Office in Beijing, 
EU Office in Hong Kong and Macao could initiate and sponsor more independent programmes 
and projects specifically designed for Hong Kong and Macao, which would be discussed in the 
chapters of Macao and Hong Kong.     
While the reform of this kind was usually put aside by international relations scholars from 
Europe and China, the inclusion of the sub-national institutions opened up a new dimension of 
study in EU-China relations and port diplomacy. Discussed in the last section, on one hand 
many major Chinese ports and port-cities were former colonies or treaty ports established by 
European powers, such that traces of European legacy remained at these major ports in China. 
On the other hand, Beijing differential treatments at ports and port-cities had either incorporated 
some colonial legacy to their governance structure, or aimed to attract foreign direct investment 
which the European states were definitely their target audience. As a result, commitment (and 
non-commitment) to these ports and port-cities from Brussels and Beijing also constituted an 
indispensable part of contemporary EU-China relations – which was commonly undermined by 
the growing literature of EU-China relations. From the EU perspective, a comprehensive 
institutional analysis of contemporary EU-China relations should include the following four 
types of relationship, which was summarised by the Figure 1.1: 
 
 
Figure 1.1 The institutional typology of EU-China relations from the EU perspective 
Type I relation referred to the overarching foreign policy interactions between the European 
Union, as a collective and supranational actor, and China, as a unitary nation-state. Such 
initiatives included those legally defined by the EC-China Trade and Cooperation Agreement 
(TCA) signed in 1985, various sectoral dialogues and cooperation frameworks between the 
Brussels and Beijing, high-level engagements such as the bilateral EU-China Summit and the 
regional Asia-Europe Summit, people-to-people programmes and technology exchanges 
administered by the European Commission, etc. Major actors involved in Type I relation were 
the European Council, the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, and to 
a lesser extent the European Parliament which is responsible for approving budget and political 
scrutiny for the success and failure of EU foreign political actions, and the European External 
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Union for Foreign and Security Policy. From the Chinese side, the main actor involved and 
responded was Beijing, the State Council and its related government organs such as the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Commerce. 
Type II relation referred to the individual state-to-state relations between EU Member States 
and China. Although the Treaty of Lisbon unified the Three-Pillar structure and further 
institutionalised external representation of the EU by a semi-permanent President of the 
European Council and a bureaucratic EEAS arms to support the more powerful High 
Representative, EU Member States maintained some degree of autonomy in diplomatic and 
political relations with third-party states. For instance, most of the EU Member States 
maintained their respective diplomatic office in Beijing and continued to function as a 
communication channel between Beijing and individual EU Member States. State visits to 
Beijing, and vice versa, were kept as a kind of usual business for major member states such as 
Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. For the newly-joined EU Member States like the 
CEE states, they were also invited to participate the “16+1” format and conducted bilateral 
business cooperation with Beijing and/or the state-owned enterprises. Apart from the CEE 
states, Beijing economic diplomacy, packaged under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also 
targeted bilateral investment opportunities in Southern European states such as Greece, Italy, 
and Portugal. Under this type of relations, major actors involved were the national government 
of the EU Member State as well as the Beijing government. 
Type III relation referred to Brussels initiatives and programmes targeted to some selected 
Chinese cities and ports. Despite Beijing strong reservation, if not a taboo, against  any forms 
of decentralisation of Chinese foreign policy capacity to provincial and local level as it 
fundamentally challenged the unitary sovereign state assumption (Ting 1997; Cummings and 
Tang 1998; Chan 1999; Shen 2010; Wang 2010; Shen 2014; Shen and Chan 2017), there was 
a growing scholarship challenging such political reality, especially if low-politics, i.e. economic, 
social and cultural interactions, was taken into an account (Zheng 1994; Cheung and Tang 2001; 
Chen 2017; Chen and Jian 2009; Chen, Jian and Chen 2010). In addition to the influence of 
sub-national cities on Chinese foreign policy, the practice of OCTS in Hong Kong and Macao 
created two Special Administrative Regions which received independent financial commitment 
and legal framework from the EU. At least in terms of institutional analysis, this kind of 
interaction could not be neglected in conceptualisation EU-China relations. Major actors 
involved in this category of relations, on one hand, included the European institutions from 
Brussels and their representative to the selected cities, on the other hand, Iing Beijing and the 
local government of the selected cities and ports. 
Type IV relation referred to individual EU Member State’s engagement to selected Chinese 
cities. Given the autonomy to establish her own diplomatic representation to third-party states, 
individual EU Member State could always set up their respective diplomatic office apart from 
Beijing, insofar it had satisfied the rule of reciprocity. For example, while there was no formal 
European Union Office, majority of the EU Member States establish their own consulate offices 
in Shanghai9. Under OCTS, Hong Kong, and to some extent Macao, was also a major hub of 
foreign representatives to China10, and some of them enjoy extraordinary position in their home 
country11. Although not all EU Member SIveloped their consular representation or independent 
 
9 The following EU Member States had established their consular missions at Shanghai: Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
10 Except for Portugal which had traditional ties with Macao, consular offices established by EU 
Member States usually would take their Hong Kong office to provide consul services to their nationals 
in Macao. 
11 For instance, the British Consulate Office in Hong Kong and Macao reported directly to the head of 
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policies towards Chinese cities, connections under this category could not be neglected 
especially different European countries had their national ties and history with some Chinese 
cities and ports. Following the same token of Type III relation, major actors involved in this 
category of relation were the government and her representatives of individual EU Member 
States to the selected cities, and from China side Beijing and the local government of the 
selected cities and ports. 
The merit of this re-categorisation of EU-China relations into four different types based on the 
level of interactions was twofold: first, it gave a more accurate understanding of the potential 
interactions between the European Union and China. A recent observation from Chen et. al. 
(2010) suggested that Beijing, on one hand, was cautious about the challenges of provincial 
international ties against central authority and sovereign unity, on the other hand she also 
wished to take some sort of advantages from decentralised ties by demanding foreign countries 
to “develop a multi-layered engagement approach towards China” (ibid:356). An analysis of 
EU-China relations involving sub-national actors like ports could, therefore, fill up the 
analytical gap of existing literature in contemporary EU-China relations. The second merit of 
such re-categorisation was that even though the thesis focused on the supranational-to-sub-
national interactions, i.e. the ports in China, these interactions were still under “EU-China 
relation matrix” with a strong presence of national and supranational actors. Especially in the 
case of China who always positions herself as a unitary state, the relative autonomy of sub-
national actors was always kept at minimum and should never challenge state unity and foreign 
policy interests of Beijing. From the EU perspective, while the representatives from different 
EU Member States would have their own services to their national citizens and establish their 
own programmes and diplomatic image in Hong Kong and Macao, it was understood that the 
EU Member State Offices and the EU Office will coordinate among themselves and came with 
a unified position on the major issues in Hong Kong and Macao. It could be said that the sub-
national level of interactions was the extension of EU interests in China and was closely 
connected to the generic supranational interests of the EU foreign policy to Beijing (Type I 
relation). 
Port Diplomacy 
The third element to be defined in the chapter was the concept of port diplomacy, which was 
also the critical idea of the thesis. This element, similar to the idea of ports and port system, 
looked plain enough, i.e. the diplomatic actions conducted by different actors at the port. In 
practice, however, the concept was further complicated by the characteristics of ports being 
included (or excluded) and the characteristics of diplomatic actions and actors being included 
(or excluded) in a study related to port diplomacy. 
Traditional scholarship on port diplomacy commonly associated the role of port to state 
diplomacy through the academic lens of maritime or naval diplomacy (Harkavy 1982; 1989; 
2007). However, such positioning of port diplomacy already implied many definitional and 
methodological constraints against a study of port diplomacy. In terms of the type of ports being 
studied under this conceptual lens, maritime or naval scholars mainly focused on naval bases 
or ports with high degree of military or naval presence. Commercial or civilian ports such as 
Shanghai in China, Buzan in South Korea or Rotterdam in the Netherlands, compared to Subic 
Bay in the Philippines, Okinawa in Japan or Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus, received less 
attention in naval studies and maritime strategy. Second, from the lens of geostrategy, the 
importance of ports was much associated with their strategic and geographical location in 
 
China Department at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London, but not the UK Ambassador in 
Beijing (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 2015), a similar practice shared by Canada 
and the United States. 
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relation to the sea lanes of communication. The port geography, the socio-political backdrop 
and the economic value of the port received little attention from the majority of geo-strategists. 
Third, the role of ports was instrumental and supplementary.  The instrumental side of (naval) 
port was that ports were essential in assisting maritime actions through the deployment of ships 
and routine maintenance, and sustaining overseas naval missions through the network of supply 
and emergent maintenance (Smith and Pinder 1997). The supplementary side of port in naval 
diplomacy was that the presence (and absence) of naval bases and welcoming ports was viewed 
as an indicator of relative sea power of a nation, as well as a real-life presentation of the alliance 
network that a nation could enjoy across the seven seas (M–han 1911:118 - 131). A specific 
port call in a disputed maritime region or a friendly port visit by a naval power was usually 
viewed as a committed demonstration to allies in the region or an occasion to show her naval 
muscles to competitors or rivalries in the region or even the world. In short, traditional 
geostrategy treated port diplomacy as a part of naval or maritime diplomacy, and the crucial 
elements of port diplomacy were naval bases, geostrategic interests, and naval maritime 
exercises. 
Instead of relying sole academic lens of geopolitics, the thesis conceptualised port diplomacy 
with some refinements contributed from the lens of port studies and critical geography. The 
first refinement of conceptualisation was the inclusion of commercial and civilian ports, which 
were indeed the majority in numbers compared to naval ports and bases. In fact, civilian “port 
call” became more and more important in post-Cold War period. Taking the Sino-German 
relation as an example, while the first port visit made by PLA-N took place at German naval 
base of Wilhelmshaven in 2001, the second port visit of PLA-N came to Port of Hamburg, a 
civilian port of economic importance to Germany (Gady 2005).  Duisburg, one of the largest 
inland civilian ports in the world, was regarded ’s “Xi Jinping's gateway to Europe” and 
strategically important to the Belt and Road Initiative (Oltermann 2018). The importance of 
commercial and civilian ports, therefore, should never be undermined in the study of port 
diplomacy in contemporary era. The second refinement was the inclusion of non-naval 
activities and assets in analysing the content of port diplomacy. A conventional textbook on 
modern diplomacy had coined Chinese economic diplomacy as “port diplomacy” which 
focused on “centring rapid logistic expansion, accelerated information skill transfer 
arrangements, intelligence and market access” through the investment of port and related port 
infrastructure (Barston 2006:73). Overseas visits, business dialogues and subsequent 
investment made by Chinese delegation consisted of city mayors and provincial officials, 
chairpersons or representatives from major state-owned enterprises in China, was Beijing main 
diplomatic tool, but not those the high-profiled leadership visits and bilateral summits (ibid). In 
addition to Barston’s observation in Chinese economic diplomacy, naval strategist Toshi 
Yoshihara suggested that Beijing had developed a “sophisticated, methodical strategy for 
securing China’s maritime claims” through “employing non-navy assets” (Yoshihara 2013:2). 
This included the deployment of coastal guards or even fishery vessels instead of formal navies 
to “patrol” in the disputed maritime space in East China Sea and South China Sea, and the 
insistence of historic fishing zones for Chinese fishermen in the disputed maritime re’ions. 
Beijing's innovation in projecting her sea power through non-traditional means should also be 
reflected in defining port diplomacy in contemporary era. Port diplomacy was no longer an area 
monopolised by navy or dominated by naval activities using naval means. Instead, a civilian 
dimension of port diplomacy, which included civilian ports, civilian activities, and civilian 
actors, was a useful addition to the existing conception of port diplomacy.  
The Role of Civilian Ports: Existing Literature on International Relations, 
Maritime Diplomacy and EU Structural Power 
Compared to everyday examples such as the growing competition on the construction of port 
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facilities in the Horn of Africa (Styan 2018; van den Berg and Meester 2018) and the “trojan 
ports” criticism against Chinese investment in Europe (Lee 2018), the discussion on the role of 
civilian ports remained as an under-explored subject in international relations theory and 
foreign policy analysis. The difficult inclusion of the civilian ports in international relations and 
foreign policy analysis could be explained in twofold: first, the “methodological nationalism” 
(Adamson 2016; see also Taylor 2000a; 2000b) and naval thinking had led to the “inattentional 
blindness” (Chabris and Simon 2010; cited in Acuto 2013) to other levels and types of 
interactions; second, the incomplete spatial turn of international relations and foreign policy 
had led to the “inattentional blindness” of the spatial characteristics of civilian ports and their 
implications of foreign policies. 
Paradiplomacy and Global City Thesis as the Starting Point 
The study of non-state actors in international relations and foreign policy was not entirely new. 
For instance, the concept of paradiplomacy was first promoted in mid-1980s when Ivo 
Duchacek (1984) published his article in Publius which challenged the statist assumption of 
foreign policies and discussed the role of subnational self-government in international politics. 
In the next decades, there were several projects which aimed to analyse the role of subnational 
governments in international politics (Duchacek, Latouche and Stevenson 1988; Aldecoa and 
Keating 1999) and the concept became more and more prominent in global politics. There were 
two types of para-diplomatic activities identified by Duchacek, namely “transborder 
regionalism” and “global micro-diplomacy” (Duchacek 1984:8 – 9), which the latter concept 
was more relevant to the discussion on the role of civilian ports in EU foreign policy. 
The concept of “global micro-diplomacy” was defined as “the stationing of permanent missions 
(state offices) in distant corners of the world” and involved following activities (Duchacek 
1984:13 – 14): 
1. Sending short-term fact-finding missions aboard; 
2. Overseas trips for promoting subnational interests; 
3. Hosting foreign dignitaries and trade representatives; 
4. Trade and investment exhibitions; 
5. Government-sponsored publicity campaign in overseas media; 
6. Specific commercial and financial zones; and 
7. Institutionalised relationships with overseas territorial communities 
Although the discussion of paradiplomacy was mainly associated with regional governments, 
the application of such concept did not limit to regional governments. As the linguistic original 
of the term suggested, the concept of paradiplomacy was referred to any diplomatic activities 
“parallel to” national diplomacy (Acuto 2013; Kuzentov 2015). Therefore, in theory, the 
concept not only covered subnational diplomacy but also supranational diplomacy such as the 
European Union foreign policy. Indeed, even before the creation of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) under the Treaty on the European Union, the European Communities 
had established permanent offices overseas such as its office in China and Hong Kong. The 
formalisation of CFSP and the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
further strengthened EU capacity as a viable paradiplomatic actor alongside with the EU 
Member States. In fact, the EU Office overseas had frequently committed to some of the 
activities mentioned above, for example organising various trade, investment or even cultural 
programmes to promote EU interests overseas. 
The framework of “paradiplomacy”, however, was just one theoretical starting point of the 
thesis. In fact, the concept may be good to capture the potential actorness of the European Union 
and civilian ports, it was never adequate to capture the special role of civilian ports in 
international politics, especially when contemporary civilian ports were serving the nodes of 
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civilian activities conducted by local, national and foreign actors. Such inadequacy could be 
compensated by the “actor-network theory” (ANT) and the idea of global city in urban studies 
and sociology (Sassen 1991; R. G. Smith 2003; Acuto 2013).  
The concept of global city was first developed by Sassen (1991) who tried to distinguish global 
cities from traditional “world cities” suggested by Hall (1966) and Friedmann (1986). Sassen 
(1991; 2005) defined the concept of “global cities” as the “command 29eterts” of control with 
a global significance in economic globalisation and flows of capital. One essential characteristic 
of global cities was that the cities would gradually detach from their geographical region and 
became independent and globalised entities in global political economy, for instance the 
influence of New York and London were far-reaching than the physical boundaries of the 
United States and the United Kingdom. Following Sassen’s idea, Calder and Freytas proposed 
the concept of “global political city” as “a metropolitan area that serves as a policy hub, major 
political diplomatic community, and strategic information complex of global import” (Calder 
and Freytas 2009:94), and applied this concept to analyse the global impact and relevancy of 
Washington DC. By applying the Actor-Network Theory, urban researcher Michele Acuto 
(2013) proposed the three main role of a global city in international politics: networking actants, 
networking actors and networking networks. From Acuto’s perspective, the global city not just 
served as “the locus of multiple agencies” and “the determinant of networked relations” 
(ibid:71, italic as origin), but also node of different various actor-networks.   
Compared to the paradiplomacy thesis which focuses on the active agency of subnational actor, 
the global city thesis focused on both the active, passive, and spatial contributions of global 
cities in international politics. The politicisation and spatialization of city space allowed a 
critical view on how the urban space had linked up the local political and spatial practice with 
international politics and global economy. Civilian ports, which were commonly embedded in 
the global political and economic system and the nodes of economic and cultural transactions, 
could always fit in Sassen’s definition of global cities. The global port framework suggested by 
Calder and Freytas (2009) and Michele Acuto (2013), therefore, served as another theoretical 
starting point of the thesis. However, as a special type of geographical entity, the thesis would 
depart from the global city framework by taking the port geography of the port seriously, which 
will be further discussed in Chapter 2. 
The Civilian Dimensions of Sea Power: From Naval Diplomacy to Seaport Diplomacy 
In fact, neither inclusion of substate actor in international politics nor the civilian dimension 
was entirely new to international politics and foreign policy. However, similar to the discussion 
on the role of substate actors in international politics, the civilian dimension of sea power also 
demanded more explanation. Traditional exercise of sea power fell into the category of “hard 
maritime diplomacy” (Le Miere 2014:8), which focused on the state’s dominance of the sea 
and secured naval victories over other global competitors, if not enemies (Till 1987: cited in 
Germond 2015). As a result, the number of overseas bases, civilian vessels, foreign civilian 
ports were understood as indicators of one’s absolute and relative strength in the maritime space. 
The role of civilian ports was rather instrumental and served as a kind of maritime asset readily 
to support naval operations and overseas expeditions. Although Mahon (1987) regarded the 
civilian maritime network,  and the attitudes of the civil society in supporting the exercise of 
sea power as the foundational conditions of being a successful sea power, the eventual 
evaluation of one’s sea power was the naval capacity in projecting national interests overseas, 
or securing national security against external threats coming from the sea. 
However, the utilisation of civilian resources, or “soft maritime diplomacy” as Le Miere 
suggested (2014:8), became more and more important in projecting and securing one’s 
maritime interests. Apart from the non-naval strategies mentioned by Yoshihara (2013; see also 
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Le Miere 2014) in projecting Beijing’s control over the disputed East China Sea and South 
China Sea, “seaport diplomacy” was a brand new strategy introduced by China to enhance her 
maritime control in Indian Ocean and Middle East (Sun and Zoubir 2017; Sun 2018). As Sun 
Degang, a renowned Chinese expert in Middle East studies in China, concluded, Beijing’s 
seaport diplomacy was an integrated diplomacy which integrated the resources from private 
companies, state-owned enterprises and different ministerial agencies ranging from foreign 
affairs to transportation, in serving the China’s external maritime power projection (Sun 2018). 
The implementation of China’s seaport diplomacy not only had enriched her diplomatic 
“toolbox” and institutional innovation, but also envisioned the potential of the traditional 
agrarian nation to “become a strong maritime power” (Sun 2018:45 – 47). 
Despite its traditional reliance on maritime dominance, there had been little research or interests 
in conceptualising the role of overseas civilian ports in enhancing maritime power of the United 
States and Europe. Instead of power projection, civilian seaport was commonly regarded as “an 
object to secure” (Germond 2015). Literature on port and maritime policy had always centred 
in an important theme, i.e. how to balance the commercial benefits and the cost on national 
security in managing civilian ports (Frittelli et. al. 2003; Haveman and Shatz 2006). Under this 
perspective, the role of overseas civilian ports perhaps was best illustrated by the introduction 
of Container Security Initiative (CSI) in 2002, a cooperation between US and foreign container 
ports in enhancing American maritime security. In short, both domestic and overseas civilian 
ports were “securitised” rather than a potential asset for power projection. 
The general ignorance on the role of overseas civilian ports was twofold. Apart from the 
inattentional blindness of traditional naval studies over the role of civilian ports, there was also 
another inattentional blindness in the spatial characteristics of Asian civilian ports and its 
linkage between Europe. Without doubt, the European countries had gradually retreated from 
their former colonies in Asia and Africa after WWII, and never returned to the region as an 
active naval power or investor in civilian port construction. Nonetheless, many Asian civilian 
ports were indeed built from the geographical site of former colonies, and borrowed the colonial 
legacy left behind by the Europeans. For instance, the institutional practice of the Port of 
Singapore and the Port of Hong Kong was largely influenced by its Anglo-Saxon culture such 
as the common law system. On the other hand, the Port of Macao had been assigned as a 
Chinese headquarter to connect the Lusophone community. Even though the European 
countries did not actively construct the civilian port in Asia as China did in Southeast Asia and 
Indian subcontinent, European countries had “softly contributed” to the construction of Asian 
civilian ports through their colonial legacy. Building upon Sun’s idea of seaport diplomacy, 
any connection and utilisation of the soft asset embedded in the Asian civilian ports by foreign 
actors, in this thesis the European Union, could also be viewed as a kind of seaport diplomacy 
and an exercise of the civilian dimension of sea power. 
Reconceptualising the Structural Power of the European Union: From a Holistic 
Approach to a Differentiated Approach 
There were literally thousands of articles, book chapters and edited works on the nature of the 
European Union as an international actor and the characteristics of its foreign policies. However, 
major narrations on the nature of the European Union commonly rested on three different but 
interlinked power: the EU as a civilian power, a normative power, and a structural power 
(Duchêne 1973; Bull 1982; Hill 1990; Maull 1990; Manners 2000; 2002; 2006a; 2006b; K. E. 
Smith 2003; 2005; Stavridis 2001; Manners and Whiteman 2003; Keukeleire 2003; Diez 2005 ; 
Sjursen 2006a; 2006b; Bretherton and Vogler 2006;  Holden 2009; Whiteman 2011; Keukeleire, 
Thiers and Justaert 2009; Keukeleire and Justaert 2012; Keukeleire and Delreux 2015; Hocking 
and Smith 2016). 
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These terms might be different amongst themselves in terms of subtle social meaning to third-
party states and the ultimate objectives the European foreign policy wished to achieve, they 
shared two foundational features in constructing EU international presence: the predominant 
use of non-military instruments and the projection of European ideals to third-party states. For 
instance, Maull (1990:92 - 93) defined the characteristics of civilian power as “the 
concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals” and “a 
willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international 
management.” Ian Manners, one of the important proponents of “normative power Europe” 
thesis, defined the concept of normative power as “the ability to shape conception of what is 
“normal” in international relations” (Manners 2002:239), and the “normal” was rooted in 
various articles of the founding treaties of the European Union, or international declaration and 
regional charter that the European Union anchored to (ibid:241). The projection of such 
“normal” was essential to EU everyday international politics and served as the foundational 
character of the EU external presence, i.e. being normative and acting in a normative way 
(Whiteman 2011:6). Keukeleire’s idea of structural power and structural diplomacy, which he 
and his colleagues primarily used to define EU diplomacy to the world, suggested that the 
objective of EU diplomacy was to pursue and support “long-term structural changes” and 
transfer various founding principles of the EU via economic-financial instruments and political 
dialogues (Keukeleire 2003; Keukeleire, Thiers and Justaert 2009). Although scholars might 
disagree among themselves on the true nature of power that the European Union belonged to, 
they all primarily agreed that the EU was aspired to bring its ideals of world order to the rest of 
the world through non-military means and diplomacy. 
Despite the slight difference in terms of objectives and means, the conceptualisation on nature 
of the characteristics of EU power did not address the local social and spatial difference of the 
third-party state. The micro-policy difference at local level and spatial-cultural difference 
among local communities within the third-party state was never addressed in the existing 
literature on EU normative power and structural foreign policy. For instance, while 
Keukeleire’s idea of structural power and structural diplomacy focused on the long-term 
structural changes of the third-party state, his idea did not differentiate the respective structures 
at state level and those at local level, as well as how the local-level structures could potentially 
make impact towards the state-level structures. While the realisation of multiple realities within 
the European Union was a common critique against the lack of effectiveness in the European 
foreign policy from within, the application of normative/structural power and structural foreign 
policy was never sensitive to the possible multiple realities in the third-party state at policy and 
spatial level, which was challenged empirically by the EU-China relations per se. In fact, there 
was also noticeable difference over the perception of the European Union between mainland 
Chinese community and Hong Kong community (Dai and Zhang 2007; Chan and Lai 2007). 
As a result, the effectiveness of EU normative or structural power would face always different 
challenges and opportunities at state and local level respectively. In fact, the existence of 
colonial legacy in various Chinese ports could on one hand provided valuable assets to the 
European Union, on the other hand generated undeniable threats to Chinese political, social and 
cultural security. The inattentional blindness of the existing literature on the state-local 
difference was a kind of theoretical gap to be filled in, which the overall design of the thesis 
aimed to achieve. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
After outlining the definition of some key elements in formulating the thesis, this section would 
discuss the key research questions the thesis wished to answer, the hypotheses made in the 
thesis and the analytical framework proposed in the thesis. 
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Formulating Research Questions 
While there were noticeable efforts in the field of human rights dialogue, climate change and 
economic governance, the overall evaluation of EU normative power was less than satisfactory 
(Balducci 2010; Kavalski 2013; 2014; Michalski and Nilsson 2019; Ferenczy 2019). For 
example, Yuan and Orbie (2015) suggested that EU normative power was relatively effective 
in the field of social dimensions such as social security. The reasons for such lack of 
effectiveness were explained by various schol’rs. Jørgensen's (2004) research on EU foreign 
policy suggested that the EU aspiration could always be countered by two other variables: 
legitimacy and interests. Youngs (2004) suggested that the normative identity of the European 
Union was only for strategic and security interests, and the practice of normative power was 
always constrained by national as well as European interests to third-party states and global 
order.  
In the case of China, Michael Yahuda (2008) further identified two spatial-policy difficulties 
in EU engagement to China, namely “the tyranny of distance” and “the primacy of trade”. The 
first variable suggested that since the European Union and China shared the two ends of the 
huge Eurasian continent, the two regimes were separated by physical distance and did not have 
any direct territorial or even maritime contact. Geopolitical concerns, therefore, played a much 
minimal role in shaping EU-China relations. However, the “tyranny of distance” was more than 
physical but the mental gap. Both European and Chinese scholars suggested that both the 
European and Chinese leaders were bounded by general ignorance and stereotypes of each other 
(Griffith 1981; Möller 2002; Men 2008; Schilling 2012). The lack of geopolitical engagement, 
therefore, was attributed to the lack of “correct” knowledge and incentives for EU leaders, 
rather than the actual physical distance between the two regions. The second variable identified 
by Yahuda (2008) was the “primacy of trade”. Both the EU and its Member States were literally 
trapped into trade and economic interests in China (Piening 1997; Casarini 2006). At the 
European level, the structural (in)competence of European foreign policy only allowed the 
European Union to leverage any normative objectives through the exercise of either positive or 
negative conditionality. The strategy was usually embedded in pre-Accession treaties of the 
future EU Member States, development aid or technological transfer programmes to the 
countries in need, or trade agreements with global partners. In the case of China, the main tool 
was always–the last one - the upgraded EU-China PCA negotiation could be viewed as the best 
illustration of the strategy that the European Union wished to deploy. At the Member State level, 
EU Member States either continued to be fantasied by the potentials of the Chinese market 
which they had been looking for since the imperial period of China, or increasingly relied on 
Chinese foreign direct investment for her economy which is hammered since global financial 
crisis in 2008 and EURO debt crisis in 2009 (Fox and Godement 2009; Godement, Parello-
Plesner and Richard 2011; Godement and Stanzel 2015). As a result, the European Union was 
more divided on the Chinese issues and caught between the continuous exercise of normative 
or structural power to China, or silenced against China’s lack of improvement on human rights 
or social reform for the sake of a better trade and investment deal or market access (Godement, 
Parello-Plesner and Richard 2011; Godement and Stanzel 2015). 
Interestingly, the overall objectives of EU engagement to China thus the two variables 
identified by Yahuda were nothing new to Europe. Since the arrival of Portuguese maritime 
expedition to China in 16th century, European policy towards China was centred at two main 
objectives: trading rights and promotion of European values. The difference was merely about 
the content: it was about the (exclusive) trading rights of luxurious goods produced by China 
such as silk, tea leaves and porcelain, and the promotion of Christianity to the Chinese imperial 
court and her subjects. On the contrary, contemporary Sino-European relations focused on 
affordable commodities and free entry of tertiary industry such as professional services and 
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capital market, and the promotion of the “European normal” to the rising communist China. 
Despite observable temporal gap between imperial Sino-European relations and contemporary 
EU-China relations, the main objectives of European foreign policy against China were largely 
the same – and so did the obstacles. While the advancement of technology and transportation 
network might bridge the physical “tyranny of distance” between Europe and China, the mental 
“tyranny of distance” remained an important obstacle to deal with. On the contrary, the rise of 
China had widened the expectation gap between European and Chinese leaders. From Beijing’s 
perspective, the rising global status and successful economic reform of PRC should be well-
respected by the West, such that Beijing expected a more balanced treatment from the European 
leaders as well as a recognition of the market economy status (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
People’s Republic of China 2014; 2018). From Brussels’ perspective, the rise of China in 
economy and global status should also be accompanied with a progressive socio-political 
reform in Chinese society, yet the result was never satisfactory in the eyes of the European 
Union (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy 2019). As a result, both the European Union and China were haunted by the 
mental “tyranny of distance” between them. Last but not least, European leaders, no matter in 
the past or present, tended to adopt a common position towards China in the aspect of trade and 
market access, though they might have different considerations in aspects like human rights 
and social reform. As a result, this common position was always fragile and continuously being 
challenged by individual state-to-state policy between European states and China. Therefore, it 
might be tempted to conclude the fundamental policy context between Europe and China did 
not change much from the imperial period to contemporary days. 
In the past, in order to fulfil the objectives and overcome the obstacles in Sino-European 
relations, European rulers forcefully introduced a political solution: establishing a “coordinated” 
treaty port system through the blended use of military exercises and diplomatic negotiation. 
This early and brutal form of port diplomacy gave the European leaders an upper hand in 
securing their business interests in China and established localised bridgeheads at the coast of 
China for further diplomatic and commercial actions. The establishment of treaty ports and 
European colonies in China thus simultaneously solved the problem of “tyranny of distance” 
and protected “the primacy of trade”. A localised European settlement in China provided an 
ideal place for the Church to continue its religious missions and promote the teaching of the 
God. Without doubt, the traditional treaty port system was already out-of-questioned as it was 
no longer legitimate and legal in international politics. Nonetheless, as discussed in last section, 
major ports and port-cities in China were indeed former treaty ports created by the European 
powers, and Beijing’s differential treatments to these ports and port-cities, to some extent, 
preserved some characteristics of treaty port system. Considering the similarities of Sino-
European relations in the past and the present, the thesis proposed the first-level research 
questions (RQs): 
RQ1: What was the role of ports and port-cities in contemporary EU-China 
relations? 
RQ1.1: Was there any role difference among those ports and port-cities? If yes, 
how could we conceptualise and explain the difference? 
In addition, given the strong presence of European colonial and treaty port legacy in the 
majority of Chinese ports and port-cities, the thesis proposed the second-level research 
questions, which focused on port diplomacy, as follows: 
RQ2: Was European port diplomacy constrained by the colonial and treaty port 
legacy in China? If yes, how could we conceptualise and explain the relationship 
between European port diplomacy and its colonial and treaty port legacy? 
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RQ3 Was Chinese response also constrained by the colonial and treaty port legacy 
introduced by Europe? If yes, how could we conceptualise and explain the 
relationship between Chinese port response and its colonial and treaty port legacy? 
To answer these two levels of research questions, the thesis proposed the following hypotheses: 
H1: Ports and port-cities in China served as a platform for the EU to exercise its 
normative power and structural power, without jeopardising the economic 
interests of the EU and its Member States. 
H1.1: The role differentiation of ports and port-cities was attributed to their unique 
port geography, which was defined by two dimensions, namely “centrality” and 
“intermediacy”. 
H2: The European port diplomacy was constrained by the colonial and treaty port 
legacy as the legacy was one of factors that defined the availability of diplomatic 
resources (centrality) and network (intermediacy) the European Union could 
deploy at the port. 
H3: The Chinese port response was constrained by the colonial and treaty port 
legacy as the legacy was one of the factors that defined the availability of 
diplomatic resources (centrality) and network (intermediacy) that China could 
deploy at the port. 
Explaining the Hypotheses 
Prior to the methodological discussion of the thesis, this section would outline the 
analytical framework used in the thesis in formulating the above hypotheses. Instead of 
solely based on traditional IR theories or geopolitics, the thesis adopted a multi-
disciplinary approach that borrowed some concepts from port studies and spatial politics. 
As a result, some clarifications were required for the sake of understanding the rationale 
behind the analytical framework. 
Port as a Negotiated Space and the Relevance of Spatial Politics 
The first element to be discussed was the spatial characteristics of ports and port-cities. While 
political geographers acknowledged that policy instruments and political interactions would 
bring impact to the meaning and the operation of space, the argument should be put into the 
context of ports and port-cities which the thesis argued that it was a unique kind of political 
space. Henri Lefebvre, one of the renowned Marxist critics against modernity, suggested that 
“the production of the city was the end, the objective and the meaning of industrial production.” 
(Lefebvre 1971:195; cited in Elden 2007:103) From Lefebvre’s perspective, the construction 
of contemporary urban space and city was never a result of natural progression but a planned 
project of industrial production (Lefebvre 1971; 1991). Space by default must be political and 
a product of social and political forces from different levels, namely the local-rural, the local-
urban, the regional and the global (Lefebvre 1991; Elden 2007). 
If the production of a city, which might be located inland or near the coast, was heavily 
influenced by external forces and global trends, the production of a port was more vulnerable 
to external influence and outsiders’ actions. In fact, the initial selection of a suitable port site 
might involve lots of geographical factors such as whether the location provided an excellent 
shelter to ships in different sizes or whether the coastal line and climate were suitable for 
maritime travel and trade. Nevertheless, the continuous existence and development of a port 
must be relied on the continuous and growing usage of ports and port facilities. linking the 
mobilities of goods, people and capital from one place to another. Therefore, port space must 
be social thus political. It was a place where “the Self” (the inland community lived in the land 
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space) meets “the Others” (the maritime community from aboard). Second, a vivid port space 
must be mutually “agreed” and co-established by the inland community and the maritime 
community. A unilateral port call might be successful through the exercise of gunboat 
diplomacy, but sustainable port calls required the political and policy commitment for both 
inland community and maritime community. As a result, port space must be a negotiated space 
between the inland and maritime community, making it a political space embedded with power 
relations and interests. Such political relation between the inland and maritime community 
could be visualised through international treaties (in traditional treaty ports) or domestic 
legislation of the inland community (in those chartered ports and port-cities). In other words, if 
both the inland community and maritime community were committed to maintain the port status, 
the port space must, at least, had some instrumental values to their respective interests so that 
they were willing to commit to the maintenance of port space. Therefore, the thesis suggested 
a hypothesis on the potential role of ports and port-cities that they served as localised European 
port space that help the EU to balance the desire to project normative power to China and the 
demand of advancing economic interests. 
A spatial perspective on ports and port-cities as a negotiated space had another merit as it helped 
to conceptualise the changing port geography at the port. Lefebvre’s theory of space had already 
implied that the “definition” of space was fluid and continuously shaped by perceived spatial 
practice, conceived spatial meaning and lived social relations and interactions (Lef–bvre 
1991:42 - 43). In the context of ports and port diplomacy, the perceived spatial practice was 
visualised by the international treaties (treaty port) or domestic legislation (chartered port) 
concerned. On the other hand, the conceived spatial meaning could be understood as the 
assigned role and meaning of this port by the inland and maritime community and port 
diplomacy was part of the lived social relations and interactions that embedded in the port space. 
From Lefebrve’s understanding, the conceived spatial meaning was always in contest and 
shaped by spatial practices of the actors in the space. Individual actor, through the contestation 
of spatial meaning and practices, would always try to seek advantage from spatial practices and 
turn the conceived spatial meaning to its favour. In the case of European port diplomacy to 
China discussed in the thesis, such an understanding of spatial politics assumed that major 
diplomatic actors, namely Brussels and Beijing, would contest for the role played by the port 
and port-city concerned through their spatial practices.  
As a result, port diplomacy not only served the generic diplomatic motives of the inland (China) 
or maritime community (the European Union), but also aimed to stabilise, if not extend, the 
role of the port assigned by the inland and maritime communities. However, port actions and 
responses should always fall within the limits of perceived and agreed spatial practice as 
moving beyond the agreed limits could possibly lead to the total destruction of the port space, 
which might not be desirable for both inland and maritime communities12. As a result, the port 
space also served a constraint against port diplomacy that limited the opportunity sets and 
appropriate actions of the inland and maritime communities, i.e. China and the European Union 
respectively. 
Port Geography and The Revised Centrality-Intermediacy Nexus 
One criticism against spatial theories was that the theory of this kind was difficult to 
operationalise. Spatial concepts, such as those proposed by Henri Levebrve, yielded little 
empirical relevance but a mere social critic against modernity and capitalism. Instead of 
 
12 Indeed, it was sometimes possible for the total destruction if either the inland or maritime community 
find the port space was crucial to their interests. A typical example of this was the maritime ban or sea 
bam imposed during mid-Ming Dynasty as a response to piracy and domestic social stability. For the 
sake of simplicity, however, the thesis temporarily ruled out such possibility in EU-China relations and 
European port diplomacy to China. 
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discussing the validity of such criticism, the thesis had borrowed an analytical framework 
developed in traditional port studies and logistics management, i.e. the port-city paradigm, so 
as to compensate for the lack of apparent empirical relevance of spatial theory. 
In their pioneer work on the “spatial characteristics of transportation hubs”, Fleming and 
Hayuth (1994) proposed the ideas of “centrality” and “intermediacy” as the two pertinent 
measurements of the spatial relationship of transportation hubs (ibid:4). According to Fleming 
and H–yuth (1994:4 - 5), centrality was defined as “a market centre performing vital economic 
functions or political centre painting the national or imperial power”, while intermediacy 
referred to “locations between important origins and destinations… chosen as waystops, route 
junctions, break-in-bulk points, gateways, etc.” Based on the idea proposed by Fleming and 
Hayuth, Cesar Ducruet and his colleagues (Ducruet 2007; Ducruet and Lee 2006) further 
refined the ideas of centrality and intermediacy and applied to the classification of ports and 
port-cities. According to their refinement, centrality was essentially “an urban functional 
measure” (Ducruet and Lee 2006:108) and defined as “a local/regional trade generation power 
(endogenous)” (Ducruet 2007:160), whereas intermediacy was “an essentially maritime-based 
measure” (Ducruet and Lee 2006:108) and defined as “external player’s election of a place for 
serving their networks (exogenous)” (Ducruet 2007:160). 
While the major orientation of the mentioned works was closely associated to port studies and 
international political –conomy (IPE) - such as the economic role and economic functions of 
the port being studied, the ideas of centrality and intermediacy could also be applicable to the 
research related to international politics and foreign policy analysis (FPA). Table 1.2 
summarised the potential refinement proposed by the thesis: 
 Port Geography under IPE Port Geography under FPA 
(proposed by the thesis) 
Centrality The endogenous economic 
interests and trade 
generation power 
The endogenous political 
interests and institutions 
generation power 
Intermediacy External player’s election of 
a place for serving their 
networks of economic 
interests and trade 
External player’s election of 
a place for serving their 
networks of political 
interests and institutions 
Table 1.2 Definitions of centrality and intermediacy under the IPE and FPA (proposed by the thesis) 
From the above table, the main modification proposed by the thesis was the emphasis of the 
political dimension” of port geography in FPA. For instance, if traditional IPE focused more 
on how commercial activities and economic interests were related to port geography and port 
institutions, FPA would focus more on how diplomatic activities and political interests 
interacted with port geography and institutions. In addition, traditional port studies assumed 
port-cities to have some degree of domestic trade generation power. The thesis proposed that, 
in addition to endogenous trade generation power, ports and port-cities should also possess a 
certain degree of endogenous institution generation power. The capacity to generate political 
interests and institutions, therefore, was the key element to understand the concept of centrality 
under port diplomacy. Following the same token, the concept of intermediacy also received 
some refinement by emphasising the political dimension of the network. Last but not least, the 
endogeneity and exogeneity embedded in the concepts of centrality and intermediacy could 
always be translated to familiar terminologies in social constructivism, i.e. the concept of “Self” 
and “Others”. As a result, the political interests and institutions generated under the ports and 
port-cities should also reflect the socio-economic common good and national myth (Gellner 
1983). On the other hand, the concept of intermediacy could be associated to the external 
challenges against the national myths through the mobilities of peoples, goods and ideas (Urry 
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2007; Clayton 2009). This implication of this concept would be further discussed in Chapter 2 
when the thesis continued to illustrate the analytical framework. 
Methodology, Methods and Limitations 
With the outline of research questions and proposed hypotheses in last section, this section 
would discuss the research design of the thesis, which included the overall methodological 
setting, the research methods and the limitations of the proposed design. 
Grounded Theory and Small-N Qualitative Comparative Study 
The dual-nature of research questions and hypotheses was one of the essential characteristics, 
if not a problem, of designing social science inquiry. On one hand, the research questions and 
hypotheses might be tangled with both descriptive and explanatory component. On the other 
hand, the research questions and hypotheses might simultaneously need to address the empirical 
realities as well as reflect upon the conceptual ideal. As a result, a social science research design 
may need to address both categorical and ordinal variables, as well as quantitative and 
qualitative data. 
Because of such dual-nature characteristics of social science, the thesis made reference on 
various methodological models and tried to take an integrative and flexible approach to develop 
the best strategy to tap the relationship among ports, port diplomacy and EU-China relations. 
In fact, the thesis positioned itself as an interpretivist project which its design was rooted at 
grounded theory proposed by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (Glaser and Strauss 1967; 
Glaser 1992; 1998; Strauss 1987; Strauss and Corbin 1994; 1997; 1998). To compensate for 
the criticism usually made against the grounded theory approach, the thesis introduced small-
N qualitative comparative study as the main research framework to “test” the hypotheses. 
Grounded Theory as an Overall Methodological Strategy 
The rationale of picking grounded theory as a guiding methodological framework was twofold: 
first, most of the research data, such as historical archives, contemporary policy papers, 
communications about EU programmes, diplomatic speech acts, norms and ideas generated by 
from port diplomatic actions, were largely qualitative although there might be some statistics 
or figures to quantify the trade generating power and commercial transactions of a civilian port. 
As a result, a methodology which could give better qualitative research environment was more 
appropriate and applicable for the research design of the thesis. Second, the existing literature 
on the role of port in diplomatic actions were rather scattered into two extremes, i.e. either from 
the perspective of high politics such as military and geostrategy, or from the perspective of low 
politics such as logistics studies or port operation. Under this academic context, the thesis aimed 
to provide a medium-range theory which bridge the analytical gap on the role of commercial 
ports in international politics. While the thesis borrowed many related concepts from existing 
theories such as the idea of spatial politics, port studies and geostrategy, a methodological 
framework rooted at a bottom-up inductive and interpretivist approach was more appropriate 
and applicable than that rooted at a top-down deductive and predictive approach. 
One merit of grounded theory was that this it allowed researchers to develop “theory that is 
grounded in data systemically gathered and analysed.” (Strauss and Corbin 1994:273) From 
grounded theory perspective, the researcher would use the data systematically collected to 
check against and modify existing theories, so that a new theory was generated at the same time 
as carrying social research (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Glaser 1992; Strauss and Corbin 1994). 
Similar to other qualitative research methodology, the grounded theory looked at the qualitative 
data generated by archives, interviews, field observations, etc., and the data collected would be 
analysed and interpreted by the researcher (Strauss and Corbin 1994:274). A new theory was 
grounded at existing literature, data collected and checked against the existing theories for 
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discrepancies, and researcher’s reflective interpretation on such discrepancies. 
Another crucial feature of grounded theory was that the application of such methodological 
strategy would focus the researcher to constantly compare the data with existing theories and 
other observations made when the research progresses. Generative or concept-relating 
questions would be asked continuously throughout the research process. The researcher also 
needed to sample appropriate theories, develop appropriate coding procedures against the 
collection and interpretation of qualitative data collected, and provided guidelines for 
conceptual integration (Strauss and Co–bin 1994:274 - 275). Although grounded theory was 
commonly used in sociological investigation, the methodology might also apply to international 
relations theory building and diplomacy studies. Given the recent turn of the grounded theory, 
researchers were required to appreciate the conditions “from international through national, 
community, organisational and institutional, suborganisational and subinstitutional, group, 
individual, and collective to action pertaining to a phenomenon.” (ibid.: 275) This kind of cross-
level analysis indeed fit well to the characteristics of European foreign policy, which its action 
involves supranational decision to localised programmes, and it aimed to make structural 
changes of the targeted society while gaining political and economic interests. Based on the 
merits discussed above, grounded theory appeared to be an appropriate guiding methodology 
for this thesis. 
Small-N Qualitative Comparative Study as the Operational Strategy 
As earlier mentioned, one feature of using grounded theory as a guiding methodology was that 
the researcher was required to make constant comparison with the existing theoretical and 
empirical realities. While many researchers had worked with their own operational strategy to 
conduct grounded theory research, the methodology was also opened to any kind of 
comparative methods, insofar the basic rationale of comparison and procedures were well-
observed and consistent. As a result, in terms of operational strategy, the thesis would employ 
the framework of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and applied to a small-N case study. 
The central feature of qualitative comparative case study was “a synthetic strategy” (Ragin 
1987:74; Schlosser et. al. 2009:6) to combine the strength of qualitative case-oriented approach 
and quantitative variable-driven approach in conducting comparative study (Ragin 1987; 
Rihoux and Ragin 2009; Schlosser et. al. 2009; Halperin and Heath 2012). Under the QCA 
approach, the researcher identified major variables across the selected cases and made in-depth 
observations of the variables. Another merit of QCA approach as a comparative framework was 
that it was more context-sensitive and allowed the connection between various levels of 
analysis (Schlosser et. al. 2009:6), giving a medium-range theory in addressing the issue. It 
should be noted that under the QCA framework, variables might not just vary in quantitative 
manner such as the fluctuation of absolute value or yielding specific kind of statistics outcome. 
Instead, the variables might vary qualitatively like the changing behaviours of an actor or 
creation of new meaning of a social action. The application of QCA, therefore, allowed the 
thesis to address both the quantitative and qualitative data that potentially generated by the 
civilian ports the thesis studied and compared. 
To setup the comparative framework, the thesis proposed a small-N case study on three ports 
in China to “test” the hypotheses. Although in the field of International Relations study, a case 
was commonly equal to a single country or a single set of foreign policies (George and Bennett 
2005; Klotz 2008a; 2008b), or “a phenomenon for which we report and interpret only a single 
measure on any pertinent variable.” (Eckstein 1975; cited in Bennett 2004) However, Klotz 
(2008a; 2008b) also acknowledged that sometimes a state or a country might not be the best 
unit of analysis. It was equally impossible to single out a particular variable for a social 
phenomenon or using a single dimension of measurement in measuring the independent and 
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dependent variables (Bennett 2004). To operationalise an appropriate case study approach, 
George (1979b) and Bennett (2004) proposed the definition of a case in the field of International 
Relations is “an instance of a class of events of interests to the investigator” (Bennett 2004:21). 
Also, instead of representing a single variable, the case was dealt in a “holistic perspective” 
which was being “considered as a complex combination of properties, a specific “whole” that 
should not be lost or obscured in the course of the analysis.” (Schlosser et. al. 2009:6, italic as 
origin) 
By this definition, the research design would focus on three “cases”, which were former 
colonies or treaty ports established by European powers during the imperial period of China, 
and remained a kind of “chartered ports” by China nowadays. These three cases were Macao, 
a Portuguese settlement established in 1557 was “formally colonised” in 1887, Hong Kong, a 
British colony established in 1842, and Shanghai, a treaty port established in 1843 and turned 
to an International Settlement in 1854. The portfolio of the selected cases, with two independent 
variables namely centrality and intermediacy, was summarised in Table 1.3 as follows:  
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 Macao Hong Kong Shanghai 
Background condition 
Ports and colonies established by European powers 
Ports and port-cities received differential treatments by Beijing 
Independent Variable 1: Centrality 
Institutional capacity 
(China) 
OCTS and a Special 
Administrative 
Region 

















A former Portuguese 
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1887) 
 
A former Portuguese 
colony (1887 – 
1999) 
A former British 
colony (1842 – 
1997) 
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A minor French 
concession next to 
the International 
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1941) 
Political and social 
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culture in different 
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Centre of Chinese 
national economy 
and European 
business in China 

































Chinese order taker  
 













Table 1.3 A summary of cases to be studied with two independent variables concerned 
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As shown in the above table, the centrality-intermediacy nexus of port geography was further 
operationalised into different dimensions, with a clear indicator of the characteristics under 
each dimension. In short, the concept of centrality would be evaluated by the institutional 
capacity, historical relations and socio-political culture of the port, while the concept of 
intermediacy would be evaluated by the economic, culture and socio-political network that the 
port was embedded in. Not shown in the table, the “dependent variable” of the research design 
was the European port diplomacy, which was operationalised in terms of port actions conducted 
by the European Union and China, as well as the norms and institutions projected from the port 
actions. 
The data collection timeframe would cover 2006 – 2018, and both qualitative data such as EU 
policy papers, speeches, communications, programme information, etc., and quantitative data 
such as statistics and figures related to the ports would be collected and analysed. Apart from 
first-hand documents and archives, secondary data already studied by the academic would also 
be consulted. Finally, active participation of programmes organised by the European Union 
from 2015 – 2018 would serve as an additional information for researcher. However, unless the 
private information from the programmes was critical and the researcher was given the consent 
by the organiser, the researcher would only use publicly-available information in analysing the 
diplomatic actions conducted by the European Union and China. Given the shorter period of 
participation timeframe than the data collection timeframe, the information learnt from those 
programmes would serve for researcher’s self-reflection to adjust the theoretical position, 
which was an essential step in conducting grounded theory research. 
Research Limitations 
A choice of a specific methodological strategy and research methods would always accompany 
with their research limitations. Given the thesis was rooted in grounded theory with small-N 
qualitative comparative study, it also acknowledged the methodological limitations they 
brought, as well as cases or areas that the thesis could not cover. One major criticism on the 
grounded theory research was the problem of interpretation, whatever it was over-emphasised 
or underrated of particular data or observation. To overcome this problem, any observation and 
data collected would be checked meticulously against publicly-available documents, such as 
official policy papers, official communication channels such as press releases, websites and 
social media, as well as secondary data such as academic journals, second-handed interviews. 
This method on one hand allowed the researcher to check against the integrity of data and 
information gathered, on the other hand minimised the risk of over-interpretation or under-
interpretation. 
The Selection and Non-Selection of “Cases” 
Any small-N comparative research would also draw the selection problems, i.e. the selection 
and non-selection of cases and variables. According to China Ports, a national-wide association 
endorsed by the Central Government, there were, including those in Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Macao, 87 coastal ports in China (China Ports and Harbours Association 2015). Therefore, a 
selection of 3 out of 87 may, intuitively, not be representative enough to show European port 
diplomacy against China. 
While the thesis acknowledged the criticism and the potential issues in representativeness, the 
selection strategy of these 3 cases were largely followed what Lijphart suggested as a “kind of 
“hypothesis-generating case studies” (Lijphart 1971:692), which aimed to develop “more 
general theoretical propositions” (Levy 2008:5). Given the lack of theoretical discussion on the 
impact of spatial difference among substate actors in EU structural power and port diplomacy, 
a comparative research focusing on a handful of cases allowed the thesis to explore the “casual-
process observations” (Brady et. al. 2004:12) within each selected case, for instance the 
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development of the port geography of the selected cases perceived by Beijing and Brussels in 
different period of time, and how these perceptions were linked to their strategies at the port, to 
induce or fence off long-term structural changes or maximise their political or economic 
interests. Such process-tracing technique required the researchers to conduct continuous 
observations guided by vague theoretical propositions such the application of ANT suggested 
by Acuto (2013) or the concept of seaport diplomacy suggested by Sun (2018). Through the 
construction of continuous dialogues between the evidence presented in the cases and the vague 
theoretical propositions, the thesis could develop a more specific theoretical framework that 
focused on spatial-cultural characteristics of local entities against the exercise of EU structural 
power towards the third-party state, so as to remove the “inattentional blindness” of the existing 
literature of EU normative/structural power and structural foreign policy suggested by various 
scholastic works mentioned above.          
In order to provide enough methodological remedy of a small-N research, the design of the case 
selection process was further guided by the “configurational comparative method” in 
qualitative comparative analysis (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009; Rihoux and Lobe 2012). 
As Rihoux and Lobe (2012:230 – 231; see also Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009:24 – 25) 
argued, any case selected in qualitative comparative analysis must be “selected purposefully” 
which could display “some common background features” and “some variations on some 
aspects”. In order to focus on meaningful variations, the selection of cases and non-selection of 
cases should be firstly driven by a clearly defined outcome of interests (Rihoux and Lobe 
2012:232; Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009:20 – 21). Given the objective of the thesis was to 
investigate how the centrality and intermediacy of former treaty ports (and current “chartered 
ports”) could contribute to European port diplomacy towards China and the Chinese responses, 
the selection process firstly put aside any non-former treaty ports or ports with little colonial 
history. Such selection strategy aimed to “control” the background conditions of the cases (as 
shown in Table 1.3) such that the comparison could focus on the qualitative change of centrality 
and intermediacy of the selected ports. Under this first-tier selection strategy, the thesis had 
narrowed down its potential case pool to the 23 ports identified under Dennys (1867) for further 
considerations. 
As mentioned above, the key outcome was to link the variation of centrality and intermediacy 
to European port diplomacy and Chinese responses, a good selection practice should reflect the 
variations across the key configurations, in this thesis it was referred to centrality and 
intermediacy. These variations of these configurations, as partially shown in Table 1.3, were 
further operationalised to the institutional capacity, quality of colonial legacy in terms of 
political, social and cultural dimension, and the economic power and network of the civilian 
ports. Table 1.4 further summarised the variations presented in the selected case under the 
strategy mentioned above: 
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 Macao Hong Kong Shanghai 
Configuration 1: Centrality 
Institutional capacity 
(China) 
One Country, Two Systems Direct-controlled 







































Economic power Weak to China and 
Europe 
Strong to both China 
and Europe 
Very strong to China 
and Europe 




Regional Regional, national and international 










Coverage of political 
network and 
interests 




Table 1.4 Summary of the variations of two configurations of the selected cases 
As shown above, the selected cases contributed meaningful variations across major conditions 
under each configuration. For example, while the case of Shanghai signified strong presence of 
Chinese institutions compared to those in Hong Kong and Macao, Macao could be further 
differentiated from Hong Kong by the presence of EU-level agreement even though both 
Special Administrative Regions were governed by “One Country Two Systems” and bilateral 
declaration between China and the colonial host. On the other hand, while both Macao and 
Shanghai were connected to Chinese order when Hong Kong was perceived as a liberal world 
order taker, the coverage of interests and network of Shanghai was much extensive and 
important than that of Macao – which was commonly perceived as a small city located in 
Southern China. Despite the relatively small number of cases were drawn from the pool of 
potential cases, the selected cases indeed presented a more favourable research environment for 
the thesis to focus on linkage between key configurations (centrality and intermediacy) and the 
outcome (the European foreign policy and Chinese response), thus help building a “typological 
theory” (George 1979a; Bennett 2004) of European port diplomacy in China.              
Of course, there were some other cases which could be meaningful and potentially replaced the 
above selected cases such as Canton, Xiamen or Fuzhou. However, as Rihoux and Lobe (2012) 
and Berg-Schlosser and De Meur (2009) both suggested, a good practice of case selection 
should also concern about the “empirical intimacy” of the selected cases, i.e. the knowledge of 
the selected cases. The selection of Shanghai (the engine of China’s economy), Hong Kong (a 
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well-known international financial centre) and Macao (a well-known international recreational 
centre) allowed the thesis to take advantage of the ample data and secondary research already 
published, as well as the personal background of the author. As a result, the selection of the 
three cases was further justified by the importance of “empirical intimacy” in QCA research 
design.   
The Selection of Time-frame 
The selection of timeframe for data collection may also attract criticisms. While the selection 
of timeframe could always be arbitrary and constrained by non-academic factors, the proposed 
timeframe had several characteristics. First of all, the year 2006 marked a fundamental shift of 
EU-China relations which highlighted the idea of “responsibilities” in the policy 
communication drafted by the European Commission (European Commission 2006a; 
Shambaugh 2007a; Men 2008; Smith and Xie 2010). Second, in terms of financial commitment, 
the year 2006 also marked the transition to a new funding cycle (2007 – 2013), such that new 
funding proposals and initiative would be proposed starting from 2006. Following the same 
token, the year 2018 was picked because it served as the conclusion of the midterm evaluation 
of the latest funding cycle (2014 – 2020). Given the time and resources constraints, the thesis 
acknowledged the criticism that the selected timeframe and cases might not be comprehensive 
enough to reveal the whole picture of contemporary EU-China relations and European port 
diplomacy to China. 
Organisation of the Thesis 
The chapter served as an introduction to the whole thesis by outlining the background of the 
research, the definitions of major elements concerned, the proposed research questions and 
hypotheses, and the methodological issues of the research design. 
The remaining chapters would be divided into two main parts. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 would 
continue the discussion on the analytical framework, through an extensive review of existing 
literature on port studies and EU-China relations. Chapter 2 would discuss major academic 
theories on port diplomacy and port system, aiming to shed light on how ports and port-cities 
could potentially make impact to international relations and foreign policy. Chapter 3 would 
discuss the evolution of European foreign policy and the EU-China relations and highlight the 
characteristics of contemporary EU-China relations that port diplomacy could potentially 
bridge. 
After the theoretical discussion, the thesis would move to the empirical part which consisted of 
three case studies: Chapter 4 would first discuss the overall Sino-European relations during the 
imperial period of Europe and that of China, a context which led to the creation of Macao as 
the first European settlement in China. Followed by the historical discussion, Chapter 4 would 
continue its discussion on Macao and its role in EU-China relations. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 
would respectively focus on historical and contemporary context of Hong Kong and Shanghai, 
and their respective role in contemporary EU-China relations. 
The thesis would conclude itself at Chapter 7 by revisiting the research questions and 
hypotheses and checking against the empirical data discussed in Chapter 4 to Chapter 6. After 
that, the thesis would proposed two theoretical propositions drawn from the empirical analysis 
and how these propositions contribute to the existing literature on EU structural power and the 
role of civilian ports in international relations and foreign policy, and suggested the future 
research agenda. 
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Chapter 2: Ports, Port System and Port Diplomacy in Different 
Perspectives 
The previous chapter outlined the overall theoretical and methodological framework of the 
thesis. This chapter, and the next chapter, would further develop major elements of the 
theoretical framework. Given the importance of ports and port system in formulation the thesis, 
this chapter would first explore the existing literature on port system and port diplomacy, and 
the next chapter would focus on the evolution of European foreign policy and the possibility of 
European port diplomacy. 
This chapter would be structured in three sections. The first section would provide a review on 
two mainstream theoretical frameworks in studying port and port system, i.e. the geopolitical 
lens and socio-economic lens, and how these frameworks were linked to the concept of port 
diplomacy. would outline the port system developed in Europe and Asia, aiming to shed lights 
on the important features of Asian ports and how European port diplomacy in the past shaped 
the Asian maritime order. Following that, the second section would outline the port system 
developed in Europe and Asia, aiming to shed lights on the important features of Asian ports 
and how European port diplomacy in the past shaped the Asian maritime order. The third 
section would link up the academic discussion of ports and port diplomacy to the features of 
Asian port system, so as to explore the relationship between (treaty) port system, the impact of 
European port diplomacy in the past, and its relevancy to contemporary EU-China relations. 
The Role of Ports in International Relations: An Everlasting Geopolitical 
Battlefield or An Integrative Socio-Economic Hub?  
A textbook-liked definition of a port was referred to an area “attached to a sea, ocean or river 
by connecting waterway” that “equipped with infrastructure and technical facilities” for the 
sake of managing specific load type that it is assigned to do so (Roa, Pena, Amante and Goretti 
2013:1056). From a functionalist and logistics perspective, the primacy function of a port, 
regardless of its location, was to “to provide shelter to a different extent to ships” and to allow 
“the transfer of goods from one means of transport to another.” (ibid) In addition, port was 
always regarded as an essential transportation node linking the land space and maritime space 
(ibid:1057). 
The above conceptualisation of port looked good to common people, as it highlighted the 
infrastructural layouts and major functions which were visible in our daily life. However, the 
above definition was rather location-neutral, i.e. the location of a port was irrelevant to its 
functions and infrastructural layouts. Given the fact that a port was a geographical space that 
plugged one’s sovereign territory to the maritime space which was largely an internationalised 
space and the freedom of navigation prevailed, the importance of a port was more than a 
facilitator of business transactions and a shelter. The socio-political characteristics of the 
sovereign territory the port located, the characteristics of the maritime space the port served, 
the absolute and relative geographical position of the port in the global maritime network and 
the type of infrastructure installed at the port etc., not only contributed to the value and 
importance of a port in logistics and commercial activities, but also defined the character of a 
port and its role in international relations. In fact, the thesis argued that this unique characteristic 
of port, and relative importance of port in social, economic and political aspect, was an essential 
foundation to understand how the foreign states exercised their port diplomacy agains the host 
of the port. 
The role of ports in international relations was commonly analysed from two different 
perspectives. The first perspective focused on the strategic position of a port, using a naval port, 
in one’s diplomacy, and the second perspective focused on how a port, usually a civilian port 
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connected the local community to the world, and vice versa. 
Port as a Geopolitical Asset and Battlefield to One’s Diplomacy 
Although the thesis did not include naval ports and facilities in its case study, the thesis still 
needed to include a short review on the role of ports from a naval and geopolitical perspective. 
After all, the importance of port and port diplomacy was first addressed by geostrategists under 
the name of sea power and naval diplomacy. A review on the geopolitical and naval lens was 
still useful in capturing the potential role of ports in contemporary EU-China relations. 
It might not be necessary to repeat the importance of “command of the sea” suggested by Mahan 
in maintaining, or challenging, global hegemonic status of a state. Maritime dominance, albeit 
in different forms, was a guiding principle shared among European empires and the United 
States. Despite the lack of maritime presence in Asia after the World War II, there was a 
growing European concern over the maritime security in the region, especially the increasing 
tension of South China Sea among China, the ASEAN and the United States (Duchatel 2016; 
Stanzel 2016; Pejsova 2019) The usual conclusion from these reports, however, was pessimistic 
owing to the lack of collective “military resources” at EU level. As a result, the European Union 
was rather passive in dealing the situation, and it had to rely on Member States’ individual 
efforts or the commitment from the United States. 
Conclusions of this kind were rather natural. In evaluating one’s maritime presence in a region, 
the most traditional, also the most straightforward, way was evaluating one’s naval capacity 
that was readily to be deployed in the region. Compared to air forces and land troops, naval 
forces could be deployed in a flexible (compared to land troops which are limited by natural 
and sovereign borders) and sustainable manner (compared to air forces which are cost more in 
everyday maintenance and overseas operation). The naval muscle of a state, in the eyes of naval 
strategists and IR experts, was always readily to be “translated” into diplomatic resources and 
messages (Le Mière 2014). To turn the naval missions and naval diplomacy more effective, the 
naval should be well-supported by an extensive network of naval bases and/or civilian seaports 
that occupied the key sea lanes of communication in the region. The role of ports, at first glance, 
was instrumental to naval diplomacy, which could be further analysed in three different aspects: 
systematic, operational and discursive. 
The systematic level was proposed by scholars like Immanuel Wallenstein (1984) and George 
Modelski (1987), which emphasised the dominance in global port system as an integral part of 
global hegemony. Wallenstein and Modelski might disagree among themselves over the impact 
of global capitalism and the fate of a global hegemony, their theories shared similar beliefs that 
global hegemons from the Spanish Empire to the United States had dominated, if not dictated, 
the technological build-ups and the commercial network – which included the dominance in 
ship-building capacity and maritime network. For instance, Modelski (1987) suggested that the 
number of capital/commercial ships and warships possessed by a state was a good indicator of 
one’s maritime strength, in both naval and civilian terms, compared to her competitors. In 
addition to outnumbering her competitors in terms of vessels and personnel, William R. 
Thompson (2001) observed that different hegemonic states shared a set of commercial maritime 
characteristics such as the possession of certain commercial ports, naval bases or points d’appui 
for the sake of the projection of maritime power or protecting overseas maritime trade network 
(Harkavy 2007:24). The “passing the torch” thesis suggested by Thompson (2001) confirmed 
the view that some ports or maritime chokepoints were critical in geopolitics and maintenance 
of one’s hegemonic position. The changing possession of these ports, for example Port Jaffna 
(from the Portuguese Empire to the Dutch Empire) and Port Colombo (from the Portuguese 
Empire to the Dutch Empire then the British Empire), also reflected the transition of global 
hegemon from one state to another. Following the same token, the continuous maritime 
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presence at these ports and chokepoints such as Port Aden, Port Cape Town, Port Singapore 
and to some extent Port Hong Kong, by the United States and her allies had allowed the United 
States to control major sea lanes of communication in the region, or major hubs of regional 
maritime trading network. Summarised by Basil Germond (2015), sea power was essentially a 
means for the hegemonic to maintain her desired global system, which currently in the form of 
Anglo-American liberal world order, as well as a product of it.  Hegemonic state could afford 
powerful navies owing to the control of global capital through trade or exploitation, and 
powerful navies supported further exploitation and control over overseas resources. From this 
perspective, controlling major civilian ports was essential for a global hegemony to maintain 
its position. As a good civilian port, by definition, was always the hub of regional and/or global 
civilian activities, it allowed the global hegemony to dictate the civilian maritime network and 
control the flows of global capital, resources and even important ideas. In fact, various naval 
strategists and scholars agreed that sea power and the construction of maritime empire was won 
and lost not by successive maritime warfare or destruction of fleets, but through the loss and 
acquisition of key naval bases or geographical chokepoints (Brodie 1941; Kennedy 1983; 
Graham 1965). Despite not being explicitly mentioned, the same rule did apply to the control 
over key civilian ports and maritime commercial hubs as well. 
At the operational level, naval bases and civilian ports were essential for naval and civilian 
maritime missions. Despite the advancement in technology and efficient supplies management, 
a navy could never sustain in maritime missions if it was not well-supported by an extensive 
network of bases (Grygiel 2012). The distinction between navy and coastal, as Grygiel (2012) 
argued, was that naval forces were required to go for missions that usually faraway and beyond 
one’s territorial waters, while the latter usually covered the territorial sea or at most the 
exclusive economic zones. For instance, the expected maritime sites of a naval operation 
included strategic sea lanes of communication or tactical chokepoints at international waters, 
or maritime space in dispute. In addition, the expected objectives of naval missions varied from 
protection of state and civilian vessels to pre-emptive deterrence against competitors through 
continuous naval presence in the region. Given the characteristics and objectives of naval 
operations, Blechman and Weinland (1977) explained the four vital functions to support the 
naval missions: the replenishment of normal and specialized “consumables” that are vital for 
naval missions; the provision of intelligence and communication support; repairing broken 
parts of the warships outside the home ports and supporting direct combat in case of armed 
conflicts. The importance of ports and related maritime infrastructure might sometimes define 
the victor of naval warfare (Kipp 2009; Grygiel 2012). Although civilian ports and vessels were 
mostly ruled out from direct participation of naval missions – except in extreme situations like 
Operation Dynamo in Dunkirk in 1940, civilian maritime facilities remained crucial in 
supporting naval operations and developed one’s sea power. An extensive civilian port network 
could allow effective replenishment of normal and specialised “consumables” through an 
effective and extensive purchase and logistic network of the required “consumables” all around 
the world. A good civilian port, as an natural hub of regional and global flows of people, goods 
and capital, was also a natural spot to collect intelligence and maintain good communication 
with allies in the region. The profit generated from maritime trade was always essential to 
support powerful navies. But most importantly, an extensive and well-functioned civilian port 
system always implied that both the government and the population were committed to take the 
oceans and maritime activities seriously, which was an essential condition to build one’s sea 
power according to Mahan. 
The third level of the importance of ports was the discursive level, i.e. the meaning of an 
extensive and effective port/base system and the messages being sent out to the rest of the world. 
Geostrategists commonly agreed that the “political use of sea power” (Luttwak 1974; Le Mière 
2014) was grounded at an extensive port/base system which helped to translate “naval 
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capabilities to political influence.” (Grygiel 2012:29) For example, a message of friendship and 
alliance could be constructed through goodwill visits to civilian ports, regular naval port calls 
and exercises, or even a land lease to an ally for building a naval base in her sovereign territory. 
On the contrary, the construction of specific naval bases with nuclear missiles, artillery facilities 
or submarines that could support direct naval and aerial combat in the region, could also be 
regarded a warning to any potential competitor in the region. Bluntly put by Grygiel (2012:29), 
states were “reluctant to ally themselves with, and open ports to, a power that has limited ability 
to provide naval protection.” An extensive network of overseas naval bases provided an image 
of strong naval capacity and enduring naval presence to the rest of the world, and such an image 
could become a critical push factor for a state in picking her future ally for better security or 
economic cooperation (Grygiel 2012; Harkavy 2007). 
The construction of civilian ports might be perceived less political and diplomatic sensitive, yet 
these overseas projects were still a good indicator of one’s diplomatic strength and its 
relationship with third-party states. The extreme form of overseas civilian port construction, i.e. 
through direct colonisation or forced treaties, was no more than a naked message to the world 
about its naval capacity and military strength. During the age of European imperialism, 
overseas colonies were both economic assets for homeland economic development and political 
bargaining chips for political gains or diplomatic trade-off. The rise and fall of one’s possession 
of colonies in Latin America, Africa and China served as an indicator of the rise and fall of its 
power status in Europe, and vice versa. On the other hand, taking the recent BRI as an example, 
it was viewed as a new kind of “economic diplomacy” (Barston 2006) to exert influence over 
developing countries and a civilian blue-water strategy without direct confrontation with the 
status-quo maritime power, i.e. the United States (Marantidou 2014; Zhou 2014; Singh 2015). 
Indian strategist Abhijit Singh (2015), by citing the docking of Chinese submarines at Colombo 
South Container Terminal (CSCT), argued that commercial facilities invested and owned by 
Chinese state-owned enterprises were readily to become a military base through four steps: 1) 
huge loans were awarded to smaller coastal and islands states; (2) waited for the beneficiary for 
its loan defection; (3) offered waiver or relief in exchange of the right to a few berths or facilities 
and (4) establishe48eterritoriinfrastructure and replenishment centres at those commercial 
berths (Singh 2015:295). Civilian ports, therefore, remained strategically important in 
contemporary international politics. In fact, many states had followed Beijing’s BRI and 
formulated their own version of civilian port investment, such as the Asia-Africa Growth 
Corridor jointly suggested by Japan and India, or the Connecting Europe and Asia initiative 
suggested by the European Union. Civilian ports, similar to naval bases, became both 
geopolitical assets and battlefield in contemporary international politics. 
Port as an Economic-Cultural Challenge to One’s Sovereignty 
While the geopolitical and strategic perspective viewed the domination of port system as an 
indispensable part of one’s hegemonic domination and a battlefield of maritime control in a 
region, another perspective, rooted in traditional port studies and social theory, viewed port as 
an economic and cultural hub that benefited and challenged state development and sovereignty. 
After all, both naval bases and civilian ports, despite in different mechanisms, could serve as 
main sites of interactions between local communities and foreigners. In the case of naval bases, 
a recent paper published by American Security Project (Wallin 2015) reminded the government 
that overseas ports and bases were the frontiers where US officers interacted with local 
populations. While port calls or home-porting was an essential part of military public diplomacy, 
the white paper also highlighted that the military should address localised concerns and craft 
an appropriate message so that an enduring relationship could be built between the bases, 
representing the image of the US, and local communities (ibid.).  
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In the case of civilian ports, the impact was more subtle as the embedded multidimensional 
interactions with foreign communities might change the social characters of a civilian port, 
turning the port socially different from its sovereign host. In fact, one kind of critics against 
Beijing’s BRI was that the economic investment allowed Beijing to build “places with Chinese 
characteristics” (Marantidou 2014:9) in those BRI-related countries. Especially for those 
developing countries in Asia and Africa, or Southern and Eastern European countries suffered 
from the debt crisis and EU-IMF austerity plan, Chinese hot money seemed to be a viable source 
of foreign direct investment to solve their financial problems or fund their infrastructural proj–
cts (ibid:20 - 21). By active promotion of the BRI investment, either in forms of official 
developmental aids or “private” capital projects initiated by state-owned enterprises, Beijing 
could leverage on her economic strength to expand her influence and improve her images in 
those countries concerned. 
The mechanism suggested above looked nothing new, as it was exactly the logic of structural 
European foreign policy (Keukeleire 2003; Keukeleire, Thiers and Justaert 2009; Keukeleire 
and Justaert 2012; Keukeleire and Delreux 2015) or the thesis of civilian and normative power 
Europe (Duchêne 1973; Bull 1982; Hill 1990; Maull 1990; Manners 2000; 2002; 2006a; 2006b). 
It did not have any geographical implication nor spatial sensitivity. However, the recent BRI 
projects and the responses made by other states highlighted the neglected, if not ignored, spatial 
sensitivity of this kind of investment. In fact, the spatial characteristics, the socio-cultural 
hybridity embedded, and the economic importance of civilian ports made them an ideal site to 
perform structural foreign policy or exercise civilian/normative power. 
While the rapid development of high-speed railway and aerial transportation had increased the 
connectivity of inland cities to the rest of the world, ports and coastal cities were always the 
nodes between sovereign territory and the outside world. They were also made to receive “the 
Others”, no matter in forms of goods, capital, people or even knowledge, in a rather everyday 
and permanent manner. To make a (good) civilian port, the “Self” was obliged to receive and 
adapt the existence of “the Others” in the port. In other words, the unobstructed flows of foreign 
goods, people capital and knowledge could be easily “offloaded” at the port, and the local 
community was “forced” to deal with these foreign objects and socialise with foreign ideas. 
The spatial character of civilian ports, therefore, provided an excellent platform for foreign 
actors to exert influence to local community or even the central government. The mechanism 
was twofold: by the creation of socio-cultural hybridity at ports that challenged the sovereign 
narration, and by the economic leverage that lured the central government to accept foreign 
rules and institutions. 
Nation-states might be differed among themselves in terms of political institutions, regulatory 
regimes or political culture, yet they all shared two political concepts, namely “sovereignty” 
and “nations”, as well as the perceived importance of state-building and nation-building in their 
everyday politics. As Grillo (1998) pointed out, the key concept of nation-state was the idea of 
homogeneity and uniformity, which aimed to rule out any possibility of having “a nation within 
a nation” (ibid:125). Even for states which embraced multiculturalism and ethnic diversity such 
as Canada or Australia, there were always some fundamental rules and values which were 
shared among the members of the nation, defined as the founding virtue of the nation, observed 
and implemented by the government through its policies. Taking Canada as an example, the 
(pan-)Canadian nationalism was defined two cultural-political ideas: the bi-cultural model that 
linked the French-Canadian and English-Canadian communities, and the liberal individualist 
ideology in political and economic activities, regardless of which political parties were in power, 
(Ives 2018). In countries that embraced a “melting pot” strategy such as France, locally-born 
ethnic minorities or immigrants were supposed to abandon their traditional social values, beliefs 
and obligations in public space, so as to become an “essential” subject of the nation. Despite 
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the criticism of cultural and religious discrimination, the French legislation against any 
religious symbols from schools was regarded as a means to promote secularity, an important 
element of contemporary French nationalism. Instead of a Weberian understanding of 
sovereignty which focused on the monopolisation of the legitimate use of physical violence, 
sovereignty could also be understood as a kind of Foucauldian Power-Knowledge concept 
which sovereign was a kind of power to dominate the narration of state apparatus and 
nationality. Cathryn Clayton (2009) further defined this narration as a kind of “story of 
sovereignty” that telling “themselves about themselves in relation to others.” (Ibid:8) This 
“story” usually included the interpretation of national past, political values and social culture. 
From Clayton’s perspective, legitimacy crisis of one state and the failure of sovereign power 
could arise not just when people start to imagine a different sovereign but a different story of 
sovereignty (Ibid:12). As a result, sovereign state would try her best to dominate the “story of 
sovereignty”, usually through controlling the socialisation process of the community against 
the “story”. The domination included the exhibition of “authentic” national history, the 
standardisation of value education at every stage of schooling, and the suppression of 
“alternated” or “subjugated” knowledge against the nation and nationality. 
The spatial character of civilian ports, which bridged the sovereign territory to foreign maritime 
space, therefore fundamentally contradicted to sovereign states’ insistence of homogeneity and 
uniformity in nation-building and state-building. Not only were the ports connected to the 
maritime “space of flows”, but also served as “hubs in dense network of maritime connections 
through which people, goods, ideas and meaning flowed.” (Driessen 2005:129 – 130) 
Compared to non-port cities or non-coastal territory of a nation-state, ports, especially civilian 
ports, were embedded to the world system owing to the frequent transactions of local and 
foreign goods/capital, multi-directional movement of local people and foreigners and unfettered 
interactions between local and foreign ideas. As a result, unidirectional and top-down flows of 
influence by the state on the story or imagination of the nation were a kind of luxury at port 
space, as it was consistently exposed to the foreland and maritime space attached to the ports. 
Given the tension between the nature of sovereign state, which always demanded homogeneity 
and uniformity in “the Self”, and the sociocultural characteristics of (good) civilian ports, which 
must be continuously affected by “the Others”, civilian ports were always a kind of contested 
political space and both local and foreign diplomatic actors. The nature of civilian ports as a 
designated socio-cultural hybrid, therefore, had opened up the possibility of non-naval and non-
military port diplomacy, which allowed foreign diplomatic actors to challenge the “story of 
sovereignty” through daily and routine economic and cultural exchange. The everyday 
socialisation in ports involved both local knowledge as well as foreign institutions. Members 
of the nation on one hand was exposed to top-down socialisation prepared by the state on the 
story of “the Self”, on the other hand exposed to the story of “the Others” which could possibly 
challenge the “official” story of the “imagined community” (Anderson 1992). Especially if the 
discrepancy of practice or institutions between “the Self” and “the Others” was huge or even 
incompatible, the “cultural shock” received by the members of port community could always 
become a threat to the “story of sovereignty”, especially in terms of the narration of worldview 
and relations to “the Others”. The threat could turn to an extreme case when the port 
communities created a different narration about the nation or identified themselves as a new 
nation. The nightmare of “a nation within a nation” became a reality and the sovereign 
government would be exposed to a fundamental legitimacy crisis within the members of the 
port community concerned (Grillo 1998:125; see also Clayton 2009:12). 
Apart from the socio-cultural challenges against the “story of sovereignty”, a good civilian port 
was also a double-edged sword against one’s economic stability thus sovereign autonomy. 
While good civilian ports could always bring the sovereign host with massive economic 
benefits in terms of foreign commodities, direct investment, or expatriates in key industries or 
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services, the extensive and semi-permanent presence of these materialistic factors also provided 
adequate economic incentives for foreign states to leverage against the sovereign host through 
civilian ports. Compared to inland cities or cities with lesser degree of foreign exposure, civilian 
ports were well embedded in the global economic system, and the life and death of port 
economy was highly dependent on the continuous usage of the port facilities and the extended 
services. As a result, foreign nation-states, major foreign chambers of commerce, or even 
individual conglomerates would always perceive themselves, sometimes even being recognised 
by the sovereign host of the civilian ports, as major stakeholders in political and economic 
development of the ports. This position, or feeling, of being a stakeholder in port politics and 
economy, might naturally be spill-over to regional or even national level of political and 
economic development, especially if the foreign states had extensive economic interests at the 
ports concerned. When the sovereign host of the ports was in good terms with foreign states, 
the extensive and semi-permanent network could generate commercial synergy and mutual 
cultural enrichment that benefited both parties. However, when the sovereign host was in bad 
terms with foreign states, the deep-rooted foreign network and substantial materialistic interests 
could always be a diplomatic weapon to challenge the economic security of the sovereign host. 
Given the high sensitivity of port economy in relation to global economy, commodity 
transactions and direct foreign investment, citizens at civilian port were highly vulnerable to 
foreign commercial boycott and fluctuations in national and global economy. In this case, the 
economic leverage embedded in civilian ports could be “weaponised” as a challenge against 
state’s legitimacy which was rooted in effective state capacity and bringing economic 
prosperity. 
In fact, the maritime space was long regarded as a “security” threat in Europe and China. For 
instance, the Vikings and Japanese pirates (wako) were never welcomed by the continental 
European states and the imperial China respectively. However, the main threats being mostly 
discussed were about territorial invasions from the seas and induced unrests at the coastal 
regions. Given the two dimensions of security challenges stated above, it seemed that a 
possession of good civilian ports was always risky and brought more harm than good to state’s 
nation-building and state-building process. Nonetheless, it should also be emphasised that these 
threats and challenges could always turn to opportunities as well for the sovereign host of 
civilian ports. The extensive economic interests, the semi-permanent existence of foreign 
communities, and the socio-cultural exchange at civilian ports could also be utilised by the 
sovereign host to impact foreign states which were embedded in the civilian ports. For example, 
the sovereign host could also take advantage of the massive economic interests at ports to lure 
the chambers of commerce or individual conglomerates against their sovereign government. 
Civilian ports, therefore, could serve as an important place to initiate the “boomerang pattern” 
(Keck and Sikkink 1999:93) of transnational advocacy, as both the sovereign host and foreign 
actors, after all, were already forced to interact with each other owing to the spatial character 
of a civilian port. In addition to economic interdependence, the sovereign host of a civilian port 
could also present her “soft power” directly to foreign audience through extensive socio-
cultural interactions between the local port community and the foreign community. The closer 
proximity with foreigners at port could provide the sovereign government a feasible, well-
established and direct communication channel, and the sovereign host could give the foreign 
communities at port a lively experience of her cultural and institutional attractiveness. In 
addition, Kokot (2009:10) reminded us that port cities had always “triggered a wide range of 
imaginations and projections, blending fantasies of freedom and faraway places with images of 
danger and moral decay.” The socio-cultural hybridity might on one hand challenge the 
narrations of sovereignty, the “images of danger and moral decay” might also trigger crisis-
driven nationalism and stereotypes over foreign influence, turning the societal security threats 
to opportunities to strengthen the “story of sovereignty”. Brining back to the spatial perspective 
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of port, a civilian port started with an absolute space of where sovereign territory connected 
with maritime space, a social space of where the locals connected with the foreigners, and an 
abstract space of which both local and foreign authorities contested for materialistic gain and 
ideational influence. The nature of port as an economic-cultural hub provided a double-edged 
sword for domestic and foreign diplomatic actors to leverage their diplomatic influence and 
foreign policy objectives against each other, giving the theoretical backdrop of the thesis. 
Ports as both Active and Passive Agency in Global Political Economy: From Global 
Cities Thesis to The Potential Role of Civilian Port  
If the first approach treated civilian ports as instrumental asset to one’s naval power and the 
second approach treated civilian ports as threats to one’s economic and social security, the third 
approach mentioned here treated ports as active and passive agents in international politics and 
global political economy. Despite the difference, the first and the second approach treated ports 
as a static concept which did not contribute any form of agency or shaping the actions of the 
actors. Such conceptualisation on the role of port in international relations and global political 
economy was rather inevitable, given the general inattentional blindness on space and non-state 
actors in traditional scholarship of international relations. 
The study of non-state actors in international relations and foreign policy was not entirely new. 
For instance, the idea of paradiplomacy was first introduced in mid-1980s and became a 
growing discipline in the study of international politics and foreign policy (Duchacek 1984; 
Duchacek, Latouche and Stevenson 1988; Keating 1997; Aldecoa and Keating 1999; Kuzentov 
2015). While the framework of “paradiplomacy” may offer a helping hand in capture the 
potential actorness of the European Union and civilian ports, it was never adequate to capture 
the special role of civilian ports in international politics, especially when contemporary civilian 
ports were serving the nodes of civilian activities conducted by local, national and foreign actors. 
Such inadequacy could be compensated by the “actor-network theory” (ANT) and the idea of 
global city in urban studies and sociology (Sassen 1991; R. G. Smith 2003; Acuto 2013). 
The concept of global city was both an old and a new subject in urban studies. A similar concept, 
the world city, was first introduced by Peter Hall (1966). From Hall’s perspective, a world city 
is an amalgam of various centres: it was the political centre encompassing major national, 
international, transnational and multinational institutions; it was the trade centre encompassing 
both imports and exports through maritime, land and aerial routes; a leading banking, financial 
and professional service centre encompassing the production, accumulation and transition of 
monetary and human capital; a consumption and entertainment centre encompassing the 
production, preservation and consumption of material goods and cultural heritage (Hall 1966:7 
– 8). Hall’s idea of world city had already implied the importance of “world city” in 
international relations and global political economy, as it was a place that “channelled 
international forces and interests towards national interest” (Brenner and Keil 2006:20). Hall’s 
idea was further developed and differentiated by Saskia Sassen (1991:2005) who promoted the 
concept of “a global city” instead of simply “a world city”. From Sassen’s perspective, one 
essential characteristic of a global city was that the city would gradually detach from its 
geographical region and became an independent and globalised entity in global political 
economy, for instance the influence of New York and London were far-reaching than the 
physical boundaries of the United States and the United Kingdom. Following Sassen’s idea, 
Calder and Freytas proposed the concept of “global political city” as “a metropolitan area that 
serves as a policy hub, major political diplomatic community, and strategic information 
complex of global import” (Calder and Freytas 2009:94). 
The most sophisticated and comprehensive evaluation of the role of global cities in international 
relations and global political economy was perhaps conducted by Michele Acuto (2013). In his 
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“progressive agenda” (ibid:13) to link global cities and world politics, Acuto (2013) defined 
the potential roles of a global city in international political economy: as a networking actant 
that passively glued various tangible and intangible (infra-)structures and different levels of 
governance under the spatial and political domain of a the global city; as a networking actor; 
as a networking actor that actively utilised its internal capacity and took proactive actions to 
link up different actors from NGOs to IGOs, for the sake of its domestic and global agenda; as 
a networking network that brought different actor-networks together and developed global 
influence through positive synergy and spill-over effect among global cities and the actors-
networks created and developed by each global city. From Acuto’s perspective (2013; see also 
Acuto and Rayner 2016), the key influence of global city in international politics and global 
political economy was the power of network-making and the potential transformation of 
“political action to concrete socio-technical structures ‘on the ground’” (Acuto and Rayner 
2016:1163; Bulkeley and Castan Broto 2013). 
Although Acuto’s primary focus was “city” instead of “port”, his thesis on the role of the global 
city in international politics and global political economy was relevant for our evaluation and 
conceptualisation of the role of ports in international relations and global political economy. In 
fact, ports, especially civilian ports, were natural network-makers as in geographical sense, they 
bridged the land and the seas; in economic sense, they connected the economic hinterland and 
economic foreland, in cultural sense, they negotiated “the Self” and “the Others”, and in 
political sense, the national and the international. As a result, the three potential roles suggested 
for global cities could naturally fit in the analysis of the role of ports, in particular civilian ports, 
in international politics and global political economy. A civilian port, based on this theoretical 
framework, served as a networking actant, a networking actor and a networking network in 
international relations and foreign policies. 
Interestingly, the application of Acuto’s thesis to civilian ports was indeed a kind of remedy of 
Acuto’s thesis. Potential criticisms of Acuto’s thesis were the lack of comparability of global 
cities and the clear measurement of city capacity to turn political narration to concrete social-
technical structures. Even Acuto and his colleague agreed that a better understanding of city 
diplomacy could be achieved through the application systematic qualitative comparative 
analysis (Acuto and Rayner 2016:1165). In the field of port studies, however, such criticisms 
were perhaps well-answered as civilian ports were always evaluated by their capacity to 
generate economic and commercial interests as well as their connectivity to local, regional and 
national economic and political entities. For instance, the port-city interface (Ducruet and Lee 
2006; Ducruet 2007) reviewed in Chapter 1 had provided a plausible answer to the above puzzle, 
through the creation of two independent variables, i.e. the concept of centrality (interests and 
institutions generating power) and intermediacy (networking capacity and potentials). The 
organic synthesis of Acuto’s thesis and Ducruet typology, therefore, became the theoretical 
foundation of the thesis in conceptualising the role of civilian port in international politics and 
foreign policies. The theoretical relevancy to EU normative/structural power and port 
diplomacy would be further discussed in next chapter.       
Ports and Port System in Europe and Asia: The Implications of the Difference 
The previous section summarised the potential role of ports in international politics and 
diplomacy from the geopolitical lens and economic-cultural lens: 1) the domination of naval 
and civilian port system was an essential step to attain global hegemony; 2) the high degree of 
interdependence in port economy gave both the sovereign host of a civilian port and foreign 
stakeholders to leverage against each other; and 3) the semi-permanent presence of “the Others 
as both a threat and opportunity to all diplomatic actors to achieve their goals. However, these 
characteristics did not automatically translate to diplomatic resources or political spill-over 
effect. Rather, since the hybrid nature of civilian ports also implied the persistence of socio-
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cultural characteristics of both local and foreign communities. The role of civilian ports and 
port diplomacy, in addition to “actor-dependence”, should also be “geography-dependence”. 
While the individual level of port geography would be addressed by empirical cases in later 
chapters, this section would focus on the systematic level of port geography in Europe and Asia, 
as well as the respective concept of sea power.  
European Port System and the Concept of Sea Power 
While some scholars had drawn analogy between Asian maritime system and European 
maritime system such as the Asian Mediterranean thesis suggested by Francois Gipouloux 
(2011), it was commonly believed that the European maritime system was built around two 
maritime ecological system: the Mediterranean system which was dominated by the Republic 
of Venice and the Republic of Genova in 13th century and the Baltic and North Sea system that 
was tightly controlled by the Hanseatic League in 14th century. Although the two maritime 
systems were different in terms of geographical position and the ways of domination, there 
were one common feature shared between these two maritime systems, i.e. the intertwined 
nature of naval and civilian dimension of ports. The Hanseatic League, for instance, was an 
economic-military alliance of free imperial port-cities, which each member of the league indeed 
waged her own mercenaries and navies to protect her political and business interests in the 
region. The very first motivation of raising her own armies and navies at ports might be a 
response against piracy at seas or raids from the hinterland, yet the powerful navies and 
mercenaries at port-cities became essential diplomatic resources in the expansion of Hanseatic 
League in 14th and 15th century. The victory in the Second Danish-Hanseatic War and the 
Hanseatic League and the resulted Treaty of Stralsund which gave the League a monopoly of 
free fish trade in the Baltic region, could be viewed as an example of how the strong navy 
translate to civilian domination of the maritime trade. As a result, the Hanseatic port system 
indeed was a port system of which every port-city of the League was both a naval base where 
the navies and mercenaries were stationed and prepared for potential hostilities, and a civilian 
port where commodities produced from different hinterlands were traded at the port market. 
The Hanseatic port system was therefore both naval and civilian. A similar port system was 
also found in the domination of Mediterranean region by the Republic of Venice, which nearly 
possessed exclusive control over the Adriatic Sea and the larger Mediterranean region (Lane 
1973). According to Lane (1973) and Harkavy (2007), the Venetian port system outside the 
Adriatic Sea was developed after the 13th century, built along the two main Venetian trading 
routes of Venetian, i.e. the “Romania” route and the “Beyond-the-Sea” route (Harkavy 
2007:35). As discussed by Peter Padfield (1979:4), the Venetian port system indeed was a 
combination of the functions of naval bases and entrepots. “Colonies” like Constantinople and 
Acre had “considerable industrial and commercial infrastructure”, and in Crete and Romania 
the Venetians got merchandize like grains, oil, wine, raw silk, alum, wax, etc (Harkavy 2007:35 
– 36). 
The inseparable nature of naval bases and commercial ports, to some extent, was due to the 
nature of maritime security and naval technology in Medieval Europe. First of all, before the 
birth of the doctrine of “freedom of navigation” and “freedom at high seas” proposed by Hugo 
Grotius, it was rather difficult to differentiate naval activities from civilian activities. For 
instance, commercial raiding and “state-sponsored” pirate acts over enemies’ commercial ships 
were accepted as a “normal” practice during the Medieval Age. There was literally no 
distinction between commercial fleets and naval ships as every fleet was designed to carry both 
goods for trade and cannons for combat. As a result, a good civilian port would be well-
equipped with mercenaries for “naval” services, shipyards and dry docks for shipbuilding and 
maintenance, and arsenals for weapons production and installation to “civilian” fleets. The 
second reason for the inseparable nature of naval bases and commercial ports in Medieval 
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Europe was that the technological limitation of the galley-based fleets commonly used in 
Medieval Europe. As John Guilmartin (1974) suggested in his work Gunpowder and Galleys, 
the “full command of the sea” maritime control suggested by Mahan was never an achievable 
stage in the earlier Mediterranean maritime system, as the speed of the fleets, the high demand 
of manpower and storage spaces for crew’s need limited the effectiveness of far-edged power 
projection. The maritime competition at seas in the Mediterranean region, Guilmartin so argued, 
was a mere “symbolic relationship between the seaside fortress, more particularly the fortified 
port, and the war galley.” (Guilmartin 1974:96; cited in Harkavy 2007:41) At diplomatic front, 
the ownership and the contestation of the Mediterranean ports reflected the polarity of European 
politics, which had switched from the competition between Venice and Genoa, to the 
competition between the Spanish and Ottoman Empire in later time. The technological 
limitations steered early development of European port system into a combination of military 
bases and commercial ports. The lack of mobility and the heavy demand of logistics and 
manpower support in blue-sea expedition also left the states with no choice but to station 
forward-based fleets over its overseas colonies, in order to maintain control over the particular 
maritime space and trading posts. 
The intertwined relation between military and economic functions of a port was furthered 
carried by Portugal, the first global maritime empire, in her overseas port system development. 
While Zheng He, the envoy representing the Ming court to Indian Ocean, had made huge power 
projection in Southeast Asia, Indian subcontinent and the East coast of Africa, it was the 
Portuguese who successfully maintained a rather permanent presence in the region through 
overseas port colonies and stationed fleets. The Portuguese Empire might be benefited from the 
lack of willingness and incentives of Ming court to continue her maritime domination in the 
region, yet the role of Portuguese port system, which was modelled from the Venetian system, 
should never be neglected in her way to global maritime domination. Instead of travelling back 
and forth to Lisbon, the Portuguese merchants developed overseas shipbuilding sites in Goa 
and Malacca such that ships could be built and repaired directly in overseas ports (Glete 2000; 
Padfield 1979; Harkavy 2007). This arrangement indeed built a solid foundation to strength 
Portugal’s capacity for long-range naval power projection. In terms of the characteristics of the 
Portuguese port colonies, economic activities indeed prevailed in overseas ports. For instance, 
many trading posts and colonies in Brazil, East Africa and India were Portuguese feitoria 
(factories), and entrepots in West Africa were slavery trading stations for European countries. 
Commercial activities and economic incentives, rather than exclusive naval domination, 
became an important motor of Portuguese maritime expansion. In the case of East Asia trading 
network, the Portuguese Empire made diplomatic treaties with the Ming court and Japanese 
Shogunate for exclusive trading and settlement rights, rather than direct colonisation of the port 
concerned (Macao and Nagasaki). In fact, naval historians like Boxer (1969) and Padfield (1979) 
suggested that in Portuguese maritime expansion, the use of naval forces played a limited role 
in overseas port acquisition and expansion of trading network. 
If the Portuguese port system was characterised as a global network of overseas production 
houses and trading hubs which were acquired through primary diplomatic means, her Spanish 
counterpart was characterised as a global maritime network of military domination and trade 
routes. The main difference between Portugal and Spain was twofold. First, Portugal did not 
compete for maritime domination in the Mediterranean region but whereas the Spanish Empire 
had fought with the Ottoman Empire for the control over the Mediterranean Sea and bases, so 
naval power was crucial for the Spanish Empire to maintain her maritime control in 
Mediterranean Sea. Second, the expansion of Portuguese seaborne empire had to face the 
resistance from Arabs, Indian and Chinese communities, whereas for the Spanish the resistance 
came from culture-rich yet military-inferior Inca, Aztec and Mayan Empire (Parry 1949; cited 
in Harkavy 2007:48). The difference in terms of resistance resulted in a huge landmass was 
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occupied by Spanish in Latin America and Philippines, where natural resources and luxury 
precious metals were in abundance. As Harkavy put it, “in Spain’s case, convoying of the silver 
flota was the be-all and end-all of its navy’s functions.” (Harkavy 2007:49) From this 
perspective, warships and civilian ships became more differentiable as the Spanish Empire 
could now afford naval ships which were specialised for combat and protecting the civilian 
ships, while the civilian ships were also specialised to carry maximum tonnage of natural 
resources and precious metal extracted from South America and Philippines. The Spanish 
overseas civilian ports might still keep the dual function of serving commercial fleets and naval 
ships, but they were no longer production houses for commodities. Instead, their primary 
function was to serve as nodal points connecting monopolised trade routes with adequate 
logistics support. 
Proposed by Wallenstein (1984), the Dutch seaborne empire was the first (second according to 
Modelski and Thompson) global hegemony. However, the port system was slightly different 
from both the Portuguese system, which focused on overseas production houses and 
shipbuilding at port, and the Spanish system, which focused on the trade routes across the 
Atlantic Ocean. Except for Java and Malacca, the two major Dutch colonies in Southeast Asia, 
Dutch permanent presence was rather limited at port especially in Africa, a continent critical to  
the maritime routes connecting Europe and Asia. Rather, the advanced shipbuilding technology 
(the Fluyt) had given the Dutch comparative advantages, and massive naval and commercial 
fleets were produced. The effectiveness of the Fluyt in terms of capacity and the lesser demand 
on manpower also allowed the Dutch merchants to opt for transoceanic trade, with fewer 
supports along the East African coastal outposts. The main innovation of the Dutch seaborne 
empire, therefore, was the management of overseas ports and maritime power. While Portugal 
and Spain relied on bureaucratic support and administrative personnel such as the creation of 
colonial governors in Brazil or Caribbean islands, the Dutch imperial court delegated such 
administrative power and duties to state-chartered companies, i.e. the United East Indian 
Company (VOC) and the Dutch West India Companies (GWC). It was not new to Europe to 
“empower” civilians or private sectors for the sake of maritime security and sea power project, 
for example the contribution from the private navies at Cinque Ports to English sea power and 
maritime trade during the 13th century was well-studied by Roskill (1962). However, the VOC 
was the first European company empowered as with a “quasi-state” status, from the recruitment 
of mercenaries and building forts to protect the trading posts, to waging wars against foreign 
invaders and concluding treaties with local rulers. With the establishment of VOC, and the 
subsequent GWC, as the white gloves of the Dutch Royal Family, the port system in Asia and 
that in the Caribbean were separately managed by “private companies” which overseas 
presence was maintained in a minimal public spending. The VOC and its European successors, 
become the first generation of civilian sea power which relied on the monopoly of commodity 
trade and trade routes for its survival. 
With the outbreak of First Anglo-Dutch War and the conclusion of the Treaty of Westminster, 
the domination of Dutch sea power was slowly transferred to the British which eventually 
created a long reign of maritime hegemony until the First World War. The British Empire was 
also the first European state to “confirm” the Mahanian proposition of the importance of the 
“command of sea” in building a global empire, as the technology enjoyed by British fleets and 
naval infrastructure built by London and the East Indian Company allowed a rather permanent 
presence of British naval power in the world. Following Thompson’s idea of system leader 
lineage (Thompson 2001), the British port system and her overseas network incorporated the 
merits of Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands: the British Empire inherited strategic ports in 
India and Southeast Asia from the Dutch and the Portuguese, while expanded her control to 
inland territories such as the establishment of the British Raj and British Malaya; while the 
British merchants gained huge wealth from Asia-Europe trade, commodities were also 
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produced and exported in landmass colonies like India (for example the tea and cotton industry); 
the EIC, though established earlier than VOC, acquired the “quasi-state” status in late 17th 
century which was eventually being perceived as a threat to London; the British acquisition of 
colonies combined the direct use of forces and “gunboat diplomacy”, and the subsequent 
management of the ports combined both British direct rule (the Crown Colony) and indirect 
rule (India). 
As the last European maritime empire, the British Empire contributed to the development of 
port system and the perception of sea power in following aspects. Firstly, the port choice/colony 
choice was no longer defined by its economic potentials but mainly its strategic values, i.e. the 
protection of sea lines of communication. Most of the Crown Colonies like Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Ceylon, Aden and Gibraltar, were located at the strategic nodes of British sea lines 
of communication, which and some of them continued to shine nowadays. The very naval mind 
set in port choice, especially in the case of China, could be best reflected by picking Hong Kong 
rather than Zhoushan as the first British port in China. Secondly, the economic and military 
functions were no longer intertwined but specialised naval facilities were established such as 
permanent coaling stations along important maritime routes. Though some of the ports like 
Hong Kong and Singapore were equipped with naval facilities and dockyards, the continuous 
professionalisation of navy and naval facilities made naval fleets and their construction and 
repair being separated from commercial fleets. The naval presence, supported by those strategic 
nodes and extensive coaling stations, served as the protection and performance of gunboat 
diplomacy, but not for economic activities. Thirdly, and perhaps the most important one, the 
British Empire had introduced the European-styled treaty port system in Asia, in order to 
facilitate free-trade thus British economic gains in East Asia. The treaty port system on one 
hand served as the diplomatic success of British Empire in opening up the Chinese soil, on the 
other hand, the treaty port system introduced European concepts like free-trade and 
extraterritoriality in the Asian region, to some extent destruct the original tributary system. 
Hobson and Kristiansen (2012) summarised the characteristics of European waters as follows: 
the European waters are rich in resources and were once vital for many coastal states in terms 
of fishery and domestic and intra-European trade; the intra-European trade routes were also 
vital for supporting transoceanic voyage and growing colonial powers; the European waters 
were confined in terms of actual maritime space and surrounded by small countries, secondary 
and great powers (Hobson and Kristiansen 2012:9 – 10). As a result, before the WWII, the 
European waters were characterised as a closed-system which small maritime states were 
trapped into the international structure of which great powers competed for the domination at 
land and/or sea, for example Spain versus Ottoman Empire, France versus Austria/Germany, 
Britain versus Spain/the Netherlands/France/Austria/Germany (Ibid:10). Smaller maritime 
states were having no choice but either forming politico-military alliance to balance the 
influence of great powers, or pursuing international laws to protect the vital maritime interests. 
The former strategy was well-represented by the initiation of the two League of Armed 
Neutrality by Catherine II of Russia during the American War of Independence and Paul I of 
Russia during the Napoleonic War, which both of them aimed to balance against British naval 
wartime policy. The latter strategy was represented by the establishment of international 
maritime laws whose primary objective was to protect their neutral rights and freedom of 
navigation against the exercise of belligerent rights by the great powers. Examples of such 
included the conclusion of the Declaration of Paris in 1856, the two peace conferences held in 
The Hague in 1899 and 1907, and the London Conference in 1908/1909.  Although during 
wartime European great powers had always challenged the maritime laws and opted for violent 
naval strategy against civilian ships, a rather ordered maritime system with international laws 
was established in European waters. Compared to other maritime space like that in Asian, the 
European port system was highly engaged to two different yet interlinked discourses in 
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international politics: the balance of (political) power and the respect of institutionalised 
international law. These two characteristics, unsurprisingly, were exported to the Asian waters 
through overseas expedition and colonisation, and further stabilised by the British and 
American hegemony. 
The outbreak of WWII not only dethroned European leadership in the world but also 
fundamentally reshaped contemporary European geopolitics. European states, after two 
successive deactivating devastating wars, could never go for global leadership again, and opted 
for economic cooperation rather than military competition. The European Coal and Steel 
Community, and its successor the European Union, created the single market for commodities 
and services. The removal of transportation barriers literally made the whole European 
continent as one hinterland for European ports. Such a geo-economic change, as different 
research works suggested (Ducruet and Jeong 2005; Lee, Song and Ducruet 2008), 
differentiated the European port system from the rest of the world. For example, ports situated 
along the European coastal lines were genuine “European port” rather than “ports of a nation”, 
as all of them were literally serving the European market rather than specific national 
economies. Owing to a massive inland European market, port functions were specialised in 
Europe, usually serving as the gateway of inland European megalopolis. The clear separation 
between inland market (economic and commercial activities) and coastal ports (port service 
activities and port community) defined hinterland-port-foreland relations which the hinterland 
was less depended on specific ports but heavily focused on hinterland-port transportation, thus 
limited the diversification of urban functions in coastal cities. (Lee, Song and Ducruet 
2008:374).  
Putting into the context of port diplomacy, the characteristics of European waters and port 
system partially explained the form of port diplomacy in the past and present day. In the past, 
owing to the extensive balance of power and the respect of maritime institutions, individual and 
pin-pointed port diplomacy was seldom an option. Any diplomatic action at port could 
potentially trigger a series of (uncontrollable) counteraction under the practice of the balance 
of power. Maritime environment thus port diplomacy was therefore governed at European level 
such as the formation of European soft rules through multilateral negotiation. As a result, the 
European waters formed a close-system which could only be exported to the rest of the world, 
but not changed by individual European state or any outsider through port and maritime 
diplomacy. In present days, however, the decline of European dominance allowed non-naval 
port diplomacy to enter the European waters, for instance the BRI investment in Greece and 
Italy. The strengthened economic integration at European level also provided a valuable 
opportunity for a diplomatic gamble: the weakened economic leverage effect at individual port 
level versus the strengthened economic leverage effect at European level if port diplomacy 
could succeed and make an impact to an EU Member State. On the other hand, in the eyes of 
Brussels, the European maritime diplomacy began to take shape and export its model of 
maritime governance from near Mediterranean to the rest of the world, through naval and non-
naval means (Germond 2015). Port diplomacy, as an integral part of maritime diplomacy, could 
always be a potential option for the European Union to achieve its diplomatic objective. 
Asian Port System and the Perception of Sea Power 
Despite the narration of the Asian Mediterranean, Asian waters and Asian port system were 
different from the European counterpart, at least before the arrival of European colonisers. The 
South China Sea, despite its huge volume of maritime traffics and severe competition of 
resources and naval control, had little similarities with Mediterranean Sea. The two 
characteristics of European waters, i.e. the balance of (political) power and the respect of 
institutionalised international law, were lacking the Asian waters. Therefore, this section would 
offer a short review on the characteristics of Asian waters and Asian port system – or to be 
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precise the Sino-centric maritime system. 
In fact, the term Asian waters had always been a contested concept owing to the huge landmass 
of the Eurasian continent. Geographically speaking, the “Asian” waters should cover from the 
Sea of Okhotsk to Arabic Sea. Nonetheless, in terms of geopolitics, the maritime Asia was 
commonly referred to “the eastern coast of the Eurasian continent” (Hamashita 2003:17). Based 
on such definition, the Asian waters covered Sea of Okhotsk, Sea of Japan, Yellow Sea, East 
and South China Sea, and then is separated into two sub-branches: on the east the chain extends 
from Sulu Sea to Celebes, Arafura, Coral and ends at Tasman; on the west the maritime chain 
connect the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean through Java Sea and the Strait of Mal–cca 
(Ibid:17 - 18). Following the same token, the Asian port system only covered ports located in 
the East Asia and Southeast Asia, but did not extend to South Asia (the Indian Ocean) and 
Middle East (the Arabic Sea), which belonged to another important maritime region in 
geopolitics and maritime studies. The segregation of the Asian maritime space might be 
arbitrary, yet the political implication was huge. Under this definition of Asian waters, the Asian 
port system was essentially Sino-centric, which the imperial China had dominated both naval 
and civilian aspects of the maritime system prior to the arrival of European navies (Arrighi, 
Hamashita and Selden 2003:8). While the thesis acknowledged the political implication behind 
this definition of Asian waters, the concept was largely useful as the primary focus of the thesis 
concerned about European port diplomacy against China in the past and present. 
By adopting this definition, there were already two crucial differences between the Asian 
maritime system and that in Europe: the lack of balance of (political) power in Asian waters in 
the past, and the lack of institutionalised consensus in present days. Compared to the European 
maritime system which consisted of both bipolar (the balance of (political) power) and 
multipolar (the international maritime law) element, the Asian waters were a unipolar system 
which was dominated by the imperial China, and became multipolar after the arrival of 
European navies and the scattered colonisation in the region13. Unlike their counterparts in the 
European waters, Asian coastal states did not trap into an enduring bipolar international system 
and had with little intention to balance against the “Chinese Empire”. Rather, the coastal 
kingdoms were used to bandwagon with the imperial China, under the maritime-tributary 
system and forming separate maritime commercial zones (Hamashita 2003:19). On the contrary, 
while the European maritime system and its governance became more unified owing to the 
establishment of Single European Market and the European Union (Germond 2015), the Asian 
maritime system did not dominate by the rising China, but an “organised anarchy” with 
different stakeholders competing for the command of (a segment of) the sea: China versus Japan 
on the ownership of East China Sea, Japan versus Russia on the ownership of Sea of Okhotsk, 
China versus the ASEAN states on the ownership of South China Sea. In addition, the rise of 
China naval capacity and the economic leverage to her neighbours under the BRI became a 
worrying trend in the eyes of the United States and Europe. On top of scattered competition 
over a segment of Asian maritime space, there was an increasing bipolar, if not multipolar, 
competition of Asian maritime system, for example the Indo-Japanese proposal on building the 
Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), or the Blue Dot Network (BDN) recently proposed by 
the United States. 
The second difference between Asian maritime system and that in Europe was the means of 
 
13 In the case of Southeast Asia, the ownership of civilian ports changed from Portugal to the 
Netherlands and then the Britain in Malay Peninsula. Given the relative domination of British Empire 
in the region, France and the Netherlands remained their strong maritime presence in Southeast Asia 
through their colonies in Vietnam and Indonesia respectively. In the case of East Asia, the “Scramble 
for China” (Bickers 2012) consensus among European powers gave rise of the treaty port system that 
shared by major European powers.  
Bringing the Ports and Port Diplomacy Back-in     60 
 
domination. Compared to European maritime order which the maritime hegemon dominated 
both the naval and civilian dimensions of maritime system, the Asian order was largely built 
on the extensive maritime trade and commercial activities. Renowned historian and sinologist 
John K. Fairbank had once made a comment that navy was “so foreign to Chinese ways” in 
explaining the failure of naval reform during the late Qing Dynasty (Dewenter 1972:739). 
However, the (apparent) lack of naval capacity did not hinder imperial China’s domination of 
the Asian seas. Before the arrival of European navies and civilian vessels, the “Chinese Empire” 
was an undisputed maritime power in the region (Elleman 2009; Lo 2012; Lorge 2002). The 
contradicting perception towards the strength of Chinese navies and maritime power was in 
twofold: first, the deployment of navy was seldom targeted against enemies “overseas” but 
enemies in close range, so that the demand of overseas naval bases were rather limited. For 
instance, even though the technology and weaponry used by Southern Song court were much 
superior to those produced in Europe (Needham 1986; Fairbank and Goldman 2006; Lo 2012), 
the primary objective of naval deployment was to defend the Song court from the invasion of 
Jins and Mongols (Tao 2002; Lo 2012). A similar case was observed in Ming Dynasty which 
the naval forces were deployment against Japanese pirates along the Chinese coastline. Except 
for expedition of Zheng He which combined both the civilian fleets and navies and reached 
Southeast Asia and Indian subcontinent, Chinese naval power did not project outward but 
served as a kind of defence against territorial invasion from the north. As a result, semi-
permanent presence of naval power was lacking and the Chinese navies were being viewed as 
a kind of “coastal guard” instead of true blue-water navy. 
The second reason for this contradiction perception was that Chinese domination of the 
maritime order was built on the tributary system, which was centred at a Sino-centric 
commercial and diplomatic network. Naval resources, therefore, were kept at minimal for the 
sake of commercial and diplomatic gains. For instance, the security threats from the north 
during the Southern Song forced the imperial court to rely on maritime trade to support her 
expenditure, as the tribute-cum-trade missions from land were cut to zero (Lo 2012). Naval 
resources, as previously mentioned, were deployed against the invasion of steppe tribes from 
the north. As a result, much of the maritime effort was placed to the administration of incoming 
maritime trade rather than overseas maritime power projection. For example, the Southern Song 
court had introduced an official position, the Superintendency of Merchant Ships, at Guangzhou 
(Canton) to handle affairs related to foreign and local merchant ships, inspect ships and levy 
duties on import. Subsequently, this practice was extended to cover newly opened ports such 
as Hangzhou, Mingzhou (Ningbo), Quanzhou, Pan-ch’iao (Jiaozhou) and Hua-ting (Shangh–i) 
(Ibid:192 - 194). Instead of navy building, the government subsidised civilian ship building, 
harbour improvement and sea-canal warehouse facilities so as to facilitate the flows of goods 
between China and the rest of the world (Sivin 1995; Wang 2000; Lo 2012). While the Mongols 
borrowed the naval technology and experience directly from the Southern Song personnel, the 
Mongols had little interests to develop the naval capacity (Lo 2012:212). Instead, the extensive 
territorial coverage of Mongolian Empire became an asset to build an economic empire and 
civilian maritime network without a proper navy. The Pax Mongolica had converted “Chinese 
China” into “Eurasian China” and built organic linkages between land routes and sea routes 
such as the “Eurasia-Indian Ocean trade network” (Yokkaichi 2008:75; Sun 2000). Similar to 
the case of Southern Song court, maritime trade was important yet instrumental, serving the 
purpose of supporting land troops in terms of transportation and resources. Therefore, overseas 
naval power projection was also kept at minimal. To facilitate trade and generate government 
revenue, an extensive and efficient network of civilian ports and commercial trading posts were 
more crucial than building naval capacity – especially when the continent was already 
dominated by the Mongols. The civilian ports and trading posts were perceived to be well-
protected by land troops and little threats were experienced from the maritime fronts. Therefore, 
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no matter in the era of Southern Song or Mongolian Empire, overseas naval bases were either 
not affordable (in the case of Southern Song) or unnecessary (in the case of Mongolian Empire). 
This gave an impression to many naval historians that the imperial China lacked of sea power 
projection, which the definition of sea power was measured by the naval presence and naval 
capacity. 
In fact, in Asian maritime system the lack of overseas naval projection did not imply the lack 
of maritime power. Instead, the civilian dimension of sea power had expanded at citizens’ level. 
For example, the Fujian merchants had created “colonies” at Sondo (Kaesong) in North Korea, 
at Lung-ya-men near the present-day Singapore, at Palembang in Sumatra, etc (Lo 2012:202). 
These Chinese merchants, without the government mandate, actively negotiated with the native 
government for the establishment of trading posts and settlement zones along the coastal areas. 
This organic and civilian maritime expansion was eventually acknowledged by the imperial 
government, who wished to be benefited apart from maritime tributary trade. A strategic 
alliance was formed between the imperial government and active Chinese merchants, and more 
civilian ports and trading posts were built along with the Mongolian expansion. While these 
Chinese “colonies” or overseas ports were built largely for the sake of maritime trade or 
settlement, in the end they also served as places of Chinese refugees who wished to evade from 
warfare or for better livelihood (Lo 2012; Elleman 2014). As a result, the Sino-centric port 
system was essentially a civilian port system without strong naval support, which could hardly 
match the conception of sea power suggested by naval historians or naval strategists. It, 
therefore, also explained why the expedition of Zheng He was viewed as the peak of China’s 
sea power as it rang the bell of traditional understanding of naval power projection. The 
maritime network enjoyed by the Ming court had covered more than the territory she could 
enjoy under her sovereign belt, and large maritime expeditions were waged for the sake of 
maritime trade and maritime diplomacy (Armstrong 2007; Lo 2012; Dreyer 1974). Similar to 
the Spanish Galleon and Dutch Fluyt, the Treasure ships supported both naval and economic 
functions, despite peaceful diplomacy was also recognised in today’s Chinese narratives of the 
voyage (Lo 2012). Indeed, the Treasure Ships did engage in naval warfare in several occasions 
(Armstrong 2007; Dreyer 1974), contributing to the forward projection of Ming naval power. 
The Ming court converted her maritime power into maritime diplomacy, which effectively 
combined the tributary system to maritime trade networks, i.e. the establishment of different 
maritime zones and the Maritime Silk Road (Hamashita 2003:20; Lo 2012). 
The Manchurians, after defeating the Ming court and becoming the owner of the “Chinese 
Empire” and Asian maritime order, originally followed Ming’s tributary system and naval 
system (Sieren, 2007). However, the Manchurian court was rather defensive and sceptical 
against the succeeded Asian maritime order and maritime trading network: first, the 
Manchurian court, similar to the Ming court, were continuously exposed to the nuisance and 
security threats generated from the Japanese pirate (wako); second, she was also afraid of the 
potential collaboration between the Chinese refugees in Southeast Asia and the Chinese 
remained at the Chinese coastal areas. As a result, the Manchurian court partially gave up her 
ownership of Asian maritime order by introducing the Frontier Shift which aimed to evacuate 
Chinese from the coastal areas and only a handful of sea ports were opened to foreign trade 
after 1684. Apart from limiting the overseas projection of maritime power through civilian 
networking and trade, foreign traders were under strict surveillance under the Canton System, 
i.e. the introduction of Gong Hong as the only legitimate middleman to conduct foreign trade 
between foreign traders at Canton and other Chinese inland producers (Shi 2009). As Shi (2009) 
and Fairbank (1953) suggested, the experience of Macao, the first European settlement 
established by the Portuguese during the Ming Dynasty, had always haunted the Manchurians. 
The Manchurian government was always sceptical against uncontrolled foreign trade, which 
could possibly lead to another settlement on the coast, or spying out the strengths and 
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weaknesses of the imperial court.  
Compared to the Asian maritime order built from the Southern Song to the expedition of Zheng 
He, the maritime system built by the Manchurian court consisted by three characteristics: first, 
the importance of coastal areas where land and sea intersected; second, the integrated sea-rim 
zones composed of the coastal areas and the trading networks; third, the crucial role played by 
port-cities in linking different maritime zones and trading networks (Hamashita 2003:19). 
Under the new maritime trade system, trade routes were well-defined and the maritime zones 
intersected at the port-cities, for instance the Pusan-Nagasaki-Fukuoka trading network linking 
Japan and Korea, the Fuzhou-Keelung routes linking the Southeast China to Taiwan, and the 
Aceh-Malacca-Guangzhou network like the Southeast Asia to China (Ibid). Chinese key ports 
like Canton and Fuzhou served as the main maritime sites for China to engage with the Asia 
seas, performing the functions of tributary trade and private trade on behalf of the state. 
Interestingly, this characteristic of port system, i.e. focusing on the port-cities as multi-
functional nodes serving for the national economy, became a characteristic of Asian port system 
in contemporary days (Ducruet and Jeong 2005; Lee, Song and Ducruet 2008). In terms of the 
overseas maritime power projection, especially the overseas “colonies” and trading posts built 
by Chinese citizens in Southeast Asia, the official imperial policy was to handicap rather than 
assist the Chinese merchants overseas who previously operated the tributary trade between 
China and Southeast Asia (Fairbank 1953:52). The overwhelmed security concern over an 
united front among anti-Qing tribes and Han Chinese in Southeast Asia was the driving force 
behind the stricter ban in 1717, when Emperor Kangxi decided to shut down the routes to the 
Southern Ocean. (Shi 2009) The continuous oppression towards the overseas Chinese 
merchants and the shutdown of tributary trade had left them with no choice but disconnected 
from the mainland forever. The broken linkage at the civilian level and the self-imposed 
restrictive policy to go abroad had slowly eroded the sea lanes of communication and the trade 
surplus from the maritime trade, and resulted in an inevitable fall of China’s sea power. The 
power vacuum was filled by the arrival of European navies and civilian vessels, and the Asian 
maritime order was challenged and shaped by the European maritime order. 
An “Eurasian” Port System? The Treaty Port System in Asia and the Early Version of 
European Port Diplomacy 
Although in last section it concluded that the arrival of European naval and civilian vessels had 
fundamentally shaped the Asian maritime order, the impact was never spontaneous as the 
earliest documented arrival of European ships could be dated back to 16th century when the 
Ming court still owned the Asian maritime order. The then-Portuguese settlements in Macao 
and Nagasaki were largely followed the Asian maritime order as it was never established as a 
colony or a treaty port under a bilateral treaty. For instance, in the case of Macao which would 
be discussed in details in Chapter 4, the Portuguese merchants had to pay for a ground rent of 
500 silver taels and provided certain defence service for the Ming government. In fact, even 
though the Manchurians took over the Chinese Empire, the Sino-centric model of diplomacy 
and tributary system was observed in conceptualising Chinese foreign relations with the rest of 
the world – which could always be signified by the “kowtow” request and subsequent 
interactions between Qianlong, the then-Manchurian Emperor, and Lord McCartney, the 
British envoy to China (Fairbank and Teng 1941; Fairbank 1942). The Canton System was also 
observed among the European communities who arrived to China from 17th century onwards. 
It was only the early 19th century when the Manchurian court failed to exercise her control over 
the edges of the empire owing to weakened state capacity, that the Europeans and the 
Americans took advantages to conclude unequal treaty relations with China and other East 
Asian countries. By 1842, the Sino-European relationship experienced the a paradigmatic shift 
when the first Anglo-Chinese treaty was signed at Nanking after First Opium War (the Anglo-
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Chinese War), and Hong Kong was ceased perpetually to the United Kingdom as the Crown 
Colony and a “treaty port”. The treaty port system had also extended to Japan in 1854 when 
Perry expedition resulted in the consolidation of the Convention of Kanagawa between the 
United States and Japan and the latter was forced to open port of Shimoda and Hakodate to 
American vessels. 
The reality, however, was more complicated. As suggested by Takeshi Hamashita (2003), the 
European maritime system was entrenched in Asia not only in terms of the number of ports the 
Asian countries ceased to European powers, but in form of the extension of “European 
diplomatic norms and treaty negotiation into Asia” (ibid:23). Nonetheless, the extension of 
norms and treaty negotiation did not completely break the tributary trade system and the Asian 
maritime order. On the contrary, the treaty port system had strengthened the role of port-cities 
like Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai in connecting the maritime zones. In addition, the 
gradual decline of Manchurian court as the centre of tributary trade was replaced by private 
trading networks merchants in southern China, who utilised the civilian maritime network 
connecting former vassal states in East Asia and Southeast Asia. Coastal port-cities like Fuzhou 
and Canton become the de facto centres of commerce and tribute-trade system, instead of the 
capital located at in the inland and northern part of China (ibid). Interestingly, the treaty port 
system was also borrowed by the Manchurian court to govern her relations with vassal states. 
For example, the conclusion of 1882 Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade between 
Chinese and Korean Subjects was viewed as an “equal” treaty based on the assumption of 
Korean as a vassal state of Manchurian imperial government (Ibid:28 – 32). 
Therefore, the introduction of international law and diplomacy, which was a characteristic of 
European maritime order, had strengthened the role of (treaty) port-cities and their relations 
among each other. Although the treaty negotiation was always conducted in bilateral fashion 
like the Sino-British Treaty of Nanking, the Sino-Portuguese Treaty on the status of Macao, the 
Sino-French Treaty of Whampoa and the separately negotiated Convention of Peking with 
Britain, France and Russia, the inter-state relations of the Western world and the “most-
favourable-nation” clause had made the access of treaty ports eventually become multilateral 
and opened to both Chinese and foreign merchants located at the treaty-port. As a result, not 
only the foreigners could gain access to treaty ports that were established by their Western 
“allies”, but also the Chinese merchants, who had been doing business at those ports, could now 
utilise the free port nature of the treaty ports overseas. With the “assistance” of treaty port 
system, the private trade network among different treaty ports in East Asia was consolidated 
independently from the official tributary trade system, thus strengthened the nodal positions of 
treaty ports in the maritime zones. The frontier trade among the treaty ports were recognised 
and became a subject matter during the negotiation, showing that the treaty port network 
developed since the early 19th century gained its weight in shaping the bilateral relations 
between China and the rest of Asian states. An early version of European port diplomacy was, 
therefore, in practice and governed the relationship between China and individual European 
state. 
To sum up, the European maritime system, in form of international treaties, had impacted the 
Asian maritime order in twofold. First, as highlighted by Lee, Song and Ducruet (2008), the 
Asian port-city interface was heavily influenced by European colonial experience. With 
reference to their proposed “Asian Consolidation Model” (Ibid 2008:378), the 5-stage 
development of Asian port-city included an inevitable part of “colonial port” and “entrepot 
port”. The former stage assumed the process of adjustment to Western shipping standards, 
allowing pendulum services and exploitation of close hinterland by foreign merchants, and the 
latter assumed the continuation of Western influence in improving port facilities and the 
establishment of simple urban-building for the sake of industrial and commercial activities 
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(Ibid:378 – 379). The external influence from the West during the colonial period, together with 
the Chinese social context in which merchants and economic activities were usually located at 
coastal region, created a unique socio-economic space in China coastal port: a multi-functional 
node for economic and political activities, an economic city serving for the national economy 
and merchants’ personal gain, and a network hub for migration and human exchange across the 
region. 
Second, the introduction of treaty port system did have an effect on Chinese diplomacy to the 
rest of the world. The European diplomatic norms and port administration was borrowed by the 
Manchurian court and her vassal states in constructing the relationship among each other, 
forming a diplomatic relations and custom system. As Rhoads Murphey (1970) suggested, the 
injection of “modernity” at the treaty port had eventually beaome the force of Chinese internal 
modernisation in late Qing Dynasty, though most of the programmes failed eventually or did 
not continue after the regime change. It was, however, self-evident that the European influence 
to Chinese domestic modernisation and diplomatic relations went through the European port 
diplomacy and the treaty port system. The questions were: 1) whether this kind of influence 
continued at those ports or port-cities; 2) how could the European Union, as a supranational 
representative of Europe, make use of these legacy in ports and port-cities to achieve its 
diplomatic objectives; and 3) how did the CCP regime make her response to the legacy or the 
continuous existence of European port diplomacy. These were also the research questions that 
this thesis wished to answer. 
Chapter Summary and Preview 
The chapter had first reviewed the role of ports and port system in international politics under 
two conceptual lenses, namely the geopolitical lens and the economic-cultural lens. From the 
geopolitical perspective, ports and port diplomacy, mainly in form of naval capacity, were 
essential to one’s maritime power projection and global hegemonic status. A secured maritime 
network with overseas naval bases and civilian ports was the foundation of state’s domination 
over the commercial network and major sea lanes of communication, which in return provided 
a strong support to overseas naval operation and diplomatic actions. As a result, states would 
contest for the ownership of key ports and more importantly the port system, turning both naval 
bases and civilian ports as geopolitical battlefields. 
From the economic-cultural perspective, the nature of ports as a hub of transnational economic 
and cultural exchange made civilian ports well-embedded in the world system compared to the 
non-port cities. The high degree of economic interdependence of port economy and the semi-
permanent presence of “the Others” in the por64eterrunity provided potential diplomatic 
resources for both the sovereign host of the port and foreign diplomatic actors to leverage 
against the counter-part. Ports, especially civilian ports, became a contested space for various 
stakeholders to act on and achieve their diplomatic objectives. 
Departing from the naval and economic-cultural perspective, the actor-network theory 
approach gave the third account on the role of ports in international relations and global political 
economy. Borrowing the global city thesis developed from Hall (1966) to Acuto (2013), there 
were three potential roles of ports in international politics and foreign policies: networking 
actants, networking actors and networking networks. The thesis argued, through the organic 
synthesis of Acuto’s global city thesis and Ducruet’s port-city interface, it could sharpen the 
global city thesis and create a comparative framework to evaluate the role of civilian ports in 
EU normative/structural power and port diplomacy, which would be further addressed in next 
chapter.    
Following the review of the role of ports, the chapter provide a short comparison between the 
European port system and Asian port system, aiming to shed light on the regional difference as 
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well as how the European maritime system interacted with the Asian port system in mid-19th 
century. As discussed in this chapter, the arrival of the European maritime system had made 
substantial impact to Asian maritime system as well as Chinese diplomatic behaviours, showing 
that European port diplomacy did make impact in changing state’s behaviours. These 
observations provided a legitimate follow-up by the thesis, i.e. whether the influence and 
practice continued between the European Union and China, albeit the treaty port system in 
China was legally ended after 1943. However, even with the legacy of success European port 
diplomacy, a revival of it could only be realised if there were good incentives, available 
institutions and appropriate policy tools provided for the European Union. The answers to the 
availability of these elements would be provided in next chapter.  
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Chapter 3: An Audit of Contemporary EU-China Relations and 
the Potentials of Sino-European Port Diplomacy 
Before proceeding to the empirical dimension of European port diplomacy towards the selected 
ports, this chapter would review the evolution of EU-China relations. There was no lack of 
academic research on EU-China relations conducted by both Western and Chinese scholars, 
with various topics and diverse methodological setting (Shambaugh, Sandschneider and Zhou 
2008; Peruzzi, Poletti and Zhang 2007; Kerr and Liu 2008; Pan 2012; Burnay, Hivonnet and 
Raure 2014; Men 2014; Reiterer 2014; Eckhardt 2015; Farnell and Crooke 2016; Zhang 2016; 
Gabriel and Schmeicher 2018). The continuous growth of literature reflected the inevitable 
result of the growing importance of China, the European Union and the EU-China relations in 
the post-Cold War order. As a result, any review on the topic could never be comprehensive 
but must be purposive in nature. 
The purpose of this chapter aimed to reveal the key features of European foreign policy and 
Chinese foreign policy, which included the multi-layered structure as well as the interests and 
perceptions behind. These elements would be discussed in the first two section of this chapter. 
After revealing the key features of foreign policies of the EU and China, this chapter would be 
concluded by introducing the possible role of ports, which was discussed in last chapter, in 
helping EU-China relations, so as to give a complete theoretical framework of the thesis to 
analysing the empirical data collected from the three selected cases. 
The Multi-layered Governance of EU-China Relations: Could a Port-level 
Diplomacy be Possible (and Meaningful)? 
Although leaders of the European Union and ministers of EU Member States had actively 
constructed the “official” image of “Europe speaking in one voice” or an “United Europe” 
(Barroso 2010; European Commission 2011; European Commission and High Representative 
of Union Foreign and Security Policy 2016; 2019; Poggetti 2017; Junker 2018; 2019), the “who 
speaks for Europe” problem (Allen 1998; Meunier and Nicolaidis 1999; Miks 2010) remained 
and the “multiple realities” discourse (Jørgensen 1998:96 – 97) was still influential in 
both academic and laymen’s conceptualisation of European foreign policy. In fact, such 
characteristic was more than obvious in EU-China relations and was considered as one 
reason that the EU failed to cope with Chinese diplomatic strategy (Fox and Godement 
2009; Miks 2010; Godement et. al. 2011; Song 2012). A recent example was the failure 
of adopting a common response to Beijing’s BRI. While the Franco-German motor 
showed reservations against the BRI and the growing Chinese investment of strategic 
industrial sectors in Europe, Italian government, following the footsteps of Greece And 
Portugal. signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Beijing for future economic 
and investment cooperation. The lack of coherent European foreign policy could be 
attributed by two inter-related factors: first, there were multiple policy instruments 
initiated and implemented by different European actors over a single policy or political 
issue; second, there was no single European interest to govern the formation of 
European foreign policy. 
The Lack of Coherent Policy Instruments: A Reality and A Blessing to the European 
Union? 
While the Treaty of Lisbon had unified the Maastricht Three-Pillar Structure into a single entity 
and gave the EU an unified legal personality in international law, the general division of labour 
established under the Maastricht Treaty did not go in vain. Rather, the early categorisation on 
EU policies was highly useful in understanding the multi-layered feature of European foreign 
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policy (Krahmann 2003; White 2004a; 2004b; Stumbaum 2009; Germond 2015). Table 3.1 to 
Table 3.4 summarised how the division of labour was implemented in major policy areas of EU 
external relations and foreign policy, which included trade, development aid, security 
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Table 3.1 The EU division of labour in external trade relations 
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Table 3.2 The EU division of labour in developmental aid, human rights and legal cooperation 
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Table 3.3 The EU division of labour in security cooperation 
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Table 3.4 The EU division of labour in global representation 
As the above tables summarised, the distinction between European level and EU Member State 
level of actions remained important especially in the field of security cooperation and global 
representation. Although the EU had slowly developed “a more consistent, cross-sectoral, and 
comprehensive approach” (Germond 2015:101) to foreign policy and security, traditional 
capacity in the field of high politics was still in the hands of EU Member States. For instance, 
despite the increase in power such as the right to speak and to submit proposals and amendments 
at the General Assembly of the United Nations, the European Union remained as a permanent 
observer and did not enjoy the right to vote and being formally represented in–the Security 
Council - where France and the United Kingdom enjoy their permanent seats. Declaration 13 
attached to the Treaty of Lisbon also explicitly stated that the reformed provisions and the 
creation of EEAS would not affect the existing rights of the EU Member States in formulation 
their foreign policy nor overseas representation to third-party states (EU Member States 2007). 
Using Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughton famous quote, the European foreign 
policy is “single by name, dual by regime, multiple by nature” (Keukeleire and MacNaughton 
2008:66). 
The maritime diplomacy, which formally included the naval version of port diplomacy, of the 
European Union could not escape from such “multiple realities”. The complicated realities 
could be understood in two different ways. In terms of policy idea, the maritime dimension of 
EU’s security not only involved the tradit–onal naval dimension - which was an integral part of 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), but also included “military, civilian, police, 
economic and normative subdimensions” and went far beyond the Integrated Maritime Policy 
(Germond 2015:101; see also Germond 2011). In terms of policy implementation, EU maritime 
policy, similar to other EU policies, had undergone “agentificati–n” (Germond 2015:114 - 115) 
and many decentralised agencies had been created, such as the FRONTEX, European Defence 
Agency and European Maritime Safety Agency. These decentralised agencies, together with 
the Council who was in charge of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the 
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European Commission who was in charge of the coordination of the Integrated Maritime Policy, 
and the EU Member States who had her own navy and overseas naval bases, created a network 
of actors in EU maritime policy, and arguably maritime diplomacy. Taking the EU Arctic 
Policy, a policy initiative proposed in November 2008 under the context of EU’s Integrated 
Maritime Policy development, as an example, the formulation of the policy combined the 
following actors and dynamics (Wegge 2012): 
1. The policy entrepreneurship of the European Commission (mainly from the DG Relex 
and DG Mare); 
2. The political battles and compromises among EU Arctic Member States (Denmark, 
Sweden and Finland), between EU Arctic Member States and non-Arctic Member 
States, and between the EU and non-EU Arctic Member States; and 
3. Decentralised agencies and experts on fishery and environment. 
It should also be noted that such network of actors, or using Keleman (2002) jargon “Eurocratic” 
structure, on one hand allowed the European Union to rely on the existing national 
administrative resources to “perform the tasks on their behalf”, on the other hand allowed the 
Member States to preserve their existing national autonomy and certain degree of control, even 
though the formal policy competence was slowly moved away from their hands (Keleman 
2002:112; also cited in Germond 2015:115). 
The concept of “agentification” indeed gave two implications which were useful in 
conceptualising EU port diplomacy, under the context of “multiple realities” of European 
foreign policy. First, the port could serve as an “agent” that served the general interests of EU-
China relations and linked up Type I and Type II relations with the Type III relations suggested 
in Chapter 1. Although there were always intrinsic values for the EU and its Member States to 
conduct her diplomacy to civilian ports, i.e. Type III and Type IV relations, there was also an 
undeniable dimension of EU port diplomacy that it was instrumental to EU and its Member 
States’ interests to the sovereign host of the civilian ports. As a result, Chinese civilian ports 
could be identified as a “decentralised” agency utilised by the European Union for the sake of 
a macro diplomatic strategy in EU-China relations. Second, the concept of “agentification” 
allowed an innovative inclusion of actors and resources in EU port diplomacy, which included 
the diplomatic resources of EU Member States to the port (Type IV relations), and some 
“delegated” civilian parties such as the chamber of commerce, academic institutes or civil 
groups named under the flag of “European” and supported by European institutions. While the 
thesis primarily focused on Type III relations, i.e. the supranational to sub-state level of 
interactions, and evaluated their impact to EU-China relations, the thesis also acknowledged 
the fruitful resources from Type IV relations (state to sub-state level) which could be possibly 
borrowed to Type III relations. In addition, the European Union would be readily to create non-
official and non-diplomatic organisations or agencies if there was no available or appropriate 
means presented in the civilian ports. In fact, the supranational Europe created in 1951 only 
recognised PRC in 1975, established its formal office in 1988 and became an independent and 
holistic actor in 2009. Prior to the arrival of the supranational Europe, many EU Member States 
had already developed her own diplomatic ties with China as early as 16th century. As a result, 
the existence of “multiple realities” with the process of “agentification” was rather a natural 
development of EU-China relations and EU port diplomacy to China. In fact, from the Member 
States’ perspective, the process of “agentification”, especially the selective creation of 
European-level of agencies at various Chinese ports, allowed them to play the dual-card game 
in EU-China relations, i.e. the selection delegation of power and negotiation to the EU level for 
the sake of interest maximisation, or maintenance of state-to-state level for national interests 
and image/power projection. Given such diplomatic context, European port diplomacy at 
civilian ports, even without being formally named, was already in practice. 
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The Unspoken Decentralisation of Chinese Foreign Policy: A Reality and A Gamble to 
Beijing? 
Compared to the well-acknowledged “multiple realities” of European foreign policy, the multi-
layered governance of Chinese foreign policy was less discussed. Overwhelmed by the neo-
realist image of Beijing, it was widely believed that Beijing insistence of sovereignty would 
make her neglect the role of sub-national actors in foreign policy. In this case, Beijing should 
turn a blind eye to the potential contribution of an appropriate port response at her civilian ports 
in foreign policy, or just remained extreme cautious to the security implications of civilian ports. 
No meaningful difference, therefore, should be observed across the selected cases or all civilian 
ports in general. The reality, however, was more complicated than a simple response of Beijing 
obsession towards sovereignty and China as a unitary state. 
The dominant discourse remained largely true especially in the field of “foreign policy” and 
“high politics” (Chan 1999; Gill 2007; Wang 2010; Zhang 2011; Vangeli 2013; Sutter 2012; 
2013; J. Zhang 2015). Nonetheless, with the gradual opening up of China especially in the field 
of “low politics”, more and more scholastic works showed that there had been a growing trend 
of decentralisation of Chinese external relations to the provincial level (Zheng 1994; Chen 2017; 
Chen and Jian 2009; Chen, Jian and Chen 2010). The best illustration of such multi-layered 
feature of Chinese diplomacy at low politics was the creation of OCTS which created a formal 
sub-national capacity in Chinese diplomacy (Shen 2016; Shen and Chan 2017). The innovative 
OCTS initiative to govern Hong Kong and Macao not only preserved the “treaty port” 
characteristics at domestic level, but also int”oduced a “quasi-state" experiment to Chinese 
foreign policy (Mushkat 1987; Tang 1993; Weng 1997; Shen 2008; 2011; 2016; Mendes 2014). 
The respective Chapter VII in the Basic Law of Hong Kong and that of Macao stipulated the 
domain of autonomy that Hong Kong and Macao enjoyed in external relations. For instance, 
Article 152 of HKBL (Article 137 of MBL) suggested that the Special Administrative Regions 
could join organisations or conferences as independent members if the organisations or 
conferences are not exclusive to sovereign state; Article 150 of HKBL (Article 135 of MBL) 
allowed representatives from Hong Kong and Macao to join national delegation if the 
organisations or conferences are exclusive to nation-states only. 
The decentralisation of Chinese foreign policy was more salient at operational terms as many 
Western countries had granted special treatments to Hong Kong and Macao, and vice versa. 
These treatments, for example, included: 
1. Formal legislative acts like Hong Kong Policy Act and EU-Macao Trade and 
Cooperation Agreement sponsored by the United States and the European Union 
respectively;  
2. Diplomatic treatment such as granting the ambassadorial level of representation or 
giving diplomatic immunity to the representatives of Hong Kong and Macao Economic 
and Trade Office (ETOs) in accordance to Vienna Convention; and  
3. Differentiated visa requirements between HKSAR passport holders and PRC passport 
holders. 
Apart from formal differentiation between Beijing and her sub-national counterparts by the 
external parties like the United States and the European Union, China had also actively 
delegated administrative power of “low-level politics” to important cities like Shenzhen, 
Zhuhai, Shanghai and Hainan, through the creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), Pilot 
Free Trade Zones (Pilot FTZ) and Free Port. Although Shanghai was not a free port proposed 
in the latest 5-year plan, port facilities management had already decentralised to city 
government of Shanghai (Wang 2004). In fact, as the empirical chapter of Shanghai revealed, 
Beijing and Shanghai government were always subjected to external partners’ lobbying on the 
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free trade zone reform. Under the proposed Greater Bay Area initiative, Beijing also recognised 
the values of “internationalised” Hong Kong and “Portuguese” Macao in domestic development 
and foreign policy objectives (State Council, the People’s Republic of China 2019). In fact, 
compared to the European Union, the Chinese government was more aware of the potential 
contribution of civilian ports in foreign policy especially in Asia and Africa. Apar from turning 
her civilian ports for strategic uses, i.e. the philosophy of “Long-term Consideration, Full 
Utilisation” which was used to described Beijing position to Hong Kong, the concept of port 
diplomacy was indeed first used to describe Chinese diplomatic actions in the region through 
the utilisation of economic power and civilian actors for political leverage (Barston 2006). 
Moreover, as a part of the Belt and Road Initiative, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road 
represented the contemporary form of port diplomacy, which focused on building port 
infrastructure and the discourse of connectivity, and eventually induced similar initiatives from 
the EU and the United States. 
In fact, the concept of “agentification” could also be applied to Beijing’s foreign policy and 
external relations, yet the division of labour was clear-cut and the tasks were well-assigned by 
Beijing. Compared to the relative autonomy enjoyed by the European Union and its Member 
States in formulating their individual responses to China, the autonomy enjoyed by the sub-
national actors were either formally controlled by the legislation or implicitly by party 
bureaucratic control. Beijing might be willing to delegate economic powers to strategic and 
economic-important cities or ports Guangdong, Shanghai and Tianjin, but never the political 
power and full degree of autonomy like constituting unit of federalism (Chan 2015a). For 
example, only trustworthy CCP members could be appointed to lead those cities and ports14. In 
the case of OCTS, Hong Kong and Macao might be granted with greater power in external 
relations in accordance to their respective Basic Law, the exercise of such power was always 
limited and closely monitored by Beijing. For instance, the scope of autonomy in foreign policy 
was defined in Article 13 of HKBL and the same article in MBL, which read: 
“The Central People’s Government shall be responsible for the foreign affairs relating to 
the Hong Kong (Macao) Special Administrative Region. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the People’s Republic of China shall establish an office in Hong Kong (Macao) to deal 
with foreign affairs. The Central People’s Government authorises the Hong Kong (Macao) 
Special Administrative Region to conduct relevant external affairs on its own in 
accordance with this Law.”15  
Together with Article 14 which stipulated the role of Central People’s Government in defence, 
Beijing clearly monopolised the power of “high politics” as well as the naval dimension of port 
diplomacy, such as naval port call and port visits by third-party navies. For example, Beijing 
was highly selective in her acceptance or refusal of port call to Hong Kong by U.S. navy in 
Asia-Pacific region amid of trade tension or South China Sea issues, a move accompanying 
with the cancellation of high-level Sino-American naval meeting in 2018 (Youssef and Lubold 
2018; Chan 2018). It should also be noted that the PLA-N had maintained a small flotilla of 
ships (squadron 38081) of the South Sea Fleet in Hong Kong, although the majority of naval 
activities conducted were outside Hong Kong. Interestingly, the PLA-N would arrange 
goodwill po–t calls to Hong Kong - a typical activity in port diplomacy to impress the visited 
 
14 For instance, the party secretary of Shanghai (currently the position is held by Li Qiang) would 
always be a member of Central Politburo of the Communist Party of China. In addition, many party 
members who had experienced in governing Shanghai would be eventually promoted to lead the 
country such as Jiang Zemin (the President of China from 1993 to 2003), Zhu Rongji (the Premier of 
China from 1998 to 2003) and Han Zheng (current Vice-Premier of China). The current President Xi 
Jinping also assumed office in Shanghai from March 2007 to October 2007. 
15 Brackets were added by the author to reflect the content of Article 13 of the Basic Law of Macao 
Special Administrative Region. 
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community (Ministry of National Defence, People’s Republic of China 2019; Huang and Chan 
2017). As a result, in terms of high politics, Beijing did realise the role of port and the 
importance of port actions to advance her national interests and images. Ironically, one of the 
target audience of such goodwill visits was the citizens of her civilian ports. 
The restrictive position in high ports adopted by Beijing in her civilian ports, however, did not 
imply the lack of diplomatic agenda at civilian level of port actions. Quite a contrary, as shown 
by various research in relation to provincial involvement in Chinese foreign policy, this kind of 
civilian network, no matter it was generated by the port or inner city, could potentially a kind 
of asset or a threat to Beijing national interests (Zheng 1994; Cheung and Tang 2001; Chen 
2017; Shen 2008; Chen and Jian 2009; Chen, Jian and Chen 2010). Compared to those 
restriction and awareness in high politics, Beijing did not control the civilian actions through 
stringent institutions. Instead, Beijing always looked for opportunities to advance her national 
interests through these established civilian networks and actions. Indeed, even though most of 
these civilian port actions like foreign economic investment and sociocultural exchange were 
categorised into “external relations” which on papers the local authority could make decision 
at operational level or even policy level, true autonomy would only be granted to ports only if 
Beijing found the leader of the port regime trustworthy (Shen and Chan 2017). Therefore, 
analysing Chinese response to external civilian port actions was a good indicator to reflect her 
perception and relationship towards the foreign communities at port – in this thesis it meant the 
European Union, and her projection of image and interests to the rest of the world. 
The Multi-layered Interests and Identities in EU-China Relations: Conflicting 
Interests and Identities within the EU?   
The last section focused on the possibility of a meaningful EU port diplomacy and Chinese 
response. Such possibility, however, could only be potentially realised if there were sufficient 
incentives and motivations to leverage on these port interactions. This section would review the 
multi-layered interests and identities behind the EU-China relations. After all, diplomatic 
actions were either driven by actor’s interests as traditional IR theories like realism or liberalism 
argue, and/or actors’ perceptions and identities as new and critical IR theories like 
constructivism or English School suggested. An overview of these two components in EU-
China relations could provide a solid backdrop in understanding the emergence of EU port 
diplomacy to China.  
The Multi-layered Interests and Identities in EU Foreign Policy to China 
As earlier mentioned, the concept of “multiple realities” involved both the policy dimensions 
and actors’ interests and identities. The last section, borrowing the concept of “agentification”, 
discussed the policy dimension and the possibility of European port diplomacy and Chinese 
port responses. This section would discuss another dimension of “multiple realities”, i.e. the 
multi-layered interests and identities of EU foreign policy actors especially in contemporary 
EU-China relations. 
Despite a growing “Europeanisation/EU-isation” of Member States’ foreign policies and 
national interests (Tonra 2001; Bulmer 2007; Wong 2005; 2006; Thomas 2011; Gross 2009; 
Wong and Hill, 2011), it was rather doubtful to claim that there were holistic and undisputed 
European interests and images presented in European foreign policies. Discrepancies in terms 
of interests and projected images were observed and sometimes shadowed the effectiveness of 
European foreign policy (Hill 1993; 1998; Zielonka 1998; Ginsberg 1999; Ekengren and 
Sundelius 2004; Ekengren 2004; Jørgensen 2004; Cameron 2007; Thomas 2011; European 
Council on Foreign Relations 2012; 2013; 2014). Such discrepancies were salient when there 
were already established conflicts among geopolitical, economic and ideational issues – which 
all elements could be found in contemporary EU-China relations (Fox and Godement 2009; 
Bringing the Ports and Port Diplomacy Back-in     74 
 
Miks 2010; Godement et. al. 2011; Song 2012). Quoting the comment made by Fox and 
Godement (2009) in their early research on EU-China relations, European foreign policy to 
China had always been “trapped in a diplomatic vicious cycle” (Fox and Godement 2009:30) 
that the European Union fails to persuade its Member States to take the EU as “an effective 
guarantor of their national interests” (ibid.). In addition, at the Member State level, their 
attitudes towards the rising Chinese economic and political might diverge among themselves 
and the division continued to strengthen after the EURO crisis (Godement et. al. 2011). As a 
result, some EU Member States were motivated “to pursue their relationship with China 
independently” (Fox and Godement 2009:30). Nonetheless, apart from the most updated EU 
paper on its China Policy (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2019), many prominent European leaders and foreign 
policy experts had increasingly called for an united front against the rising or even “rival” China 
(Gill 2018; Dempsey 2019; Morvan and Pacroel 2019; Verhofstadt 2019). The growing concern 
in speaking with one voice, not only in terms of foreign policy position but also interests, 
towards China therefore required a closer look, through the academic lens of “aspiration, 
legitimacy and interests” suggested by Jørgensen (2004). 
Aspiration of EU Foreign Policy towards China: From Unconditional Engagement to 
Reciprocal Strategic Partnership 
Since the normalisation of diplomatic relations between Beijing and Brussels in 1975, the 
bilateral relationship had changed from a “derivable relationship” (Shambaugh 1997:45, cited 
in Vogt 2012), shadowed by the United States and Soviet Union, to a “comprehensive strategic 
partnership” (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy 2016) with multidimensional cooperation ranging from global climate 
change to international trade regime reform. While there were always ups and downs in EU-
China relations and frequently being reviewed by many scholars (Casarini 2006; Dai 2006; 
Men 2008; Shambaugh, Sandschneider and Zhou 2008; Yahuda 2008; Song 2009; Stumbaum 
2009; Song 2012; Vogt 2012; Austermann, Vangeli and Wang edited 2013), European foreign 
policy was centred at an aspiration towards China developed since the imperial period, i.e. 
engaging the Chinese government and market. However, there was observable difference in 
terms of the type of engagement and the degree of commitment the EU wished to projected to 
China. 
The first stage of aspiration was characterised as “constructive engagement” (European 
Commission 1995; Sandschneider 2002:33; Casarini 2006:7; Men 2008:13) or “unconditional 
engagement” which was contrast to US constructive engagement policy to China (Fox and 
Godement 2009:19). The normalisation of EU-China relations in 1975 created a new trade 
impetus between Europe and Asia especially after 1978 when China gradually opened her 
market to foreign countries. To manage the trade relations, a trade agreement was signed 
between Brussels and Beijing in 1978 and such agreement, while still focusing on trade, 
extended to Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) in 1985. Although sanctions were placed 
during 1989 after the Tiananmen Incident, most of the Western European countries remained 
faithful to China’s gradual human rights and economic reforms. By 1991 most of the EC 
sanctions were lifted except the arms embargo and the liberal world, led by the United States 
and the European Union, was confident that Beijing would be gradually “normalised” and 
followed the pathway of Eastern European Soviet Socialist Republics after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union (Men 2008; Pan 2012). From EU perspective, the gradual success of European 
integration in maintaining peace and prosperity against Communism made EU Member States 
confident on its “ethical” or “civilian” power (Whiteman 1998; Larsen 2002; Aggestam 2008). 
It was widely believed that the European experience had much to offer to China on market 
reforms and socio-political development, and would transform Beijing to “normal” regime 
through EU active engagement (Pan 2012:43). In addition, the end of Cold War also shifted its 
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focus from Europe to Asia so as to maintain the developmental momentum of European 
economies. A new Asia strategy was developed in 1994 (European Commission 1994), and a 
long-term China policy became an integral part of Europe’s external relations (European 
Commission 1995; Casarini 2006:10).  
The experience of the “triumph of capitalism” and the gradual reform of Eastern European 
countries, therefore, led the Western European countries to think Beijing would eventually 
gradual political and social reforms alongside with her adaptation to global capitalism and 
domestic economic reform. This strategic thinking, to some extent, turned to an “unconditional 
engagement” towards China, even though the EC and its successor the EU had already 
introduced the tool of “political conditionality” and “human right clause” as an essential 
principle in its trade agreements to third-party states since 1991 – making EU-China trade 
relations largely “unconditional” (Fox and Godement 2009:20). Instead of updating the 1985 
EC-China TCA and introducing human right clause and political conditions similar to other 
agreements with developing countries such as Ukraine and Georgia, “a long-term relationship” 
(European Commission 1995) between the EU and China was built with no formal 
conditionality attached. To further support the relationship, the EU had introduced various 
sectoral dialogues and programmes on top of the TCA. 
The “constructive engagement” proceeded to a “comprehensive partnership” in 1998 (European 
Commission 1998) and peaked itself in 2003 when both the European Union referred its 
relationship with China as a “maturing partnership” (European Commission 2003). As Smith 
and Xie (2010) argued, the 2003 Communication published by the European Commission aims 
to upgrade the relationship to a “European level” relationship (Smith and Xie 2010:438; Fox 
and Godement 2009:33) and developed a strategic dimension of the EU-China relations. 
However, the European Union remained “unconditional” to its engagement to China by paying 
attention to create more sectoral programmes and dialogues, including the Galileo Programme 
and the Industrial Policy dialogues in 2003 and the Tourism Agreement signed in 2004. As 
criticised by Ba–ysch et. al. (2005:8 - 9; cited in Smith and Xie 2010:439), the programmes and 
dialogues of this kind might create “the danger of loss of focus and strategic vision” and the 
objectives did not “serve the EU’s overall objectives as defined in its strategic papers.” 
However, under the general discourse of “shared interests” and “constructive engagement”, the 
EU Communication just outlined the benchmarks for further reform but not turned them into 
the pre-conditions for improving EU-China relations – a common strategy for EU to exercise 
its structural and normative power. 
The aspiration of “Europeanising” China through constructive/unconditional engagement did 
not receive favourable responses from Beijing. The difference in ideological backgrounds, 
developmental pathways made the two entities focus on different set of rights and freedoms. 
As Men (2008:7) suggested, the lack of political and social reform, as well as the growing trade 
deficit with China’s limitation against EU market access, became a major disappointment issue 
in changing the discourse on EU-China relationship (Men 2008; Smith and Xie 2010). This 
could be best reflected by the “give-give” principle suggested by Peter Mandelson, the then-
Commissioner on Trade (Mandelson 2005; cited in Dai 2006:13). Instead of a simple “win-win” 
principle, the “give-give” principle demanded “a prudent understanding of the concerns and 
requirements of the other partner, as well as a healthy and natural respect on each side for the 
other’s interests.” (ibid) Unlike the previous unconditional engagement strategy, the European 
Union started to demand Beijing’s understanding of European interests and requirements in the 
EU-China relationship. The demand of reciprocity and Chinese commitment to European 
interests became more salient when the European Commission published its new 
communication on EU-China relations, which was titled “Closer Partnership, Growing 
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Responsibilities” (European Commission 2006a) and a specific policy paper on EU-China trade 
and investment relations (European Commission 2006b). 
The 2006 Communication could be considered as a major shift of EU aspiration on EU-China 
relations because it was the first document that highlighted “responsibilities” and put EU-China 
partnership and EU-China competition in equal footing (European Commission 2006a; 
Shambaugh 2007a; Men 2008; Smith and Xie 2010). Compared to the previous 
communications and strategy, the 2006 Communication made several “requests” (Shambaugh 
2007a:1) of China ranging from the full implementation of WTO obligations to better 
protection of human rights. These requests were accompanied with “sticks” such as a potential 
use of WTO dispute settlement mechanism and the continuous refusal of granting China Market 
Economy Status if there is no significant change of European access to Chinese market 
(European Commission 2006a; European Commission 2006b; Smith and Xie 2009; 2010). 
Although in the 2006 Communication, the European Union was committed to upgrade/update 
the 1985 Trade and Cooperation Agreement framework to a comprehensive Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) and developed “the full scope of the bilateral relationship” 
(European Commission 2006a:9), such upgrade was a double-edged sword as the full-fledged 
partnership. From EU perspective, a comprehensive PCA must involve both economic and 
political dimensions. Discussed by various scholars and practitioners, many non-economic 
issues such as human rights, sustainable development and Taiwan issues were introduced 
during the negotiations, which was contrast to the wishful thinking of Beijing (Weske 2007; 
Crossick 2009; Fox and Godement 2009; Wortmann-Kool 2009; Smith and Xie 2010). Fox and 
Godement (2009:12) even suggested that the agreement should be based on “reciprocal 
engagement” which demanded a commitment from Beijing on a range of sensitive issue. In fact, 
conditionality, no matter it was implemented positively or negatively, was an essential feature 
of PCAs signed between the EU and its partners (Chan 2009). Taking the recently concluded 
EU-Singapore PCA as an example, Article 44 of the proposed PCA stipulated the non-executive 
clause which allowed the EU to suspend the execution “in cases of systematic and serious 
violation of essential elements, including democratic principles, the rule of law and human 
rights” (European Parliament 2019). However, it was never available to check whether the 
eventual PCA between the EU and China had such conditionality clause as the negotiation was 
no longer in the agenda between the EU and China. Instead, a Strategic Agenda for Cooperation 
was introduced in 2013 and a partnership instrument was created to finance related initiatives 
in China (European External Action Service 2013; European Commission 2014). 
Unlike the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement stated above, the Strategic Agenda for 
Cooperation did not produce any upgrade of bilateral treaty framework, or explicitly put in the 
concept of conditionality in EU-China relations. However, the Strategic Agenda for 
Cooperation, and two policy communications produced in 2016 and 2019, continued to strength 
the concept of responsibility and reciprocity. For instance, in the foreword of the Strategic 
Agenda for Cooperation, the EU highlighted the idea of “shared responsibility” in the context 
of “a multipolar world”, and stressed that the partnership was “based on the principles of 
equality, respect and trust.” (European External Action Service 2013:2) The 2016 Joint 
Communication even explicitly asked for reciprocity … across all areas of cooperation” and 
engaged China “in its reform process in practical ways” (European Commission and High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2016:2). Compared to 
previous narratives, it was rather obvious that the European Union no longer treated China as a 
developing country that justified special treatments from EU unconditional engagement. 
Instead, as reflected by the latest strategic paper published in 2019, the EU considered that “the 
balance of challenges and opportunities presented by China has shifted.” (European 
Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
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2019:1). The EU would formulate its policy to China from a  more “realistic, assertive and 
multi-faceted approach”, and the concept of “a systemic rival” first appeared in any EU policy 
towards China (ibid.) In short, even though the European Union might not consider China as 
an international rivalry as the United States did, it could be seen that the aspiration of the EU 
was fundamentally shifted from the early unconditional engagement to reciprocal engagement. 
Policy re-orientation and new approach were therefore necessary for such turn, and a multi-
faceted approach could mean more than policies solely on Brussels-Beijing relations, but covers 
other levels of government. 
Legitimacy of European Foreign Policy to China: From Civilian Power Discourse to 
Normative Power with Structural Changes 
The shift of EU narratives towards EU-China relations also reflected the changing EU 
international identity and self-conception. As Jørgensen (2004) argued, the legitimacy of EU 
foreign policy could be understood in twofold. The first understanding is that EU foreign policy 
must be a legitimate measure in the eyes of major stakeholders, i.e. the supranational 
bureaucrats and Member States leaders. Although the majority of the competence in foreign 
policy was at the hand of national leaders seated in the European Council and operated by the 
High Representative, these leaders were “well-supported” by European bureaucrats in the 
EEAS and respective commissioners when the initiative covered their portfolio, for instance 
humanitarian aid and external trade agreement with the third countries. The European 
bureaucrats maintained high level of influence such as agenda setting and the supply of 
information for decision-making. On the other hand, given the consensual feature of EU foreign 
policy decision framework, a handful of EU Member States could veto a foreign policy 
initiative if they found it illegitimate or against their national interests. The second 
understanding of the idea of legitimacy was that EU foreign policy served as a tool to enhance 
EU legitimacy domestically and internationally though its identity expression. In fact, one 
important role of “foreign policy” was to mediate the relationship between a state and –he rest 
of the world - foreign policy per se “as a performance of identity” (Ifversen and Kølvraa 
2007:5), although legitimacy could also be boosted by materialistic outcome and administrative 
efficiency. (Smith 1994; Risse 2005: Kritzinger 2005) Through the creation of foreign policy 
and its performance, the EU on one hand could be “identified” and became a visible actor in 
global affairs; on the other hand through the narration of the “Others” the EU could find its own 
“Self” thus became a legitimate actor to represent the Europeans at international level. 
In conceptualising EU presence in international politics, many scholars identify the EU as either 
a “civilian power”, a “normative power” or a “structural power” (Duchêne 1973; Bull 1982; 
Hill 1990; Stavridis 2001; Manners 2002; 2006a; 2006b; Manners and Whiteman 2003; Diez 
2005; Sjurjen 2006a; 2006b; Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Whiteman 2011; Keukeleire 2003; 
Keukeleire, Thiers and Justaert 2009). First formulated by François Duchêne (1972; 1973), 
Maull (1990:92 – 93) suggested that a civilian power should embrace the characteristics of “the 
concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with 
military power as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of 
international interactions.” Manners (2002) argued that the civilian power Europe consisted of 
three distinctive features: “the centrality of economic power to achieve national goals; the 
primacy of co-operation to solve international problems; and the willingness to use legally-
binding supranational institutions to achieve international progre–s” (Manners 2002:236 - 237). 
For normative power, it was firstly introduced on the distinction between economic power, 
political power and power over opinion and presented itself away from the empirical and 
material impact. The concept of normative power focused on the ideational and cognitive 
process with “both substantive and symbolic components” (Manners, 2002:239; see also Carr 
2001).While Diez (2005) suggested that the normative power was being part of the civilian 
power, Manners differentiated it by defining normative power as “the ability to shape 
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conception of “normal” in international relations” (Manners 2002:239) and “non-material 
exemplification found in the contagion of norms through imitation and attraction.” (Manners 
2006b:176) Rather than based on diplomatic solution, economic power and legally-binding 
supranational structures (Manners 2000; 2002), the normative power of the European Union 
was based on the “historical context, hybrid polity and political-legal constitutionalism” 
(Manners 2002:240 – 241). Manners argued that the normative power was the identity of the 
European Union as well as the everyday practice of European foreign policy and capabilities, 
i.e. being normative and acting in a normative way (Whiteman 2011:6). From Whiteman’s 
perspective, normative power Europe should be studied based on different level of international 
society, ranging from individual level to structural level, from European level and non-
European level (Whiteman 2011:7). Turning to the policy-level analysis and the EU self-
asserted position in international politics, Stephen Keukeleire (2003; Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan 2008; Keukeleire, Thiers and Justaert 2009) suggested that the European foreign 
policy should be understood as a “structural foreign policy” that in a long run seeked “to 
influence or shape sustainable political, legal, economic, social, security and other structures 
which can be situated at various relevant levels (individual, society, state, regional, global…) 
in a given space” (Metais and Thépaut 2013:6). The European Union was perceived as a 
“structural power” which aimed to influence or shape the structures of the third party through 
its foreign policy,  for example the application of the abovementioned concept of conditionality 
to CEE states during the enlargement exercise (Grabbe 2002; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
2004; 2005; Schimmelfennig 2008), and the subsequent borrowing of the enlargement 
experience to export values and norms to the European Neighbourhood (Lavenex 2004; Kelley 
2006; Pace 2006; Baracani 2007; Sasse 2008; Whiteman and Wolff 2010; Raik 2011; Balfour 
2012; Metais, Thépaut and Keukeleire 2013). Moving further from the conditionality clause, 
Richard Youngs (2010) defined the concept of structural power as moving “from narrowly 
conceived conditionality to broader means of exerting political leverage” (Youngs 2010:1). 
This included using “smart sanctions” and engaging the local stakeholders to press for 
democratic reforms from within (Youngs 2010:9 – 11). 
Two implications could be drawn from the above understanding of the legitimacy of the 
European foreign policy. The first one was rather generic: any kind of debate on EU actorness 
or the kind of power the EU represented indeed reflected the lack of solid international identity 
of the EU in both domestic and international audience. The fluid nature of EU identity/identities 
on one hand was the source of EU normative power, as such “fluid, complex, multiple and 
relational aspects of the self-other contestations” define EU normative power (Manners 
2006b:178). On the other hand, it created the security problem for EU as a post-national polity. 
Diez (2005) also commented that the normative power Europe was a kind of “discursive model” 
for EU external presence, “a new sense of collective purpose” and “a new rhetoric… for the 
EU on its future global goal” (Aggestam 2008:1; Mayer 2008:61; Bickerton 2011:25). The 
failure of delivery of such model not only created a legitimacy crisis of EU foreign policy per 
se, but also generated a kind of societal security concerns challenging the EU as a regional 
security complex.  Rather than traditional security challenges covered military and territorial 
security, societal security concerned “the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for 
evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and 
custom” (Buzan1991:19 – 20; see also Wæ ver, Buzan, Kelstrup and Lemaitre, 1993). In this 
case, being normative and acting in a normative way was a “security-driven choice” of the 
European Union, and the normative facet of the EU and the security concerns of the EU 
constituted “parameters for each other” (Youngs 2004:431). 
The second one was more specific on the EU-China relations. As we compared the rhetoric of 
“civilian power”, “normative power” and “structural power”, we could see the shifting from a 
pure “civilian power” with unconditional engagement, to a “normative power” which opted for 
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structural changes in China through the deployment of civilian operation. As demonstrated by 
the 2013 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation and the 2016 Joint Communication, the EU always 
asked for multiple areas of reform from economic to environment, through various of 
“dialogues” and initiatives (European External Active Service 2013; European Commission 
and High Representative for Union Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2016). More 
importantly, the promotion of “global public goods, sustainable development and international 
security” became an important objective for EU foreign policy towards China, and expected 
China to balance both responsibilities and benefits drawn from the liberal world order 
(European Commission and High Representative for Union Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
2016). Instead of a unilateral commitment and engagement practiced for a decade, the EU 
turned itself as “a partner in China’s reform” and helped China to manage the “structural 
transition” through sharing EU experience an– innovation (ibid: 5 - 6). The changing narrations 
of EU-China relations was indeed a reflection of the “strategic adjustment” made to mediate 
the changing domestic systems and international systems. Given the highly volatile and 
conditional nature of legitimacy in contemporary days, the EU was required to make active 
changes not only in terms of policy papers’ rhetoric but also EU programmes at different policy 
aspects. In this case, port diplomacy through civilian port could always serve a kind of policy 
innovation in EU-China relations, especially if it could fit the interests of the EU and its 
Member States.  
Interests in European Foreign Policy in China: Economic Gain versus Ideational Expression 
Mentioned in last chapter, Michael Yahuda (2008) identified two elements that governed the 
contemporary EU-China relations, i.e. “the tyranny of distance” and “the primacy of trade”. 
The two concepts were introduced by many scholars and experts in EU-China relations before 
even Yahuda’s conceptualisation. For instance, Griffith (1981) had highlighted that the physical 
distance was not the main reason for the geographical disengagement between Europe and 
China. Instead, the general ignorance and stereotypes in the past had made Europe to turn a 
blind eye to Beijing in their decision-making mind map, and the same situation happened to 
Beijing against Brussels as well (Möller 2002; Men 2008; Schilling 2012). For the second 
element, some scholars suggested that it was owing to the structural characteristics of European 
foreign policy, which was limited by the competence enjoyed by the European Union and was 
more visible in the field of trade relations (Piening 1997). In addition, the Member States’ 
governments were fantasied by the potential of Chinese domestic market since the imperial 
period (Casarini 2006), and the inflow of Chinese hot money after the financial crisis 
(Godement et. al. 2011). From Beijing’s perspective, she also needed to explore the European 
Single Market for her exports as well as imported technology for her domestic development 
(Casarini 2006). The European market was also a kind of good investment for both Chinese 
public and private sector to dilute their financial risks and over-reliance on US market. However, 
the changing context of international political economy, the improvement in technology and 
transportation, and the closer alignment of economic interests in EU-China relations did not 
change the respective foreign policy priority of the EU and China towards each other, which 
remained to be secondary to its relations with United States (Vogt 2012).    
In fact, the two elements identified by Yahuda (2008) had their respective relevancy to port 
diplomacy. First, the “primacy of trade” not only described the importance of material 
transactions between Europe and China, but also the role of these transactions to the European 
Union. As discussed in last section, contemporary security issues were far more than traditional 
territorial security but involved different sectors of security from economic security to societal 
security (Buzan 1991; Wæ ver, Buzan, Kelstrup and Lemaitre, 1993), with the ultimate concern 
on maintaining the legitimacy of the regime. While neofunctionalism and liberal 
intergovernmental differed themselves in explaining European integration, they shared the 
similar ideas on the legitimacy of the supranational regime, i.e. the importance of economic 
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performance and functional efficiency (Haas 1964; 1968; Moravcsik 1999; Risse 2003; 2005; 
Kritzinger 2005). Neofunctionalism suggested that a loyalty transfer from one’s national regime 
to a supranational organisation was always possible if people perceived that the supranational 
organization was far more effective in answering citizens’ demands and provision of public 
good (Haas 1964; 1968; Risse 2005). On the other hand, liberal intergovernmentalism regarded 
economic performance and functional efficiency as the prerequisite of nation-states to 
participate in European integration and collective policy (Moravcsik 1993; 1997; 1999). The 
division of Member States’ position over EU-China relations was the best illustration of the 
liberal intergovernmentalist argument (Fox and Godement 2009; Godement et. al. 2011). As a 
result, economic performance became an important parameter in defining the achievement of 
European foreign policy, as it could either positively contribute to the legitimacy of the 
supranational regime, or negatively contribute to the hesitation of Member States’ further 
commitment. In fact, a similar concern also suited for contemporary China either, which 
demanded nationalism and economic performance as the key of Chinese stability (Shirk 2007). 
Given the main feature of civilian ports as a facilitator of global transactions as well as a motor 
for economic prosperity, civilian ports had naturally a position in contemporary EU-China 
relations and port actions at civilian ports could be critical to both the EU and China in 
protecting and promoting their commercial interests and economic agenda.    
In addition, “the tyranny of distance”, which covered both geographical distance and mental 
distance, was a double-edged sword to EU normative power. On one hand, the lack of physical 
contact lowered the cost of adopting “hard-line” identity politics against China, as any direct 
retaliation or military threat was required to overcome the geographical distance between 
Brussels and Beijing. For instance, it was rather scarce for East Asian and Southeast Asian 
states to receive political dissents such as Dalai Lama from Tibet, Rebiya Kadeer from Xinjiang 
or even Joshua Wong from Hong Kong, or to make comment against the socio-political 
situation within China owing to the huge immediate threat posed by China in terms of military 
and economic dominance in the region. On the contrary, it was rather normal for the European 
Union and its Member States to receive people from similar background even some of them 
had close economic ties with Beijing, ranging from nominating and awarding Liu Xiaobo for 
Nobel Peace Prize to receiving political activist Joshua Wong for public hearing on Hong Kong 
democratisation process. On the other hand, the lack of social contact and the historical context 
of European imperialism in late Qing Dynasty and communist China discourse made the 
exercise of normative power directly to the centre of the regime far more difficult. The 
“cognitive dissonance” (Shambaugh:2008) between China and Europe in terms of perceptions 
and expectations of the relations between themselves or in other areas was too large to be 
overcome (Cameron 2009; Smith and Xie 2010; Schilling 2012), and China held different 
perceptions towards individual EU member states (Möller 2002). In addition, though Europe 
might not be the first tier of expression of Chinese nationalism, she was indeed the core actor 
in Chinese “century of humiliation” thus gaining some weight in nationalistic discourse, 
especially when the two regions disagreed with each other (Grant 1995; Men 2008). In this case, 
the penetration of ideas and norms would be less effective without a suitable portal to enter 
Chinese leadership and society, as the Chinese leadership would be extremely aware of such 
sharing of minds. Civilian port, which served as an natural geographical space for people-to-
people interactions and exchange of ideas, could be an ideal place to bridge such “cognitive 
dissonance”. 
The Multi-layered Interests and Identities in Chinese Foreign Policy to the EU 
Compared to her European counterpart, Beijing did not have the problem of “multiple realities” 
in terms of defining national interests and objectives in her foreign policy. However, the role 
of interests and identities remained crucial to understand Chinese foreign policy to the EU, 
Bringing the Ports and Port Diplomacy Back-in     81 
 
which also defined the boundaries of port responses at civilian ports. 
Beijing primary position to the EU was rather instrumental, and constructed with reference to 
the new Sino-American bipolarity and the Confucius strategic culture of co-opting one group 
of barbarians to control another group of barbarians (Shambaugh 1996). The concept of 
“Western learning for practical purposes and Chinese learning for the fundamentals” (Yahuda 
2008:18) had framed the cooperation between Europe and China as a key initiative against the 
projected imperialism of United States. While the so-called “new diplomacy” (Medeiros and 
Fravel 2003) formed since the Jiang’s era might deviate from the tradition realist perception of 
Chinese foreign policy, Beijing commitment to multilateralism was indeed combined with 
“multipolarism” and the primary objective was to “accord China greater leverage and influence” 
(Wu and Lansdowne 2008:7 – 8). As a result, Beijing engagement to the European Union and 
her active participation in Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) was viewed as a counterweight of US 
hegemonic influence in global and regional order, and such strategic thinking was decisive in 
shaping contemporary EU-China relations. Also, the rather instrumental value of the European 
Union allowed Beijing to play different mind-games and pragmatic strategies against the EU, 
for instance the divide-and-rule strategy (Vangeli 2013). In fact, the less successful exercise of 
normative power Europe against China could attribute to the internal fragmentation of the EU 
(Fox and Godement 2009; Miks 2010; Godement et. al. 2011; Song 2012). For instance, the 
“scorecard” published by European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), a think-tank 
focusing on the analysis of European foreign policy, showed that EU member states were quite 
divergent in issues like human rights and governance, economic disputes with China and 
attitude of cooperation towards China in solving the EURO crisis (European Council on 
Foreign Relations 2012; 2013; 2014). 
The impact of identities and values in Beijing foreign policy to the EU was more subtle, and 
the historical background of EU-China relations mattered in shaping the ideational framework 
of contemporary EU-China relations. Wang (2012) discussed the four main pathways of 
historical memory in shaping contemporary Chinese foreign policy as follows: 
1. It defined the norms and shared framework among senior officials; 
2. It served as a point of reference when making a decision; 
3. It affected the interpretations, perceptions and understanding of phenomena; and  
4. It shaped the priority of interests and actions to be taken. 
Another EU-China relation expert Reuben Wong (2013) suggested that the changing role of 
China in the international system had forced Beijing continuously revaluate her identity and 
self-image, and the historical interactions between imperial China and the rest of the world 
became an important pool of ideational resources. Through selective remembering and 
forgetting of her past symbols and representation, Beijing aimed to create an image that could 
successfully resemble the glory of imperial China and the “century of humiliation”, for the sake 
of the regime stability. An illustrative example regarded this idea was the BRI, which consisted 
of the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR). The 
naming of the key initiatives involved in BRI not only resembled the glorious past of China as 
an undisputed centre of Asian commercial network under the tributary trade system, on the 
other hand it aimed to counteract the Western-sponsored String of Pearls” discourse by 
highlighting the nature of Silk Road – which had always been a cultural signifier of Chinese 
commercial attraction in the past and a legacy “defined” nowadays Chinese economic 
cooperation. By linking Chinese new economic diplomacy with these culture-rich narrations, 
Beijing not only constructed a revival of Chinese glory which echoed the nationalistic “China’s 
Dream” narration proposed by Xi, but also an image of “peaceful development” by 
downplaying the anxiety of military intention in the project. 
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Putting the above analysis of the role of interests and identities into the analysis of potential 
Chinese port responses, two lessons could be drawn. First, differential treatments could always 
be justified, either through the pragmatism behind Chinese foreign policy or the difference of 
perception. The pragmatic argument was twofold. On one hand, insofar the ultimate objective, 
i.e. promoting economic prosperity and maintaining internal and external stability, differential 
treatments could be introduced and challenges could be tolerated. A typical example of such 
toleration was the flexible arrangement of OCTS which delegated a high degree of autonomy 
to two Special Administrative Regions. On the other hand, differential treatments could be 
justified as Beijing could hold different perceptions and interests to each foreign community at 
civilian ports. The benefits generated to Beijing through her interactions at different ports with 
different foreign communities, in this thesis the European communities, might make impact to 
Chinese port responses at specific civilian ports or specific group of European communities. 
The second lesson drawn from the above analysis was that Chinese historical interactions and 
perceptions about foreign communities as well as the maritime space in general could possibly 
make impact to contemporary Chinese port responses. The impact might be understood in two 
different but interlinked perspectives. First, the maritime space was generally perceived as a 
threat in traditional Chinese culture, especially after the mid-Ming Dynasty. In analysing the 
imperial Chinese international “personality”, Fairbank (1969a) concluded that Chinese power 
was largely land-based and bureaucratic, which he contrasted to maritime and commercial. A 
conservative and inward-looking attitude towards Chinese maritime space turned Beijing adopt 
a rather responsive approach towards maritime opportunities and threats. Rather than taking 
advantages, Chinese government was sceptical towards the maritime space and the arrival of 
European powers further strengthened the perception (Fairbank 1969a; Wang 2004; Chang 
2006). If national security was the top concern of realist China since 1949, security challenges 
from maritime space might occupy a crucial position in this top concern. These challenges 
included the direct security challenges such as turning the civilian ports as a potential base for 
revolution, to indirect ideational and economic challenges that impacted the societal and 
economic security of contemporary China. The second conceptual pathway to conceptualise 
the importance of historical interactions was the history of the civilian ports per se. The history 
of a civilian port, for instance, the major foreign communities present in the past and their 
relations with China, or the historic institutions and interactions created in civilian ports, might 
shape Chinese port responses at these civilian ports. Unlike the perception over its maritime 
space which was mainly negative, this kind of historical interactions could be either positive or 
negative depended on the nature of interactions and who did China interacted with. As a result, 
the history of a civilian port could be a potential asset, as well as a kind of liability, for Chinese 
foreign policy thus port responses. 
A Typology of Ports and its Potential Role in EU-China Relations 
The bifurcation of the European foreign policy towards China, together with the mental distance 
between the Europeans and the Chinese on the idea of “normal”, created the “normative dead 
ends” in Europe-China relations (Vangeli 2013:25). From the EU’s point of view, a strategic 
partnership should fulfil both the economic and strategic demand of the European Commission, 
representing the supranational level, and the member states, as well as projecting the EU as “a 
force for good” (Smith and Xie 2010). While the economic and strategic logic might be easily 
for Beijing to make concession, she would always prefer separate the normative and political 
issues from economic cooperation as it was always a kind of security threat to her. The dilemma 
of responding to the economic demand at member-state level and the ideational demand at the 
European level, therefore, required a tactful diplomacy for the EU in facing China’s rising 
international status. From the above discussion, using civilian ports and port diplomacy as the 
leverage seemed to be a way-out for the European Union.                    
Bringing the Ports and Port Diplomacy Back-in     83 
 
The idea of “agentification” of European maritime policy established the possibility to turn a 
civilian port as an agent to serve the greater good of European foreign policy. The remaining 
question was how a possible mechanism could be constructed. The concept of port geography 
and the typology of ports might provide an answer to this question. 
In defining the port geography of a civilian port, Fleming and Hayuth (1994) gave two 
dimensions of port geography, namely the dimensions of centrality and intermediacy. 
Following the framework of Fleming and Hayuth (1994), Ducruet provided a meta-
geographical matrix of the typology of civilian ports as follows (Figure 3.1): 
 
Figure 3.1 A typology of civilian ports under the centrality-intermediacy nexus  (Ducruet 2007:159) 
While the above categorisation was designed for IPE instead of international relations, the 
thesis borrowed this model in framing the role of civilian ports in EU-China relations. 
Mentioned in the introduction, the thesis revised the dimension of centrality as the capacity for 
a diplomatic actor to generate socio-economic common goods and soft institutions, while the 
concept of intermediacy as the socio-political quality of the maritime network a civilian port 
possessed and served. The dimension of centrality included both the institutional capacity 
owned by the actors concerned, the political and cultural presence at the civilian ports and the 
historical linkage between the actors and the ports concerned, and categorised in accordance to 
Bringing the Ports and Port Diplomacy Back-in     84 
 
the level set by Ducruet (2007), i.e. from low to medium and then high. On the other hand, the 
dimension o intermediacy included the political, economic and cultural network that the civilian 
ports connected to, and also categorised in accordance to the level set by Ducruet (2007), i.e. 
from low to medium and then high. The thesis, therefore, had used the same typology suggested 
by Ducruet (2007) in defining role of civilian ports in European foreign policy. 
In traditional IPE and port studies, the port geography of a civilian port was a crucial factor in 
determining actor’s port choice to ship and offload their cargoes and goods to a specific country, 
especially if the country had more than one civilian ports. Notteboom (2009:746 – 747) had 
summarised the typical factors of port choice according to the demand, supply and market 
profile of a civilian port as follows: 
1. The demand profile included “the flow orientation of the port towards the foreland and 
hinterland, the scale and growth of the port, and the connectivity of port within wider 
maritime networks”. 
2. The supply profile included “the availability, cost, quality and reliability of the nautical 
access, container terminals, and hinterland access”. 
3. The market profile included “the cargo-control characteristics, the structure of the 
terminal-operating business within the port, and presence of logistics activities in the 
port, the logistic focus of the port, and the port reputation”. 
In addition to Notteboom’s profiling of a civilian port and the implications to port choice, Lam 
and Dai (2012) had reviewed three major methods that governed the port selection problem. 
The analytical hierarchy process (AHP) method focused on the ranking of both services enjoyed 
and cost embedded during the selection process, thus it was a multi-objective, multi-criteria 
theory which allowed the shippers and carriers to make rational decisions on port preferences 
based on a set of detailed, comprehensive and ranked criteria. The discrete choice model (DCM), 
on the other hand, assumed that shippers and carriers might not necessarily know the details of 
port infrastructure and service provided. Service factors were internalized during the decision 
process such that the cost criteria such as charges, traveling distance and efficiency of handling 
shipment had been more prominent in decision-making process. Finally, the data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) focused on the relative efficiency of using different ports through the relative 
productivity the container port enjoyed. While the decision-making model might be different 
in some criteria, Lam and Dai (2012:514) suggested that “location, port charges, port 
infrastructure, ship calls, container traffic and water depth (indicating the size of vessel that can 
enter the port)” were critical to the port selection process. The above discussion on port choice 
might to distant to the core concern of the thesis. However, the analytical gap would be much 
smaller if the concept of structural power and structural foreign policy was taken into an account.  
The Exercise of EU Structural Power and the Inattentional Blindness of the Spatial 
Difference within a Given Geographical Space 
It was not entirely new to conceptualise the EU as a normative power or a structural power 
which aimed to promote normative changes and structural changes of the third-party state 
(Duchêne 1973; Bull 1982; Hill 1990; Maull 1990; Manners 2000; 2002; 2006a; 2006b; K. E. 
Smith 2003; 2005; Stavridis 2001; Manners and Whiteman 2003; Keukeleire 2003; Diez 2005 ; 
Sjursen 2006a; 2006b; Bretherton and Vogler 2006;  Holden 2009; Whiteman 2011; Keukeleire, 
Thiers and Justaert 2009; Keukeleire and Justaert 2012; Keukeleire and Delreux 2015; Hocking 
and Smith 2016). The two prominent discourses on the characteristics of EU power were the 
normative power formulated by Ian Manners (2000; 2002; 2006a; 2006b) and the concept of 
structural power and structural foreign policy promoted by Stephan Keukeleire and his 
colleagues (Keukeleire, Thiers and Justaert 2009; Keukeleire and Justaert 2012; Keukeleire and 
Delreux 2015). While the normative power discourse placed more focus on the non-military 
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nature of the European Union and its foreign policy, the concept of structural power and 
structural foreign policy deserved a closer look. The concept of structural power, as one of its 
founder Stephan Keukeleire suggested, aimed to pursue and support “long-term structural 
changes, both in the internal situation of the countries concerned and in the inter-state relations 
and general situation of these regions” (Keukeleire 2003:47). To achieve so, Keukeleire argued 
that the EU external relations were a kind of “structural foreign policy” which were designed 
to transfer “various ideological and governing principles” of the EU to the third-party state 
(ibid.). Structural diplomacy, therefore, involved “the process of dialogue and negotiation by 
which actors in the international system seek to influence or shape sustainable external political, 
legal, economic, social and security structures at different relevant levels in a given geographic 
space” (Keukeleire, Thiers and Justaert 2009:146, emphasis added by the author). From the 
perspective of Keukeleire and his colleagues, the idea of structural was indeed twofold: 1) the 
objective of the policy to shape structures and 2) the expected long-term and sustainable effects 
towards the targeted structures in the given geographic space (ibid.; see also Metais and Thepaut 
2013). 
Given the expected long-term effects and sustainability of structural foreign policy, Keukeleire, 
Thiers and Justaert (2009) had identified several, but non-exhaustive as the authors highlighted, 
factors contributed to the effectiveness of structural foreign policy at the state level. The factors 
included: 
1) Intensity and the quality of the dialogues that could successfully turn political 
declaration into operations;  
2) A long-term strategy that aimed to formally or informally institutionalise the 
continuous dialogue and negotiation;  
3) A comprehensive approach to develop a close relationship with various levels of 
partners and actors, and to cover various levels of relevant structures;  
4) The degree of embeddedness of structural power in other forms of diplomatic actions 
and external relations conducted by the actor itself and its diplomatic allies;  
5) The idea of legitimacy in the eyes of the third-party state and an appropriate 
provision of “carrot and sticks” to the state concerned.  
The theoretical framework of structural power and structural foreign policy attracted lots of 
evaluation on its content and effectiveness. For instance, an edited work on EU neighbourhood 
policy highlighted the pros and cons of EU structural foreign policy in promoting rule of law 
in the neighbourhood region (Metais, Thepaut and Keukeleire 2013), or an evaluation of the 
characteristics and effectiveness of EU aid policy in advancing EU structural power to the world 
(Holden 2009).In terms of challenges at global level, Keukeleire and Delreux (2015) pointed 
out that the presence of Russia and Islamic community at EU’s eastern and southern borders 
was an important factor contributing the failure of EU structural power in the region, while Li 
(2017) suggested that the rise of China in Africa as a viable alternative to development aid had 
undermined EU conditionality – a typical component of EU structural foreign policy – in Africa. 
Despite the emphasis on multi-level engagement suggested by Keukeleire and his colleagues 
in exercising structural power, literature on EU structural power was never sensitive to the 
spatial difference within “a given geographic space”. While the collective essays on the 
promotion of the rule of law to EU neighbourhood did analyse the effect of EU structural power 
to different neighbouring states or the micro-policies that targeted different actors, those essays 
did not take the spatial characteristics into a serious consideration. One could possibly project 
the difference, in terms of impact and obstacles, if the EU micro-policies were implemented at 
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the national capital or central business district vis-à-vis a medium-sized town in suburb region 
or a small village in rural area. On the other hand, one could also project the difference, in terms 
of implementation strategy and operational tactics, when the EU wished to introduce its micro-
structural policy to the national capital vis-à-vis a village located at the very periphery of the 
national political and economic system. As reviewed in the last section of this chapter, the 
concept of multiple realities was not limited to the European Union but also, in the thesis, China. 
Therefore, a comprehensive evaluation of EU structural power and structural foreign policy to 
China should also take the spatial difference within China seriously. 
Apart from the importance to acknowledge the spatial difference within China in evaluating 
EU foreign policies towards China, the role of subnational entities, in this thesis the civilian 
ports, should be taken into the account as well. As reviewed in Chapter 2, civilian ports were 
undeniable actor-networks in international politics and global political economy. The three vital 
roles suggested by Acuto (2013) were critical to EU structural policies towards China. First of 
all, the role as a networking actant of a civilian port placed various targeted structures and 
potential local resources within the port space, and such a concentration of structures could 
potentially facilitate (or hinder) the exercise of EU structural power and structural foreign 
policy towards the port per se as well as Chinese responses. On the other hand, the role as a 
networking actor of a civilian port connected actors at various levels in the EU and China, from 
formal diplomatic actors like the EU Office or Chinese central government’s representative at 
the port concerned, to informal actors like commercial chambers or municipal authorities. 
These actors were “caged” by the port space, “forced” to utilise the diplomatic resources 
available to them at the port, to protect and project their own structural foreign policy agenda. 
Finally, the role as a networking network of a civilian port determined the extensity of the 
influence of EU structural foreign policies and Chinese responses in terms of the potential spill-
over effect from local, regional to national. The role of networking network also determined 
the possibility of future step-in from external allies, the availability of additional resources in 
supporting the exercise of EU structural power or Chinese defence from it.       
Therefore, the economic rationality in explaining a commercial actor in picking a suitable 
civilian port might be analogical to the political rationality for a diplomatic actor to pick a 
suitable civilian port to offload its “diplomatic goods” and advance its structural power in the 
region. In traditional port studies, the economic rationality and the capacity of a port to handle 
economic goods could be evaluated by two variables namely centrality and intermediacy. In 
fact, the idea of centrality, i.e. “the endogenous economic interests and trade generation power”, 
could also be understood as “the endogenous political interests and institutions generation 
power” if the concept was “politicised” and readily applicable to foreign policy analysis. On 
the other hand, the concept of intermediacy, i.e. “external player’s election of a place for serving 
their networks of economic interests and trade”, could also be understood as “external player’s 
election of a place for serving their networks of political interests and institutions”. Table 3.5 
proposed a potential thematic matrix to link up the concepts of centrality and intermediacy to 
the respective roles of civilian ports under the modified global city thesis suggested by Acuto 
(2013): 
  
Bringing the Ports and Port Diplomacy Back-in     87 
 
 Networking actant Networking actors Networking network 
Centrality The availability of 
various structures and 
resources within the 
port space 
The capacity to glue 
various actors within 
the port space 
The spill-over 
capacity from one 
structure to another 
structure within the 
port space 
Intermediacy The degree of 
connectivity of various 
structures between 
local port space and 
national geographic 
space  
The capacity to glue 
various actors between 
local port space and 
national geographic 
space 
The leverage effect of 
shaping structures in 
local port space to 
national structural 
change  
Table 3.5 The relationship matrix between the role of civilian ports & centrality-intermediacy analysis 
From the table above, it could also show the potential linkage among the concept of structural 
power, centrality-intermediacy analysis, and the roles of civilian ports. The concept of 
centrality indeed reflected the opportunities and constraints of the exercise of structural power 
and structural foreign policies at port, while the concept of intermediacy reflected the 
opportunities and constraints to leverage structural power at port to regional or even national 
level.  
By acknowledging the importance of centrality and intermediacy in the role of civilian ports 
and structural power, the thesis, through a comparative study of Hong Kong, Macao and 
Shanghai which possessed different levels of centrality and intermediacy, aimed to visualise 
EU “structural port diplomacy” to China and the responses from Beijing to EU structural port 
diplomacy. The proposed analytical framework, on one hand, filled in the existing literature 
gap of EU structural power which was inattention to the spatial difference within the state in 
evaluating the structural foreign policies. On the other hand, it strengthened the discussion of 
the role of substate entities, in particular civilian ports, in EU-China relations and a broader 
audience of international politics and global political economy. 
Chapter Summary and Preview 
This chapter served as a bridge between the theoretical discussion of the previous two chapters 
and the empirical chapters on Macao, Hong Kong and Shanghai. The chapter had firstly 
introduced the “multiple realities”, in terms of actorness and policy instruments, of both the EU 
and China, so as to establish the feasibility of European port diplomacy and Chinese port 
responses. After that, the chapter continued to discuss the multi-layered interests and identities 
in contemporary EU-China relations from the perspective of Brussels and Beijing, highlighting 
the motivation and constraints behind European foreign policy and Chinese foreign policy, 
Beijing, and how interactions within a civilian port could contribute to their respective concerns 
in interests and identities. The chapter concluded itself by introducing an academic mechanism 
to define and discuss the linkage among the role of civilian ports, the centrality-intermediacy 
analysis and the concept of structural power. The innovative adaption of the port-city interface 
suggested by Ducruet and his colleagues (Ducruet and Lee 2006; 2007), the global city thesis 
presented by Acuto (2013), and the discussion of structural power by Keukeleire and his 
colleagues (Keukeleire, Thiers and Justaert 2009; Keukeleire and Justaert 2012; Keukeleire and 
Delreux 2015) became the cornerstone of the analytical framework of the thesis. This vague 
framework would then be applied to the selected ports in China, namely Macao (Chapter 4), 
Hong Kong (Chapter 5) and Shanghai (Chapter 6).              
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Chapter 4: Macao as a Sino-European Condominium – The Role 
of Macao in Sino-European Port Diplomacy 
Although it was the first European settlement created in China, Macao, among the selected 
three civilian ports studied in the thesis, received less attention in international relations study. 
Compared to Hong Kong, a well-known financial centre and logistics hub, and Shanghai, the 
busiest civilian ports in the world and the motor of Chinese economy, Macao was known as its 
“Las Vegas of Asia” in gambling and tourism. However, it was not the case in 16th and 17th 
century when the Europeans firstly arrived China from maritime routes. Followed by the first 
Luso-Chinese trade agreement concluded between the Portuguese traders and Canton 
authorities, the Portuguese traders were allowed to turn Macao into an official “warehouse” in 
1557. Since then, Macao had occupied a crucial role in Portuguese trade routes from Goa to 
Nagasaki, until mid-17th century when tides of political issues happened in Europe and Asia 
both turned against Portuguese domination. The role of Macao changed from serving the sole 
Portuguese interest to a more generic European interest. Nonetheless, the role of Macao 
received its final blow when Hong Kong was established as a British colony and international 
treaty port after 1842. 
The rise and fall of Portuguese Macao were researched by many scholars (Fernandes 1997; 
2008; Edmonds 1993; Edmonds and Yee 1999; Chan 2003), but little attention was placed to 
the changing port geography of Macao during the period. Given the lack of international 
attention, academics also showed less interests in conceptualising the role of Macao in shaping 
historic and contemporary EU-China relations. In fact, as the first European settlement in China 
as well as the only Chinese civilian port that concluded a bilateral trade agreement with the 
European Union, the case of Macao provided valuable insights and resources to study the role 
of civilian port in Sino-European relations. 
As the first empirical chapter of the thesis, this chapter would first outline the changing port 
geography of Macao from the creation of Portuguese settlement in 1557 to the creation of 
British Hong Kong in 1842, which effectively ended Macao’s crucial role in Sino-European 
trade relations. Followed by that, the chapter would discuss how Macao was turned to a 
diplomatic condominium by the CCP and Lisbon and its impact to Macao port geography after 
the handover of sovereignty to Beijing in 1999. The chapter would conclude itself by discussing 
of EU port actions under the EU-Macao TCA, Chinese port responses in Macao, and the lessons 
and implications drawn from these interactions. 
The Creation of Legacy: The Early Role of Macao in Sino-Portuguese Relations 
and Sino-European Relations (1557 – 1842) 
Although the formal “diplomatic” contact between Europe and China could always be dated 
back to the mission lead John of Plano Carpini to Karakorum which aimed to negotiate a peace 
settlement with Mongols, such contact did not institutionalise into formal diplomatic ties and 
civilian exchanges between the Europe and China. Quite a contrary, European princes and 
merchants were blocked from land access to China by the Mongolian Empire and then the 
Ottoman Empire. To bypass the powerful land power of Mongols and Arabs, European captains, 
sponsored by Portuguese and Spaniard courts, began their voyage in order to restore their 
contact to China through maritime routes. As shown by a set of instructions issued by King 
Manuel I of Portugal dated 13th February 1508, one objective of the voyage to Asia was to 
“inquire about the Chijins (Chinese)”, such as the socio-economic characteristics, their voyage 
patterns, their religious beliefs, etc. (Chang 1969:33) In 1511, the Portuguese fleets successfully 
made contact with Chinese fleets at Malacca when the Chinese captains sought help from 
Portuguese against the King of Malacca (Souza 1986:15 – 16). Although no substantial help 
was given by the Portuguese, it was said that the Chinese merchants were pleased and carried 
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with them a favourable report of character and their prowess. (Chang 1969:34) Subsequently 
in 1514 and 1516, two voyages were led by Jorge Alvares, who came to Tunmen (Tamao) and 
established a memorial monument of stone, and Rafael Perestrello, who arrived in Canton and 
brought back to the Portuguese court profitable goods and information about the commercial 
potentials of Sino-Portuguese trade. In 1517, on behalf of the Portuguese court, diplomat Fernao 
Peres de Andrade arrived Canton and met with local officials, aiming to establish formal 
diplomatic and commercial relationship with the Ming court in China. While members of the 
Portuguese fleets were initially allowed to reside onshore and traded with the Chinese locals at 
Canton and from surrounding ports, the Portuguese court failed to establish a formal embassy 
in Beijing partly owing to the general scepticism towards foreigners and the actual 
misbehaviours of some Portuguese captains in Malacca and Tuen Mun (Chang 1969:53 – 54). 
The above reasons, together with the unfortunate death of Emperor Zhengde who received the 
Portuguese envoy in 1520, eruptively ended the negotiation between China and Portugal in 
1521 (Souza 1986:16 – 17). In fact, all foreigners were banned to stay in Canton and to trade 
with Chinese merchants officially from 1521 (ibid; Chang 1969). Not until 1557 when the 
Portuguese merchants and Chinese local officials decided to turn Macao as a Portuguese 
settlement, Europeans (mainly Portuguese) were officially barred from Chinese trade even 
when the Chinese government reopened Canton for foreign trade in 1530 (Souza 1986:16 – 17). 
A Coastal Town in Sino-Portuguese Relations: The Early Role of Macao in Portuguese 
Port Diplomacy to China 
Despite the early historical record which showed as early as 1535 Macao was one of the official 
places for Chinese customs authority to collect dues after the Ming court decided to resume 
foreign trade, it was less known to the foreigners as a trading port nor a developed city for 
Chinese merchants to reside before 1557 (Chang 1969; Souza 1986). The excellence 
geographical position of Macao, which was located at the Western side of Pearl River estuary 
connecting the South China Sea, did not transform Macao as a trading hub owing to the general 
scepticism of the Ming court against maritime trade and her defensive attitude towards the 
Japanese piracy along the Chinese coast. Ironically, it was also part of the reason why Macao 
was chosen by the Ming co“rt as the Portuguese "warehouse” in China. As Chang (1969:87) 
suggested in his analysis on Sino-Portuguese trade relations, the Cantonese authorities on one 
hand loved to resume foreign trade at Canton so as to collect more customs dues (and perhaps 
personal bribes) from trading with Europeans. On the other hand, they were rather cautious 
about the “re-arrival” of the Portuguese merchants whose bad reputation as “Folangji pirates”16 
was widely circulated among the Chinese community since 1521. As a result, while the 
authorities legalised Portuguese merchants to trade at Canton, they also wished to keep the 
Portuguese merchants away from the populous city. The geographical location of Macao, which 
provided an accessible maritime route to Chinese main trading post but could be easily 
contained and isolated by land troops, apparently fit in Chinese concern over foreign maritime 
trade. From the Portuguese perspective, prior to the establishment of Macao as a semi-
permanent settlement, the Portuguese traders were not allowed to trade in China (Souza 1986) 
or only temporarily settled at outlying islands near Macao such as Lampacao and Shangchuan. 
A rather permanent settlement in Macao, which was closer to Canton and physically connected 
to the Chinese landmass, was always more preferred. 
Therefore, the mutual consent of making Macao as a semi-permanent settlement for Portuguese 
traders was never related to how “good” the quality of centrality and intermediacy. From the 
 
16 The term Folangji was borrowed from the Persian term Farangi, which could briefly be translated as 
the Franks. It was a common name shared among South and Southeast Asian communities during 15th 
century when they first arrived in the region. The Chinese communities may be introduced to the name 
by the Muslim traders when they traded with their vassal states in Southeast Asia (Zhang 1934). 
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Chinese perspective, Macao had little value in generating economic profits or political 
institutions as it was just an underdeveloped place and remained active only for the sake of 
collecting duties; in terms of intermediacy, it was always secondary to Canton, the main trading 
post of China authorised by the Ming court and Macao was never embedded itself to the 
economic, political and cultural network of foreign communities. It was exactly the opposite 
that the limited accessibility of Macao (especially by land routes) that favoured Chinese port 
choice to host the growing Portuguese community. From the perspective of Portuguese traders, 
they always wished to settle as close to Canton, if not in Canton, as possible. The concern over 
weak maritime infrastructure and economic generating capacity in Macao was outweighed by 
a closer geographical position than outlying islands, which were a kind of “non-port” with no 
economic generating capacity and distant from the Chinese mainland. Based on the typology 
suggested in Chapter 3, Macao could be classified as a kind of coastal town, which had low 
level of centrality and intermediacy. Interestingly, to choose a coastal town as a main site of 
interactions, the geographical advantage, instead of the capacity and the network owned by the 
civilian port, might the key factor to be considered by the diplomatic actors: the port choice of 
Macao, from Chinese perspective, was owing to the ease to selectively engage and contain the 
communities of Macao; from Portuguese perspective, it was just a kind of better-than-nothing 
deal and served as a bridgehead of future Sino-Portuguese engagement. Prior to the conclusion 
of the first Sino-Portuguese Agreement in 1554, both parties did not consider Macao seriously 
as a developed civilian port for facilitating the transactions or promoting of political values. 
With the conclusion of the Sino-Portuguese Agreement in 1554, Macao became a Portuguese 
settlement in 1557. However, such agreement did not generate the same “treaty port” status as 
with the ports Hong Kong and Shanghai in 1842 under the Treaty of Nanjing signed between 
the British government and the Manchurian court. In fact, compared to the status of Hong Kong 
which was ceased as a crown colony, the status of port Macao –as always in dispute - especially 
whether the Chinese imperial court had ceased the sovereign rights over Macao to the 
Portuguese crown. Despite various sources of diplomatic records, the general understanding 
was that the Portuguese community was granted to live in Macao in exchange for their service 
to defend Chinese coast from robbery and piracy, and for a 500-tael of silver ground rent per 
year to the Cantonese authority (Chang 1969; Wu 1997; Haberzettl and Ptak 1991; Chan 2003). 
Given the political culture of imperial China which only the Chinese emperor could forfeit his 
ownership over the Chinese soil, an agreement firstly concluded between a local official and 
Portuguese captain-major could never involve clauses related to sovereignty transfer from the 
China to Portugal. In fact, neither the Cantonese authority had questioned its legal rights over 
Macao internal affairs as well as the Chinese subjects living the Macao, nor the Portuguese 
community in Macao had doubted the legality of their rights granted by the Chinese authority, 
apart from their inborn rights as a Portuguese subject. Instead of a unilateral concession of both 
sovereign rights and administrative rights of port Macao, the Chinese authorities after the 
official recognition of Portuguese settlement in Macao maintained a minimal administration 
over the port and the port communities, such as the control of supplies from the mainland and 
the flow of Portuguese personnel to the mainland through the Barrier Gate (Portas de Cerco). 
In fact, as Chinese scholar Wu (1997) and Portuguese scholar De Pina-Cabral (2002) both 
suggested, much of the activities of Portuguese was confined to Macao, with limited exposure 
in Canton. For instance, Portuguese missionaries were only allowed to go inland until 1581 
(Wu 1997:38). Trading rights and privileges were sometimes at the discretion of Chinese 
officials, especially when they failed to receive bribery from the Portuguese missions. (ibid:39) 
Compared to modern diplomacy based on sovereign equality and honour system, the 
Portuguese community had to pay tribute as well as bribery for a “normalised” diplomatic and 
trade relations. The confinement of Portuguese community and the rest of foreigners at Macao 
was on one hand motivated by the selfishness of local Chinese authorities as they did not want 
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the “golden goose” to be shared among other ports outside Canton; on the other hand, the 
conflicts between Portuguese merchants and Chinese community remained a taboo such that 
any further penetration of Portuguese or other foreign communities to the core cities of China 
would be harmful to local stability. 
All in all, from the Chinese perspective, the changing status of Macao as a semi-permanent 
Portuguese settlement did not change her position and policy to Macao. The Portuguese 
community should be isolated and closely monitored, and only be permitted to travel inland 
through special licenses granted by local authorities. Therefore, rather than expanding the 
“centrality” of Macao, Chinese officials adopted a “negotiated separation” strategy to manage 
the Portuguese community at Macao (De Pina-Cabral 2002:22). The “negotiated separation”, 
from Chinese perspective, could be conceptualised as a “negotiated separation” between Macao, 
as the only-recognised Portuguese settlement at Chinese soil, and the rest of the Chinese 
territory. Apart from sending customs officials to collect tributes (and perhaps briberies), 
Chinese authorities would interfere with local affairs at Macao only upon the request from the 
Portuguese community, or when the incidents were severe enough and related to Chinese 
community (De Pina-Cabral 2002; Chang 1969; Porter 1996). Despite the changing status of 
Macao from a Chinese coastal town to a coastal town shared by both the Chinese and 
Portuguese communities, the Chinese authority had never invested more resources to upgrade 
the centrality and intermediacy possessed by Macao. Rather, the Chinese government aimed to 
maintain her small but intact level of centrality at Macao, and created a “negotiated separation” 
through the installation of the Barrier Gate and official policies, so as to limit Macao’s 
penetration to Chinese mainland community. The apparent stability of the “official” coastal 
town discourse, which would be further discussed in later section, could be attributed to the 
stability of interests and identity towards foreign communities and maritime trade among 
Chinese officials, which perceived them as an opportunity as well as a threat to Chinese 
community. 
From the Portuguese perspective, however, the “negotiated separation” was visualised in 
another way: a negotiated separation between the Portuguese community who were living 
inside the Catholic citadel, and those Chinese who were living outside the walls of the citadel. 
In fact, the negotiated separation may not be the will of Portuguese merchants, given the fact 
that the Portuguese community was highly depended on food and water supplies from the 
mainland, as well as the official recognition from both local and central authority. The position 
of Portuguese merchants at Macao was therefore rather passive, as “the Chinese mandarins… 
only had to close these doors when they were dissatisfied with Portuguese activities.” (De Pina-
Cabral 2002:2; see also Chang 1969) Instead of competing for full domination over Macao, the 
Portuguese community on one hand committed mostly to the Chinese official/officials’ 
demands such as paying tributes (and briberies) to local authorities, on the other hand they 
formed a self-governing regime consisted of Portuguese and Macanese community, i.e. the 
local Creole community who identified themselves as a free subject under the Portuguese crown 
instead of Chinese emperor rules. The Senado Municipal (later being bestowed as Leal Senado) 
was indirectly elected by the Portuguese community resided or born in Macao and responsible 
for local administration such as urban affairs or public transports and jurisdiction (Gomes 1996). 
Although the spread of Catholicism to China might be an important motivation for the 
Portuguese community to expand its influence towards China, the centrality, i.e. the norms 
generating power of Portuguese government in Macao was limited within the citadel and 
closely checked by the local authorities as well as central government in Beijing. As a result, 
the Portuguese community could only maintain a low but intact level of centrality in Macao. 
The discussion on Macao’s intermediacy, was more complicated as it involved the Chinese 
community from the mainland, the Portuguese community in Asia and Southeast Asia and other 
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European communities who soon arrived to China from Europe. Reviewed in previous 
paragraphs, the “negotiated separation” imposed apparent restriction on Macao’s intermediacy 
especially towards the Chinese community in mainland. Not only the installation of the Barrier 
Gate that served as a regular check against Portuguese traders and missionaries to enter the 
mainland China through Macao, but also the introduction of maritime ban that blocked 
Portuguese community from legally connecting with other Chinese ports or coastal 
communities17. In practice, however, the Chinese officials took advantages of the presence of 
Portuguese community for the sake of government revenues (through levies and customs duties) 
and personal gains. As Chinese historian K.C. Fok conceptualised the essence of “Macao 
formula” as a reconciliation of two contradictory objectives: maintain Chinese coastal security 
against any form of foreign maritime aggression, and benefit economically from the foreign 
trade (Fok 1978; 2003; 2006; Mendes 2003). Local Chinese officials soon realised the benefits 
of having a “foreign” community on Chinese soil because they could trade with foreign traders 
at Macao without breaking the maritime ban (Chang 1969; Wei 1992; Wu 1997; Coates 2009a; 
2009b). The triangulation of Chinese foreign trade operated as follows: first, the direct bilateral 
trade conducted between Chinese merchants and Portuguese merchants that the Chinese 
merchants provided essential supplies to Portuguese settlement and galleons at Macao, in 
exchange of Portuguese goods demanded by local communities;  second, the Portuguese 
community served as a middleman between Chinese and other foreign merchants such that they 
could get access to others’ goods and markets without breaking the maritime ban –ule (Coates 
2009b:36 - 38). As Wei (1992) and Wu (1997) suggested, Macao always played a special 
function which was differed from Chinese mainstream foreign policy position and a role 
different from other Chinese ports. To some extent, during the maritime ban period, Macao was 
“blessed” to develop exclusive maritime network and enjoyed privileges such as lower tax and 
convenient dockship in Canton and Macao (Chang 1969:102 – 103; Wu 1997:41 – 42). In 
addition to Portuguese service in trade, the Chinese government also relied on the Portuguese 
community to “supervise” Western traders’ activities along the Chinese coast and to defend the 
Chinese coast from the Japanese pirates (Mendes 2003:45).  
Because of this, Macao’s intermediacy, which was defined as the maritime connection of a 
civilian port, was much fluid than it official image. Macao’s intermediacy was implicitly 
boosted by local Chinese authorities, notwithstanding the isolationist official foreign policy of 
imperial China. Therefore, instead of having a stable port geography, Macao’s intermediacy 
was always subjected to the discretion of local Chinese authorities: when the Chinese 
authorities, at both central and local level, perceived that the benefits from foreign trade 
outweighed the security concerns or personal nuisance, the Chinese officials would welcome 
an extension of Macao’s intermediacy to cover the Southeast coast of China; when the security 
concerns or personal nuisance was never compensated by the additional gain from foreign trade, 
the Chinese officials would simply shut the gate and contain Macao’s intermediacy. As a result, 
Macao was positioned between a kind of outport to China which possessed low level of 
centrality and intermediate level of intermediacy, and a kind of coastal town which both the 
level of centrality and that of intermediacy remained low. Also, from the above analysis, the 
perception of material gains through transactions and networking was an important factor to 
adjust Chinese position towards Macao. 
From the Portuguese perspective, while Macao’s connectivity to the Chinese market was 
 
17 The maritime ban was a law introduced to bar Chinese subjects to go aboard so as to stop the coastal 
community to join or provide supplies to Japanese pirates. In addition, only Canton and later Yueh-
kang (a port near Fujian which was originally served a port for smuggling and unauthorised trade) were 
opened to tributary trade. Only licensed Chinese merchants could be allowed to travel along the coast 
of China and they were required to be identified carefully by customs officers. 
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critical in evaluating Macao’s intermediacy, the evaluation must also include its relation to 
other Asian ports and other European communities in the region. Unlike nowadays that the 
European states generally enjoyed friendly relations with each other and coordinate among 
themselves under the umbrella of the European Union, European empires had always been 
competing among themselves in terms of global expansion, in particular the access to Chinese 
market. Rather than sharing their privileged trading rights in China to the rest of the European 
merchants, the Portuguese community in Macao always wished to defend their exclusive rights 
through diplomatic bargain or the use of force. For instance, when Spain and Portugal were 
unified under the personal union of Phillip II of Spain (Philip I of Portugal) after 1581, the 
Portuguese community at Macao was in deep concern that the unification would extend to the 
region of Southeast Asia and East Asia, turning themselves from Portuguese subjects to Spanish 
subjects and Macao would therefore be forced to open to Spanish merchants, who already had 
their strong base in Manila to protect their commercial interests and partially traded with 
Fujianese merchants from China (Chang 1969; Souza 1986; Coates 2009b). On the other hand, 
Spanish merchants located in Manila also wished to take advantage of Portuguese access to the 
Chinese market. As Chang (1969) suggested, the Portuguese residents in Macao took advantage 
of their (relatively) close relations with local authorities and the general fear of foreigners in 
Chinese soil, such as framing the Spanish (and later the Dutch) as pirates and evil-doers and 
hiding from Chinese authority so as to maintain her semi-independent status and monopoly 
over Chinese trade. It was also suggested that the Portuguese community “implicitly” 
surrendered part of the legal autonomy in Macao in exchange for Chinese protection against 
other European aggression (Chang 1969; Souza 1986; Coates 2009a;2009b). Although Chinese 
authority may not really welcome Portuguese monopoly over her foreign trade to other 
European countries and remained open to newcomers to trade near Canton, it did not actively 
intervene or create another settlement other than the Portuguese merchant (Chang 1969:101 – 
102). Accompanied with the diplomatic bargain with the Chinese authorities, the Portuguese 
Macao authority also made strong appeal against their own imperial court on the competition 
of trading rights with the Spanish subject in Manila. By 1594, the Spanish king issued a decree 
to remove Spanish trading rights with China at Manila and passed the rights exclusively to his 
Portuguese subjects at Macao, Macao enjoyed its peak in terms of intermediacy with the the 
Portuguese community in Macao developing exclusive link from Japan, through China and 
India, to Portugal, and monopolised the European trading network in South China Sea from 
Canton to Manila and Malacca. From the Portuguese perspective, the extensive network built 
at Macao turned Macao as an ideal hub for her commercial empire and business interests in 
Europe and China. 
On the contrary, other Europeans could never utilise such high level of intermediacy nor 
successfully established themselves in Macao. Not only the Spanish merchants were forced to 
surrender their trading rights to Chinese (Fujian) merchants in Spanish Manila, the Dutch and 
the British were also barred from sharing the trading rights enjoyed by Portuguese merchants. 
For instance, in order to fence off the Dutch and the British communities, the Portuguese Macao 
authority decided to build gun foundry and fortify Macao through building walls and cannons 
since early 17th century (Garrett 2010). Therefore, from other European perspective, Macao 
was a port that could never be used without Portuguese discretion until the mid-17th century, 
when the Dutch and the British navies successfully established their trading posts and colonies 
in Southeast Asia and challenged Portuguese monopoly over the sea lanes of communication 
from Goa to Nagasaki. Prior to that, other European communities could never establish their 
“centrality” at Macao nor enjoyed a share of Chinese trade or other Asian trade through 
Macao’s network. Macao was therefore a mere non-port Chinese city, which the Europeans 
did not possess any form of generating power and could not utilise the network for their own 
diplomatic or economic agenda. Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 summarised the separate port 
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geography of Macao in 1557 and that in early-17th century: 




Level of centrality Low Low Nil 
Level of 
intermediacy 
Low Low Nil 
Type of port Coastal town Coastal town Non-port 
Table 4.1 The port geography of Macao in 1557 












(economic gain > 
security threats) 
Type of port Coastal town 




(economic gain > 
security threats) 
Table 4.2 The port geography of Macao in early-17th century         
The “Fall” of Macao as a Portuguese Hub and a European Outport: European Port 
Diplomacy against a European port established in China 
The decree issued by the Spanish King, who was also the King of Portugal, in 1594 ceased the 
Spanish trading rights with China at Manila. Since then, Portuguese Macao began to dictate the 
Sino-European trade and Japanese-European trade. Although the Protestant European empires 
such as the Dutch and the British Empire wished to challenge the dominant position of the 
Iberian Empire in Southeast and East Asia, they were never successful during the early years 
of the 17th century. In the case of Macao, for instance, the Portuguese Macao authority had 
successfully defended against various armed raids from the Dutch since –601 (Coates 2009b:55 
- 56). The armed raids ended when the Truce of Antwerp was concluded in 1609, and the Dutch 
businessmen were allowed to carry on their business in the Southeast and East Asia except for 
those ports and places controlled by the Spanish reign, which also included the Portuguese ports 
outside Europe owing to the personal union between Portuguese and Spanish Empire (Chang 
1969:; Coates 2009b). The Truce, while giving other European empires an access to the region, 
also protected Portuguese monopoly of the sea lanes of communication from Japan via Macao 
to Malacca, enjoying its golden era of trade and commercial network in the region (Souza 1986; 
Coates 2009). The door of Macao remained closed to other Europeans despite the concession 
made by the Spanish crown to liberalise trade in the region. To some extent, the concession 
resulted in the inevitable decline of Macao several decades later. The decline of Macao, on one 
hand, led to the change of Chinese diplomacy towards Macao, as the Asian maritime space was 
opened by Europeans from both the Catholic Church and Protestant Church, resulting in both 
greater security concerns and greater economic prosperity to trade with other foreign 
communities. On the other hand, the Portuguese authority in Macao was forced to respond to 
the changing diplomatic environment at both the Chinese and European fronts. 
At the Chinese front, the arrival of other Europeans, in particular the Protestant rivals, triggered 
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the anxiety of both Portuguese Macao authority and the Chinese imperial court. As mentioned 
above, the Portuguese community at Macao decided to strengthen Macao’s defence through 
fortification and building gun foundry (Garrett 2010), which was an act never welcomed by the 
Chinese authorities. The planned fortification and weaponry facilities of Macao, which could 
be viewed as boosting Portuguese “centrality” of the port through military installations, had 
echoed the security concern of Chinese government over the presence of foreign communities 
in China. As discussed in the last section, Macao could only serve as an outport to China if 
and only if both the local and central authority perceived the security threats could be 
compensated by the economic gain such that the restriction against Macao’s intermediacy 
would be lifted. However, the newly installed military and naval facilities, together with 
inhuman acts like public execution of Dutch “sailors” after the victory made Chinese local 
authorities to rethink the perceived benefits and threats of having a foreign settlement at 
Chinese soil (Chang 1969; Coates 2009a; 2009b). In fact, there were rumours circulated in the 
Chinese community against the Portuguese intention to fortify and militarise Macao, which was 
perceived as an aggression to seize Chinese throne rather than a defence against Protestant 
Europeans, were widely circulated among the Chinese officials and communities (Coates 
2009b:56). Even though the rumours were discharged by Chinese military after investigation, 
the Chinese authorities decided to step in and increased their control over the city, such as 
cutting off food and water supply to Portuguese community through official and civilian –eans 
(Chang 1969:123 - 124; Coates 2009b:71). The Barrier Gate was shut down, new customs 
control and heavier duties were introduced to Portuguese merchant ships, fines were imposed 
to Portuguese Macao authority against its failure to block “barbarians” (the British ship London) 
or Japanese to enter or stay in the port. New permit and license requirements were introduced 
against buildings built or ships docked in –acao (Chang 1969:119 - 120; Coates 2009b:71). 
Such policies not only weakened Portuguese centrality in Macao as the generating capacity was 
limited by a more stringent control of vital supplies from the Chinese mainland, but also 
curtailed Macao’s connectivity to other Chinese markets. 
Even though the Portuguese merchants wished to restore their friendly relationship with 
Chinese traders by introducing a partnered association to regulate imports and exports at Macao, 
the civilian partnership did not work well but turning the Chinese communities more hostile to 
their Portuguese counterparts (Chang 1969; Coates 2009). The heavier control from Chinese 
authorities, on the other hand, induced more smuggling activities that harmed Chinese centrality 
enjoyed at Macao as this kind of activities reduced the formal capacity for local authorities to 
generate revenues through levies and duties as well as personal benefits – but only created 
nuisance as the local authorities were obliged to tackle the problem of smuggling to protect the 
official revenues. As a result, the perceived gap between security threats and economic gain 
became larger and further upset Chinese local authorities. The deteriorating relationship 
between Chinese authorities and Portuguese Macao authority resulted in the termination of all 
commercial privileges of Portuguese merchants at Canton and the commercial door was shut 
again against Portuguese traders. Since then, the Portuguese merchants at Macao became out-
of-favour from Chinese authorities’ and merchants’ perspectives, thus they actively shut down 
Macao’s land and maritime linkage to the rest of the Chinese territory. The eventual shutdown 
of Portuguese Macao trading network with Chinese inland traders at Canton not only reflected 
Chinese scepticism against Portuguese motives in Macao, but also practically transformed 
Macao as a non-port to Chinese community. While the Chinese government maintained low 
to medium level of centrality owing to the increased policy and political pressure from Beijing 
to Macao, the complete shutdown of Macao’s connectivity to Chinese mainland had removed 
Macao as a possible port choice of Chinese authority to further its trade to Portuguese 
community.           
The decline of Macao’s role as a Portuguese hub to administer Southeast Asia-China-Japan 
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trade was further curtailed by the changing geopolitical environment in Southeast Asia and East 
Asia. The continuous invasions (and defeats) of Dutch navy in early 17th century did not result 
in a total retreat of Dutch interests in the region, rather the Dutch began to collude with local 
pirates and eventually settled at Formosa (Taiwan) after 1625. The Dutch growing influence in 
Southeast Asia and Formosa allowed them to prey on Portuguese ships in the regions and to 
obstruct the sea lanes of communications between Malacca and Macao. Although the 
Portuguese Viceroy in Goa signed a convention with British companies which allowed well-
armed British ships to take Portuguese passage to China, such diplomatic act failed to protect 
Portuguese sea lanes of communication from Malacca to Macao (Coates 2009b:70). Instead, 
the eventual arrival of British merchant ship London not only triggered a tightened control of 
Chinese authorities as mentioned above, but also rendered Portuguese Macao more vulnerable 
to other European influences. Europeans other than the Portuguese could finally get access to 
Macao’s water and trading network through the convention concluded between Portugal and 
Britain. With the collapse of Malacca in 1641, the Portuguese traders were cut off from their 
Southeast Asia stronghold and the intermediacy of Macao could no longer maintain at its 
Western front. 
At the eastern front, Portuguese trading rights in Japan received successive blows as the 
Tokugawa Shogun adopted various measures to confine the spread of Christianity in the 
territory, for example the re-enactment of anti-Christianity edict in 1616 and a total ban of 
Christianity in 1620. Missionaries were formally banned from entering Japan and a Japanese 
official agent was sent to Macao, asking the overseas Japanese community to return and cut off 
their connections with Portuguese and other European trades at Macao (Souza 1986; Coates 
2009a; 2009b). The exclusive trading right received its fatal blow when the third Tokugawa 
Shogun, Iemitsu, issued the Sakoku edict (close-country order) in 1635, cutting off all European 
trade in Nagasaki and expelling them to Deshima, a small artificial islet for foreign trade (ibid). 
The remaining Portuguese and European traders, except for the Dutch who assisted the 
Shogunate military actions during the Shimabara Rebellion, were expelled from Japan after the 
alleged connections between the rebellion forces and Portuguese traders. The end of Japanese-
Portuguese trading network had effectively cut off Macao’s intermediacy from its East front, 
with the network being surrendered to the Dutch traders.             
The changing political situation in Asia had already put Portuguese Macao at the verge of 
collapse as the maritime network and the sea lanes of communication from Goa to Nagasaki 
were eroded by the arrival of Protestant Europe and the close-door policy of Chinese and 
Japanese government. As a result, the level of centrality, i.e. the capacity to generate economic 
gain and spread political values was heavily hammered as the exclusive trading rights in China 
and Japan was no longer available to the Portuguese community (Souza 1986; Coates 2009a; 
2009b). Nonetheless, Portuguese Macao remained to be an outport for Portuguese community 
as they could still utilise the Spanish network in Asia and Southeast Asia to promote her 
economic benefits. Even though the Portuguese community in Macao did not make good terms 
with the Spanish community in Manila when both parties competed for the trading rights in 
China (Chang 1969), the Malacca-Macao-Manila trade remained an important component of 
Portuguese Asian trading network. Especially when the Japanese trading network was shut 
down after 1635, the Portuguese traders in Macao could only rely on their linkage with Spanish 
Manila, Malacca and Goa (Coates 2009b). However, when the Portuguese royal house decided 
to revolt against the Spanish crown in Europe and supported by her fellow traders in Asia, 
Portuguese traders had expelled the entire Spanish community and the network it represented 
from Macao, effectively cutting off the trading route between Macao and Manila (ibid.). As a 
result, when Malacca was also fallen to the hand of the Dutch in 1641, he Portuguese Macao 
suddenly found themselves isolated from the original Goa-Malacca-Macao passage, with only 
small islets in Southeast Asia to support the lone Portuguese city in Chinese soil (Souza 1986; 
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Coates 2009a; 97eterr. The lack of maritime network possessed by Portuguese Macao not just 
further reduced the level of intermediacy of Portuguese Macao, but also hammered the level of 
centrality as Portuguese Macao was no longer economically profitable or socio-politically 
attractive to the surrounding states or governments. As a result, even though the Portuguese 
Macao government maintained minimal yet effective control over the city under the due 
influence of Chinese authorities, the trading network developed was withered and the golden 
age of Macao as a Portuguese hub ended after 1641. With reference to the typology suggested 
in Chapter 3, the withered intermediacy and weakened centrality had turned Macao from a 
Portuguese hub back to the coastal town position, and the Portuguese community in Macao 
could only utilise the geographical advantage of Macao to connect with China and the world, 
for instance smuggling through the maritime routes between Macao and the Chinese mainland 
(van Dyke 2012; Ho 2012). From the European perspective, the decline of Portuguese maritime 
dominance, in terms of the loss of trading rights in China and the eroded sea lanes of 
communication from Goa to Nagasaki, had opened up the maritime space in the region. Other 
Europeans, especially the Dutch and the British, had gained access to the sea lanes of 
communication in Asia and eventually China (Chang 1969; Coates 2009). For instance, the 
convention concluded between the Spanish Empire and British Empire was a first attempt by 
other Europeans to gain access to Macao’s centrality and took advantage of its limited supplies 
and a temporary settlement. As a result, other Europeans started to take Macao as a coastal 
town that could possibly support their voyage to China, which was eventually realised in the 
18th century, when China re-opened its foreign trade with Europeans. Table 4.3 summarised the 
port geography of Macao perceived by different diplomatic actors from mid-17th century (after 
the fall of Malacca): 




Level of centrality Low Low Low 
Level of 
intermediacy 
Nil Low Low 
Type of port Non-port Coastal town Coastal town 
Table 4.3 The port geography of Macao in mid-17th century 
The changing policy position of China and Japan towards the Portuguese traders, the tense 
relationship between Portugal and Spain, and the fall of Malacca to the Dutch navies, brought 
an end to Macao’s short golden period of regional trade. After 1641, the Portuguese community 
in Macao found themselves losing control over the sea lanes of communication from Indian 
Ocean to the Sea of Japan, and they were isolated by the Japanese shogunate, the Chinese 
imperial court and Malayan sultans. For the next 60 years, Macao was running in chaos with 
the lack of supplies from the Chinese authorities and the lack of support from the local 
community to open up the trade routes with other European countries. (Coates 2009:81) With 
the lack of intermediacy, Macao remained a coastal town, if not a non-port, in the eyes of 
Chinese, Portuguese and Europeans, until the 18th century when the geopolitical context had 
changed in China. 
The change could be conceptualised in two different but inter-linked ways: first, the gradual 
accommodation of the presence of other Europeans by the Chinese and Portuguese community; 
second, the gradual opening up of Chinese trade again under the new Manchurian court (Coates 
2009a; 2009b). Although the new imperial Manchurian court and local Chinese communities 
remained sceptical against the presence of foreign communities (Fairbank 1969a; 1969b), 
Canton was re-opened to foreign trade with a newly installed Canton system – and to both 
Catholic and Protestant Europe (ibid.). However, the Protestant Europeans, similar to the 
Catholic Europeans, were also required to leave Canton after the end of the trading season and 
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they were restricted to bring women with them when they were in China (Coates 2009a; Porter 
1996; De Pina-Cabral 2002). As a result, the Protestant Europeans demanded a place for 
settlement at Chinese coast where they could normally reside during the off-season. Macao, 
being as the “most European” place located in the Chinese soil and historically connected to 
China through maritime and land network, seemed to be the most convenient place for both 
Catholic and Protestant communities to reside. However, the difference in religious and social 
practice between the Catholic and Protestant community, which remained important to define 
the political cleavage among European states, had limited the acceptance of the Protestant 
European community in Macao. On the one hand, the Portuguese Viceroy at Goa, who was 
appointed to oversee Portuguese limited interests in Asia, saw the Protestant European 
community at Macao as a threat to Portuguese interests and identity in Asia (Souza 1986; 
Coates 2009a; 2009b). The Portuguese authority in Goa maintained the old standards in 
governing foreign residence in Macao, for example they should speak Portuguese, registered 
with a Portuguese name and behaved like a Catholic, which the demands were unrealistic to 
other Europeans. On the other hand, the Portuguese in Macao, who perceived themselves as the 
de facto defender of Portuguese interests in Asia, found the existence of the reluctant Catholic 
Church (in the form of Bishop sent to Macao since 1691) and the imperial court (in the form of 
the Governor and outdated rules) had prevented them from attaining the full potential of the 
benefits brought by other Europeans (ibid.). As a result, the local Senate always lobbied for a 
more relax and liberal approach to govern Europeans other than Portuguese. As a result, the 
Bishop was removed in 1757 and so did the restrictive rules (Coates 2009a; 2009b). 
In fact, the shifting of power balance between Catholic states and Protestant states, in both 
Europe and Asia, had already limited Portuguese strong governance to other European 
communities: first, the Sino-European trade was already dominated by the British merchants, 
such that local Portuguese community depended on “European” trade rather than “Portuguese” 
trade. Second, the political unrest in Lisbon was viewed as a challenge of “true” Portuguese 
interests in Asia, such that any full-fledged Portuguese governance in Macao was both resisted 
by the Portuguese and Macanese community living in Macao (Coates 2009; De Pina-Cabral 
2002). As a result, local Portuguese and Macanese communities sometimes side-lined the 
religious difference and helped the British to pacify their tension with Chinese authorities, or 
even accommodated the presence of British community in Macao against the threats from 
Spanish Manila (ibid:87 – 90). As Coates (2009:83) commented, the British community 
“behaved virtually as if the Portuguese did not exist, and the Americans and others were not 
much better.” While the European communities maintained a relatively small size population 
compared to the Portuguese and the Macanese community in Macao, the Portuguese 
governance structure could never govern these non-Catholic communities effectively. 
Although Macao was re-plugged into the sea lanes of communication from Indian Ocean to 
South China Sea, it was at the expense of losing her capacity, at central level, to govern the rest 
of the European communities and her control over the local communities. Instead, the 
governing capacity was further diffused to the local Senate in Macao. Except for radical 
movements such as the toleration of British “occupation” in 1808 against the potential threat 
from Spanish Manila, the Portuguese authority largely maintained its weak centrality, in terms 
of governing the local Portuguese and Macanese community, as well as a revival of economic 
generating capacity through accommodating other Europeans in the port. In evaluating the 
intermediacy. Macao was once reconnected to major sea lanes of communication as well as the 
maritime network in the region. However, compared to the glorious years Macao enjoyed in 
the past, the maritime network and connections were no longer owned by the Portuguese but 
other Protestant Europeans such as the Dutch and the British. Therefore, the reason of which 
Macao was selected was never related its economic connections or cultural attractiveness, but 
the geographical advantage of Macao as well as the established Portuguese network in China 
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and the rest of Asia. Coincidentally coined by Coates (2009b:83), after the removal of the 
Bishop as well as the restrictive rules against other Europeans, Macao was then turned to be the 
“outpost of all Europe” and once again became “the centre and fulcrum of foreign relations 
with China.” The old Portuguese network was absorbed and integrated to other European 
maritime network, for example the peaceful settlement between the British navies and Chinese 
authorities in 1808, or the opium smuggling case of Thomas Beale (ibid: 87 – 90). While it was 
impossible for Macao to return its glorious past as a Portuguese hub, the level of intermediacy 
was partially revived through its reconnection with the sea lanes of communication owned by 
other Europeans. As a result, the role of Macao had changed from a Portuguese hub to an 
outport, serving for both Portuguese and European communities. 
From the European perspective, despite the growing influence in Macao in terms of political 
institutions and economic dominance, the European communities were still under the rule of 
Portuguese authority in Macao. In addition, the reopening of Canton for foreign trade was also 
accompanied with the introduction of Canton System so as to govern the foreign communities 
(Fairbank 1942; Fairbank and Teng 1941). Owing to severe competition in sea lanes of 
communication and trading rights in Asia, the maritime networks enjoyed by each European 
state were never unified. As a result, rather than position Macao as a hub that was dedicated 
for “the” European interests, European authorities took Macao as an outport for their own sake 
and connected to the network of their own. The selection or the eventual non-selection of Macao 
as the civilian port for pursuing the European interests, therefore, was primarily based on the 
perception economic interests gained through Macao’s intermediacy, or the ownership of 
greater centrality in other civilian ports. Finally, as reviewed above, the position of Chinese 
authority remained largely unchanged except the re-opening of Canton for foreign trade. The 
Confucius strategic culture, a land-based mind-set and bureaucratic administration, remained 
the crucial elements in formulating Manchurian foreign policy (Fairbank 1969a). As a result, 
the mere re-opening of Canton and its reconnection to foreign trade only led the Manchurian 
court to return her position to Macao during the Ming Dynasty, i.e. the coastal town discourse. 
Table 4.4 summarised the port geography of Macao in 1757, the year when the local Senate 
successfully removed the Bishop and the restrictive rules introduced by the Portuguese imperial 
court: 




Level of centrality Low Low Low 
Level of 
intermediacy 
Low Medium Medium 
Type of port Coastal town Outport Outport 
Table 4.4 The port geography of Macao in 1757 
From 1757 onwards, the status quo was largely maintained except some radical incident such 
as the British “occupation” in 1808. Despite the ups and downs of Sino-European relations, 
Macao continued to serve as an undisputed outport that connected Europe and Asia, as well as 
a nodal point of major sea lanes of communication in the region. However, the situation had 
changed fundamentally after the outbreak of the 1st Anglo-Chinese War, or commonly known 
as the Opium War. Documented by Coates (2009b), the British originally offered the local 
Portuguese government in Macao a deal to upgrade British commitment in Macao in exchange 
of the protection of European subjects who were resembled in Macao after the opium ban 
initiated by the Manchurian imperial court. British also wished to rebuild the Anglo-Portuguese 
alliance, and took Macao as the bridgehead to protect the European (British) trading rights in 
China. The diplomatic pact, however, was rejected by the Portuguese authority in Macao and 
Macao remained neutral throughout the Opium War (Coates 2009b; Wu 1997). The decision 
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was no unsurprising as the Portuguese Macao relied on the prosperity of Sino-European trade 
on one hand, the food and water supplies from the Chinese mainland on the other hand (Coates 
2009b; Wu 1997; De Pina-Cabral 2002). As a result, a good Anglo-Portuguese relation might 
bring more fortune to the Portuguese community in Macao by an enhanced trade relation with 
the dominant British Empire, but a bad Sino-Portuguese relation would cause life-and-death 
problems to the local communities in Macao.         
The move was rational, but the price to pay was huge to Macao, especially in terms of its port 
status in European trade. The Opium War was won by the British navy and the Manchurian 
court was forced to cease Hong Kong, an underdeveloped port a few hundred miles away from 
Macao, as a British colony and four more international treaty port including Shanghai. The 
creation of treaty ports and British Hong Kong gave Europeans and Americans extraterritorial 
rights and they were no longer subjected to Chinese legal rules and political influence. The 
majority of European and American merchants, even for those Portuguese merchants used to 
reside at Macao, decided to move their headquarters, capital and maritime network from Macao 
to Hong Kong (Coates 2009a; Ho 2012; van Dyke 2012). Macao was eventually abandoned as 
an outport for all Europeans as either the level of centrality or intermediacy was no longer 
competitive: the British maritime network was then centred at Hong Kong while the 
institutional capacity enjoyed by Europeans was well-protected by international treaties. The 
Portuguese community was no longer active at Macao but maintained a minimal level of 
political and economic influence. The Protestant European communities found themselves 
more comfortable residing in British Hong Kong. The original maritime network established 
by Portuguese and European communities were slowly shifted to Hong Kong, along with the 
migration of Portuguese and European merchants from Macao to Hong Kong. Even for the 
Chinese traders themselves, the treaty port system established in Hong Kong and Shanghai was 
more favourable to them as they were no longer subjected to Chinese official controls. The role 
of Macao, therefore, was secondary to the role of Hong Kong, in the eyes of Chinese, 
Portuguese and European communities. It was turned to a mere coastal town which the main 
functions were supportive to the official trade in Hong Kong, such as illegal opium and human 
trafficking, a neutral gold trade, or a place for European or Chinese merchants in Hong Kong 
for entertainment (van Dyke 2012; Ho 2012). The value of Macao, in this case, was purely 
geographical and readily to be replaced if the diplomatic actors found a more suitable place to 
handle the “dirty works”. Table 4.5 summarised the port geography of Macao after 1842, when 
the British Hong Kong was established under the international treaty port system: 




Level of centrality Low Low Low 
Level of 
intermediacy 
Low Low Low 
Type of port Coastal town Coastal town Coastal town 
Table 4.5 The port geography of Macao after 1842 
The Revival of Macao as a Chinese Cityport? The Role of Macao before the 
Handover of Sovereignty 
Although the Sino- the Sino-Portuguese Treaty of Peking concluded in 1887 also turned Macao 
into a Portuguese colony that enjoyed a similar status as British Hong Kong, Macao could never 
come back as an outport of Europe18. On one hand, damages were already done to Macao’s 
 
18 Portugal and China have signed the Treaty of Amity and Trade in Tianjin in 1862 but the treaty was 
not formally ratified by both parties owing to the last-minute change of clauses after the signatures. As 
a result, the treaty was void in 1864 and the status of Macao as a Portuguese colony and a free port was 
only confirmed by 1887. 
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intermediacy since the establishment of British Hong Kong had taken away most of the Sino-
European trading network which was well-supported by by unchallenged British naval 
domination from Indian Ocean (through British India) to Strait of Malacca (through British 
Malaya). On the other hand, the Portuguese government in formulating her treaty with the 
Manchurian imperial court, took Macao as a strategic asset to balance between China and 
Europe (Goncalves 2003). For instance, the administrative boundaries of the colonial Macao, 
not only the territorial boundaries but also the maritime boundaries, were not clearly defined. 
In fact, the treaty also deliberately barred any transfer of territorial title or administrative rights 
without the consent of the imperial Chinese authority (Goncalves 2003:58). While there were 
several attempts made to purchase Macao during the late Qing period and became part of the 
bargaining chips of the complicated jeu diplomatique of major European nations, the 
Portuguese government generally maintained her promise to the Qing court and remained as 
the sole de facto sovereign administrator of this coastal town, even though by 1880s Lisbon had 
already found it difficult to assert herself in Macao and in global competition with other 
European powers (Vasconcelos de Saldanha 1996; cited in Ptak 1998:392 – 394). From the 
view of other European powers, the importance of Macao was never its socio-political 
institutions nor commercial networks built in China or Southeast Asia. Rather, its importance 
was owing to the strategic location between Fort Bayard (currently known as Zhanjiang), a 
French colony in China, and British Hong Kong. The geographical position of Macao, therefore, 
created a spatial separation between French geopolitical interest in China, which had already 
connected the South-western part of China through the French Indochina, and British 
geopolitical interest in China, i.e. the British domination of maritime trading network which 
covered the South-eastern part of China, from Canton to Shanghai (Coates 2009b). 
The key geographical, but not geopolitical, position of port Macao could also be reflected from 
the lack of interests of “Macao Issue” after World War I peace negotiation. Discussed in 
Vasconcelos de Saldanha’s work (1995) on Portuguese foreign policy in early 20th century, 
Lisbon wished to take advantage of the post-war context to rebuild her influence in China and 
solved the Macao Issue as “the victors” of World War I. Prior to the Washington Conference, 
the Kingdom of Portugal had made several attempts to modernise Macao’s natural port facilities, 
including the Loureiro Project suggested in 1884, the Branco Project and the Miranda Guedes 
Project between 1907 – 1909, but none of these projects materialised owing to Portuguese 
calculation against the potential opposition from the Manchurian court and the British 
government in changing the status quo of Macao (Haberzetti and Ptak 1991). Even though the 
Manchurian court was replaced by the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China after 
the 1911 Revolution, Lisbon’s attempts to upgrade the port facilities of Porto Interior of Macao 
and tried to construct the Porto Exterior from 1919 were still not welcomed by her Chinese 
counterpart (Vasconcelos de Saldanha 1995:171 – 172; Haberzetti and Ptak 1991:301 – 303). 
During the Washington Conference, the Portuguese delegates also found that their demand of 
discussing Macao Issue was side-lined by the agenda of the conference, and they were asked to 
“remain in strict agreement with the British Delegates” (Vasconcelos de Saldanha, 1996). In 
addition, the Portuguese diplomats also worried about the increasing Chinese nationalist 
sentiment against Portuguese suzerainty in Macao would eventually harm the economic 
position, which by the time was a coastal town for (illegal) opium trade, gambling and 
prostitution, as the Military Government in Guangdong wished to prohibit any gambling 
industry in Macao in exchange of the negotiation of the border issues (ibid.). As a result, even 
though the Portuguese authority wished to change the port geography of Macao by boosting its 
economic and political generating capacity, she was required to balance the diplomatic position 
of the leading European state, i.e. the Britain, and the Chinese position. The coastal town status 
of Macao was a kind of consensus agreed by most of the stakeholders in the region. After the 
Washington Conference, the role of Macao had been stabilised as a secondary coastal town to 
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support Hong Kong and European interests in China, as well as a political-neutral platform to 
provide entertainment, opium trade and labour trade. 
Building a European Port with Chinese Characteristics: From an Informal Political 
Condominium to a Formal Political Condominium 
The second Chinese Civil War between the Nationalist Party (KMT) and Chinese Community 
Party (CCP) resulted in two ideologically different regimes governing different parts of China, 
and made Portuguese Macao once again being caught into new diplomatic context: historically, 
the Colonial Government of Macao formulated her regional agreement with the Military 
Government of Guangdong which, broadly speaking, was part of the KMT government; 
ideologically, the anti-Communist Salazar regime was a natural ally of the capitalist bloc and 
NATO; geographically, Portuguese Macao was attached to mainland China governed by the 
CCP after 1949. Compared to Hong Kong whose colonial government was heavily backed by 
London against the potential communist infiltration, neither Portuguese status in Macao was 
heavily threatened by the new state nor the Macao government was heavily backed by Lisbon 
and supported the Nationalist regime in Taipei (Fernandes 1997; 2002; 2008; Goncalves 2003). 
While this illustrated again the lack of geopolitical interests of China and Europe over Macao, 
the key geographical position of Macao was indeed re-utilised as a potential breakthrough for 
the communist China against the Western blockage. 
Discussed in Fernandes’ works (1997; 2008) on Maoist policy to Macao, Beijing always 
favoured the status quo and continued the “informal political condominium” (Fernandes 
1997:47) so as to utilise the commercial and personnel network of Macao (as well as Hong 
Kong). From Beijing’s point of view, the policy of maintaining the status quo, compared to the 
policy consisting in taking back Macao (as well as Hong Kong) in terms of sovereign and 
administrative title, was always preferred, unless any provocative actions in Macao (and Hong 
Kong) had threatened the legitimacy and security of the newly established state. In fact, 
compared to the British government who was being perceived as cunning and acumen and a 
major ally of the United States, Beijing considered Lisbon a friendlier Western country with 
more local support from the Chinese community in Macao (Yahuda 1993; Leung 1999; Chan 
2003). could also be reflected from the comment from the British Governor to Hong Kong 
Alexander Grantham, who stated that Macao always had “better liaison or side-door contacts 
with the Chinese authorities”, despite the fact that the Lisbon did not acknowledge Beijing as 
the legitimate regime and was still in contact with Taipei after 1949 (Grantham, 1965[2012]; 
also cited in Fernandes 1997). The low but intact level of centrality in Macao, from Chinese 
perspective, was a natural heaven for Beijing importation of “strategic materials” from the 
outside world, especially when Hong Kong was under enormous pressure from London and 
Washington to curtail smuggling to mainland China, as well as for Chinese to export their goods 
through the stamp of “made in Macao” and earning foreign reserves and hard currency like gold 
through underground transactions (Jain 1976:230 – 242; Edmonds 1989:xxiii – xxiv). 
To ensure the level of centrality at Macao remained intact yet without formally taken-over by 
either the capitalist or communist bloc, Beijing had committed to a two-way strategy: on the 
one hand, Beijing continuously applied “pressure”, though official and people’s diplomacy, to 
Macao and thus Portugal to maintain Macao status as a “Chinese territory under Portuguese 
administration” (Jiang 1992:213 – 224; Tam 1994:260 – 262; Chan 2003:498; Fernandes 
1997:50), and any change of status – no matter the implementation of a strengthened embargo 
regime in 1952 or the 4th centenary celebration of Portuguese occupation of Macao in 1955, 
was not welcomed by Beijing (Fernandes 2008; Chan 2003). On the other hand, Beijing also 
resisted the pressure from Moscow to turn Macao as a site for ideological confrontation and a 
political settlement will only be negotiated “when the conditions are ripe” (Fernandes 
2008:249). By establishing the Nam Kwong Trading Company, the de facto representative of 
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the PRC in Macao, Beijing’s agenda in Macao was rather obvious: 1) as a “shadow government” 
in Macao to facilitate the importation of “strategic materials”; 2) as a contact point to meet “red 
capitalist patriots” and stabilise the Southeast China area, where was the traditional KMT 
political and economic stronghold; 3) as a bargaining chip to influence Western diplomacy 
through Lisbon (Fernandes 2008). 
From the European perspective, the role of Macao during the early years of the People’s 
Republic of China was maintained at the secondary level which served as a diplomatic 
bargaining chip. The port functions of Macao, i.e. a European coastal town, was never a 
concern for the Western world, and the development to support the port of Macao remained 
minimal. It could be best reflected by various actions taken by the West after the embargo was 
proposed against China after the Korean War. While Britain was a founding member of the 
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) and an active coordinator 
of the Chinese Committee (CHINCOM), the Salazar government was not invited at the first 
place19. It was only by 1952 when the capitalist bloc found it necessary to include Macao for 
an effective embargo against China, that British government decided to include Portugal in the 
two international committees (Fernandes 2008:237). However, when Portugal’s commitment 
to strengthen the regulatory regime resulted in Chinese para-military responses at the border of 
Macao, the European world showed little help to Macao and Portugal. For instance, the 
Portuguese government had first proposed an exemption regime to be set up in Macao, which 
allowed some goods to be traded between China and the outside world, after the border conflicts 
in July 1952, but the CHINCOM members found the proposal unworkable and turned down 
Portuguese request. Revealed by one of the Portuguese delegates, Jose Calvet de Magalhaes, 
the British delegates in the COCOM were “overall more persistent and tough” towards Macao 
violations against the embargo. However, when London wished to ease her trade relations with 
Moscow two years later, she then pressured Washington to negotiate with Lisbon for an 
exemption regime in Macao, which in return turned down by Macao government and the 
Overseas Office in Lisbon, even with the persistence of Foreign Office of Portugal to conclude 
the deal (Fernandes 2008:235 – 238). Such a change in attitude towards Macao from Britain, 
and perhaps the rest of COCOM members which included the United States and major Western 
European countries, reflected the fact that Macao’s commercial networks with China, compared 
to that of Hong Kong, was at minimum for any standalone consideration but for the grand 
diplomatic and commercial considerations of great power politics. In the view of other 
Europeans other than the Portuguese, a coastal town called Macao, which was geographically 
important but geopolitical trivial, was always ready to be sacrificed for a better diplomatic cause. 
From the Portuguese perspective, therefore, the pro-status quo policy from Beijing and the lack 
of European commitment to support Portugal had limited Portuguese diplomatic options. As 
revealed by Jose Calvet de Magalhaes, Portuguese primary interests in Macao and China were 
limited to “the maintenance of Portuguese sovereignty and the well-being of the colony of 
Macao” (Fernandes 1997:45). It was done by the selective realism and pragmatism towards 
Chinese official diplomacy and back-door demands. For instance, while Lisbon showed 
apparent weakness during the border disputes initiated by Beijing in 1952 and the cancellation 
of the 4th centenary celebration in 1955, the Salazar government did change the status of Macao 
from “Overseas Colony” to “Overseas Province” and formally included Macao as the part of 
the Portuguese Republic (Yang 1998:157; Chan 2003:498; Fernandes 2008:243). Several 
economic plans were drafted to enhance Macao economic well-being such as, the proposal to 
create an exemption regime in Macao to facilitate the trade between Macao and China, the 
creation of Portuguese Economic Space, various plans for further industrialisation and 
 
19 This position might be owing to Salazar’s rouge state strategy and growing scepticism against the 
United Nations, so that Portugal was isolated in the UN by the Western world (Reis 2013). 
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economic diversification, promoted trade relations between Macao and Portuguese Africa, 
rather than relying solely on gambling and entertainment industry (Sit, Wong and Cremer 1991; 
Fernandes 1997). Domestically, the Portuguese government adopted a kind of synarchism to 
incorporate Chinese business elites from Macao Commercial Association (an unofficial 
representative of Beijing in Macao), local Macanese communities and Portuguese bureaucrats, 
so as to balance the interests of Beijing, Macao and Lisbon (Goncalves 2003:58). 
In evaluating the port geography and network management during the period, the original 
motivation of Portuguese government was to take advantage of the complicated diplomatic 
backdrop to rebuild Macao as a cityport from the coastal town it has been, through 
strengthening the centrality via formal incorporation to the Portuguese Overseas Empire and 
second generation of industrialisation, as well as boosting intermediacy via formal 
incorporation to the Portuguese Economic Space and commercial ties with other Portuguese 
Overseas Provinces in Africa in addition to the established linkage with Hong Kong. These 
plans, however, were not fully utilised owing to two reasons. From the European perspective, 
any upgrade of Macao port functions would directly challenge the maritime dominance of 
British Hong Kong, so that the British would try to exert pressure against any plan that might 
bring up Macao’s competitiveness (Fernandes 1997; 2008; Leung 1999; Chan 2003). From the 
Chinese perspective, local Chinese business elites in Macao always favoured underground and 
unchecked commercial ties with Beijing, rather than a formalised exemption regime which 
might alter the status quo (Fernandes 2008). As a result, even though the Portuguese 
government had developed plans to upgrade the port geography of the informal condominium, 
the Sino-European disinterest to these plans had limited any meaningful change of the coastal 
town. Both China and Europe enjoyed the “division of labour” between Hong Kong and Macao, 
which the role of Macao was a secondary coastal town supporting the cityport Hong Kong. 
The geographical advantage, the established illegal maritime trade network since the late Qing 
dynasty, and the politically-neutral position of Macao had made Macao as an ideal coastal town 
for diplomatic trade-off and underground activities: from Beijing perspective, Macao was 
always a good smuggling port to break through the Western trade embargo; from other 
European perspective, Macao was a diplomatic bargaining chip that allowed selective 
engagement and containment against China. As a result, the proposed reform of port 
infrastructure by Lisbon was not fully realised and the upgrade of Macao’s centrality and 
intermediacy was suppressed. Table 4.6 summarised the port geography after 1949: 





















Table 4.6 The port geography of Macao after 1949 
The implicit co-governance system became more salient when the Cultural Revolution in 
mainland China had its spill-over in Macao in December 1966. The local unrests and the threat 
to cut off supplies to Macanese and Portuguese population resulted in a humiliating public 
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apology by the Portuguese governor in Macao and a secret pact was concluded between Beijing 
and Lisbon on the promise to fully cooperate with Beijing demands in exchange of Portuguese 
continuous administration in Macao (Tam 1994:245 – 254; Huang 1991:237 – 239; Chan 
2003:498; Fernandes 1997:50). Since then, the synarchism was tilted in favour of Beijing and 
the informal condominium was at its peak, i.e. a European port with high Chinese (political) 
characteristics. Indeed, many scholars argued that the Portuguese colonial rule ended after 1967, 
but not 1999 when the sovereignty was formally transferred to Beijing and the Macao Special 
Administration Region (MSAR) was in operation (Tam 1994; Chan 2003; Leung 1999). From 
Beijing perspective, the political “centrality” of Macao was further secured by the secret pact 
although on surface Macao was still ruled by the Portugal. 
The status quo was further upset by Portuguese decolonisation strategy after 1974, when the 
newly established Portuguese government decided to retreat from Macao as part of the global 
decolonisation commitment. Prior to Portuguese unilateral move, Macao (like Hong Kong) was 
removed from the international list of dependent territory such that the two Chinese territories 
were not subjected to self-determination like other European colonies in Africa and Southeast 
Asia. Shortly after the coup d’etat on 25th April 1974, delegates from the provisional 
government were sent to Macao to ensure the status quo remained and Portugal had no intention 
to seize the territory (Gonclaves 2003:58). A remark was made by Almeida Santos, then 
Minister for Inter-territorial Coordination, which also hinted that universal rules, i.e. self-
determination and referendum, shall not be applied to the “special case” of Macao and the 
decolonisation process should be determined with the objective to resolve problems and relieve 
tensions (ibid.). However, the Portuguese authority also revealed the desire to retreat from 
Macao, but such offer was rejected by Beijing (Bruce 1975:138). A series of informal 
negotiations were held from 1976 on the Sino-Portuguese relations as well as the future of 
Macao. By 1979, the two countries reached a secret understanding that Macao was “a Chinese 
territory under Portuguese administration” (Jiang 1992:213 – 224; Tam 1994:260 – 262; Chan 
2003:498). The formal acknowledgement of Chinese sovereignty in Macao paved the way for 
a planned retrocession of Macao to China in the near future. As discussed by Chan (2003:498 
– 499), the secrecy of the future retrocession arrangement of Macao as well as the lack of firm 
commitment to recover Macao in 1979 reflected that Beijing’s diplomatic position to Macao 
was always secondary to two “unification” issues: the national unification between mainland 
China and Taiwan, and the recovery of sovereign title of British Hong Kong (see also Edmonds 
1993; Fernandes 1997; Edmonds and Yee 1999; Leung 1999; Henders 2001; Hook and Neves 
2002). The formal yet underground condominium was finally revealed in January 1987 when 
the Lisbon-Beijing negotiation on the future of Macao was nearly finalized, and the Sino-
Portuguese Joint Declaration was signed on 13th April 1987, making the co-governance system 
on Macao fully on the surface and ruling the final years of Macao as a Portuguese administered 
Chinese territory. 
The conclusion of Macao’s future in 1987 triggered a new round of port diplomacy and port 
geography re-engineering at Macao. From the Portuguese perspective, the primary objective in 
Macao was rather simple: an honourable exit without abandoning the people in Macao, and 
trying to maintain the Latin culture in Macao which could be a potential tie for Portugal to 
utilise in the future Sino-Portuguese relations (Edmonds and Yee 1999:802 – 803). These 
interests might possibly be achieved through accumulating Portuguese political, economic and 
cultural “centrality” and/or strengthening Macao international presence and “intermediacy” 
during the last years of colonial period. In short, upgrading Macao port geography from a 
coastal town to cityport or even a gateway would also be in the best interests of Portuguese 
“honourable exit” strategy. However, it should also be noted that the structure of formal 
condominium also limited Portuguese plan to build up too many political and economic 
muscles in Macao, as after all any Portuguese plans should never challenge “Chinese effective 
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control or sovereignty over the territory” (Edmonds and Yee 1999:803). The Chinese 
perspective on reengineering Macao port geography was rather complex compared to that of 
Portugal, and such complexity was largely due to 1) the lack of local knowledge on Macao 
populace; 2) the Tiananmen Incident in 1989; 3) the handover issues of Hong Kong and Macao 
(Edmonds and Yee 1999:807 – 808). At the beginning of the negotiation, Beijing did not 
differentiate the socio-political situation of Hong Kong and Macao. Therefore, Beijing policy 
towards Macao was largely modelled from that towards Hong Kong, even though pro-Beijing 
loyalists were, compared to those in Hong Kong, politically dominant in Macao after 1966. As 
a result, Beijing had tried their very best to accommodate Macao populace, including the 
Macanese community and the Macao-born Chinese community.  In addition, Beijing also 
assumed that the “close” Anglo-Portuguese relations would serve as a bridge to communicate 
Chinese attitudes towards European colonialism in Hong Kong and Macao, such that Beijing 
position on the validity of those unequal treaties was well acknowledged by both Lisbon, whose 
the undergrounded negotiation had already started since 1979, and London, whose the official 
negotiation started in 1982. As a result, Beijing was caught in an “unwelcomed surprise” when 
she realised that London would not follow the position of Lisbon in giving up the sovereign 
titles of Hong Kong Island and Kowloon Peninsula (Chan 2003:499). 
After realising all the differences in the case of Hong Kong and Macao, Beijing changed their 
strategies towards Macao and took Macao and Sino-Portuguese cooperation as a diplomatic 
bargaining chip against the confrontational Sino-British relations and the handover issue of 
Hong Kong, especially after the outburst of Tiananmen Incident in 1989. Compared to strong 
criticisms against any kind of infrastructural projects in Hong Kong during the last 5 years of 
British colonial rules, Beijing turned a blind eye over Portuguese utilization of public funds to 
support infrastructural and cultural projects, even though the legality of some projects were in 
doubt (Leung 1999; Edmonds 1993; Edmonds and Yee 1999). Official representatives from 
Beijing and Macao seldom complained or even made enquiry on Macao public administration 
on the surface, although it was said that Beijing were rather discontent about the lack of 
efficiency, the slow localization of Macao public administration and the legal reform (Edmonds 
1993; Yee and Lo 1991; Leung 1999; Chan 2003). From the Chinese perspective, the smooth 
handover of Macao as well as the privileges given to Macao on one hand was a political 
demonstration to both British and Hong Kong communities, on the other hand was a kind of 
appeasement policy towards Lisbon as Beijing always afraid of pre-mature departure and a 
sudden end of Portuguese colonial rules in Macao, which in return hammered the confidence 
of Hong Kong community and, ultimately the Taiwanese community, on “One Country, Two 
Systems” (Edmonds and Yee 1999:807 – 808; Chan 2003:503). 
The importance to maintain such political confidence was best reflected by the changing 
attitude towards the Macao handover process and poor administration after 1997, when the 
sovereign and administrative titles of Hong Kong were successfully reunited at Beijing hands. 
For example, while the direct stationary of PLA in Macao was not included in the Sino-
Portuguese Joint Declaration, Beijing, under the name of helping the future MSAR to maintain 
order, unilaterally announced the plan to build garrison and stationed troops in Macao in 1998 
(Edmond Yee 1998; Chan 2003). This move might be symbolic and indeed welcomed by the 
pro-Beijing camp in Macao, yet from Lisbon perspective she was caught in a surprise as the 
arrangement to station troops in Macao was never included in the Joint Declaration or the MBL, 
was contradicted to the mutual understanding between Beijing and Lisbon, and was never 
practiced by Lisbon since 1960s (Edmonds and Yee 1998:808). The unilateral change of policy 
after 1997 could only be explained by the de-coupling of the handover issue of Hong Kong and 
that of Macao. 
All in all, as Hooks and Neves (2002) and Henders (2001) separately argued, the overall 
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strategy for Beijing in dealing with Hong Kong and Macao was a controlled internationalisation: 
on one hand Beijing required an international endorsement on “One Country, Two Systems” as 
a viable solution for Hong Kong, Macao and the eventual Taiwan; on the other hand, Beijing 
always avoided “over-internationalisation” against the handover issues of Hong Kong and 
Macao. In the case of Macao, Henders further argued that the relative “less internationally 
visible and less threatening” Macao potentially allowed Beijing to “experiment with local 
autonomy” (Lam 1999; cited in Henders 2001:348). While Willy Lam did not explicitly argue 
that such experiment concerns on domestic fronts or international fronts, one official made 
explicit comment that Macao participation in different international governmental 
organizations (IGO) reflected different needs, different positions and different interests 
(Henders 2001:348). Indeed, Beijing had actively sponsored Macao international position 
through various means since the eve of Portuguese colonial rules, and the policy continued 
nowadays such as the introduction of Macao Forum which will be briefly covered in the next 
section. 
In short, the formal condominium on one hand further strengthened Beijing political “centrality” 
over Macao as she was now formally incorporated into the future planning of Macao and would 
eventually take back Macao administrative title in 1999; on the other hand Beijing would 
maintain the strategy to utilize Macao “intermediacy” as a leverage towards Europe – not just 
Portugal but the United Kingdom or even the European Union – and tried different 
“intermediacy” experiment in Macao so as to assist Beijing future diplomatic needs (Fernandes 
1997; Henders 2001; Hook and Neves 2002; Mendes 2011; 2014). However, it should be noted 
that Beijing always wished to maintain her absolute control over former European colonies like 
Hong Kong and Macao, such that the political “centrality” was always prevailed in planning 
the future port geography of Macao as well as Hong Kong. Table 4.7 summarised the expected 
port geography of Macao after 1999, the handover of sovereignty of Macao from Lisbon back 
to Beijing: 
 Chinese authority Portuguese authority 
Level of centrality Medium Medium 
Level of intermediacy Medium High 
Type of port Cityport Gateway 
Table 4.7 The expected port geography of Macao after 1999 
The Chinese and Portuguese respective expectations on the port geography and port role of 
Macao resulted in many policy cooperation and conflicts between Beijing and Lisbon during 
the final stage of the transition period. In terms of cooperation, both Lisbon and Beijing had 
actively sponsored Macao international personality and active engagement in economic IGOs 
and international agreements (Hender 2001); both Lisbon and Beijing decided to promote a 
hybrid cultural identity of Macao and selectively leaving traces of Portuguese colonial history 
and Latin culture in Macao (Edmonds 1993; Yee and Lo 1991; Lam 2010); strengthening 
Macao economic “centrality”, i.e. connecting to mainland Chinese urban space such as Zhuhai, 
through railway projects and “intermediacy”, i.e. connecting Macao to the maritime space, 
through the construction of new deep-water port at Taipa and Coloane (Edmonds 1993; 
Fernandes 1997). In terms of conflicts, the slow localisation process and the overemphasis of 
Portuguese heritage and history in Macao, and the efforts to incorporate Macao civil service 
under Portuguese bureaucratic system, were perceived as a way for Portuguese to extend their 
influence towards the future Macao Special Administrative Region – an act always condemned 
by Beijing (Yee and Lo 1991; Edmonds 1993; Edmonds and Yee 1999; Chan 2003). However, 
the overall consensus in upgrading the port role and port functions from a coastal town 
prevailed during the negotiation process, despite the difference in terms of final role. From 
Beijing perspective, Macao could serve as a Chinese cityport with Latin European 
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characteristics, so as to demonstrate both the commitment to modernise the coastal town 
Macao and maintain its cultural connection to Lusophone world. From the Portuguese 
perspective, Lisbon could take Beijing modernisation strategy in Macao as a way to strengthen 
its economic and cultural generating power in Macao, so that she could claim a glorious retreat. 
A further wishful thinking from Lisbon was that the inclusion of Macao in Chinese future 
development plan in Southern China, together with the connection with the Lusophone 
countries and the European Union, could serve as a gateway for Lisbon to connect the Chinese 
market and the European market. 
European Port Diplomacy prior to the Handover: A Passive Inclusion and a Back-up 
Plan to Sustain EU Interests in China 
As the above table suggested, the original reform of port geography did not include the position 
of the European Communities or its successor the European Union. Albeit both Britain and 
Portugal were a member of the EC (and later the EU) since 1973 and 1986 respectively, pan-
European responses were rather silent against the issues of Hong Kong and Macao. Such benign 
neglect of these European colonies in China is explained as follows: in terms of institutional 
capacity, the EC did not have the institutional practice to develop collective responses towards 
Member States’ diplomatic business or major international issues; in terms of political culture, 
London, and to some extent Lisbon as well, reluctancy to “communitize” the Hong Kong 
question further strengthened EC perception that the issues of Hong Kong and Macao were 
bilateral business and other European states should stay away from the process (Hook and 
Neves 2002:127). From Beijing perspective, these considerations were more than welcome as 
Beijing was used to state-to-state bilateral negotiation. As a result, while the EC imposed trade 
embargo against China after 1989 and slowly developed collective response over humanitarian 
issues, it remained silent over Macao transition and did not formulate collective responses other 
than diplomatic statements from the European Council (ibid.). 
The status quo, however, was slightly altered in 1992 when Portugal was designated to hold the 
rotating the Presidency Country of the Council of the European Communities, and a Trade and 
Cooperation Agreement (hereinafter named as EC-Macao TCA) was signed between the 
European Communities and Macao. It was the very first agreement signed between Europe and 
China after the Tiananmen Incident, as well as the very first agreement signed between the 
European Communities and a European “colony” in China and a non-state government. 
However, the reason behind such diplomatic breakthrough was not driven by major changes of 
EC collective interests in Macao. Quite a contrary, Macao was never an ideal place for 
European investment owing to its small economic size, a gradual disintegration with its 
economic hinterland, i.e. the Pan-Pearl River Delta region, and poor local governance (Hook 
and Neves 2002). Rather, the change was largely driven by a diplomatic strategy played by 
Lisbon to further secure her interests in Macao, i.e. establishing a commercial linkage between 
the European market and the Chinese market through Macao, under the growing concerns of 
the European states on Chinese socio-political conditions (Fernandes 1997; Edmonds and Yee 
1999; Hook and Neves 2002). First of all, Lisbon wished to maintain her “good understanding 
and cooperation” with Beijing. The Macao issue, therefore, was a good and practical excuse for 
Lisbon to maintain the formal diplomatic contact without breaking the collective European 
position of isolating China after the Tiananmen Incident (Fernandes 1997:53). Second, the 
Portuguese government also wished to drag the European Communities into the transition 
period and became the back-up forces in supporting Portuguese decolonisation strategy, whose 
primary objective was to exit with honour, leaving Macao with Latin cultural heritage and 
protecting the Macanese (and some Macao-born Chinese) interests in Macao (Fernandes 1997; 
Edmonds and Yee; 1999). To achieve the objectives mentioned above, creating a separate 
Macao identity within the European political circle was a necessary step for Lisbon, such that 
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the Macao transition process could be de-linked from that of Hong Kong, which was 
overshadowed by difficult Sino-British relations and London reluctance against any European 
diplomatic involvement in the issue (Hook and Neves 2002:127). As a result, Lisbon, by 
making use of her agenda setting power as the EC presidency country, actively lobbied for a 
recognition of an independent international identity of Macao differed from that of PRC. The 
major achievement, from Lisbon perspective, was the conclusion of an independent agreement 
between the European Union and Macao, which was later agreed by China of its continuation 
under the MSAR (EEAS 2017; Henders 2001). 
Apart from Lisbon’s diplomatic strategy to formally include Macao in EU future diplomatic 
agenda, there was also a growing concern within the European political circle about the socio-
political conditions of China, given the massive crackdown of popular dissents at Tiananmen 
and the lack of promising political reforms of the authoritarian communist regime. The 
handover of Hong Kong and Macao, two colonies governed by the “free-world”, to 
authoritarian China was seen as a kind of betrayal such that the European states considered to 
provide more outside support to Macao (and Hong Kong). While various measures were done 
bilaterally in the Anglo-Saxon world to support Hong Kong, the (continental) European states, 
under the “leadership” of Portuguese Presidency, decided to handle the issue collectively under 
the framework of the European Communities, through signing the “third-generation” trade 
agreement with Macao (Henders 2001; Hook and Neves 2002). The “third-generation” trade 
agreement, according to EEAS official remarks, was a multi-dimensional agreement covering 
“not only economic and industrial aspects, but also culture, environment, training, drug abuse 
control, tourism, etc.”, and the cooperation was based on “observance of democratic principles 
and human rights” (EEAS 2017). This “basis for cooperation” was stipulated explicitly in the 
Preamble as well as the Article 1 of the Agreement (Preamble and Article 1 of the EC-Macao 
TCA; see European Communities 1992) and it was supposed to be renewed annually after the 
fixed 5-year contracting period (Article 19 of the EC-Macao TCA; ibid.). At institutional level, 
a Joint Committee was set up between Brussels and Macao in governing the functioning of the 
TCA and it was designated to meet annually to “study the development of trade and cooperation” 
as well as to “exchange opinions and make suggestions on any issues of common interests 
within the fields covered” by the TCA (Article 16 of the EC-Macao TCA; ibid.). 
The EU-Macao TCA had therefore created a rather permanent mechanism for the European 
Communities and its successor the European Union to intervene in Macao socio-political 
development since 1992. The mechanism was also agreed by Beijing even though the EU-
Macao TCA has an explicit statement on respecting democratic principles and human rights. 
Apart from the economic, industrial and technological cooperation, the EC-Macao TCA 
included other fields of cooperation (Article 4 of the EC-Macao TCA; ibid.) which some of 
them could be considered as “soft-power” cooperation such as “information, communication 
and culture” (Article 9 of the EU-Macao TCA; ibid.), “training” (Article 10 of the EU-Macao 
TCA; ibid.), and social development (Article 12 of the EC-Macao TCA; ibid.). To some extent, 
the EC-Macao TCA may be considered as an efficient projection of diplomatic interests 
demonstrating the “structural power” of the EU, which tried to use economic and technological 
transfer to lure China to adopt other structural changes, and governing the process through a 
common institution as well as conditionality (Chan 2009). Macao, at its best, could always be 
the back-up plan for the European Union to maintain its interests in China, and become a 
continental European model established in South China for China’s reform (Hook and Neves 
2002:133).            
Considering the port geography and port function of Macao, the European Union might also be 
tempted to turn Macao from a coastal town to a European gateway to China, serving as an 
“intermediate” to bring European influence to South China at minimum or the rest of China at 
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maximum, through maintaining the Latin European influence in Macao. While the EC-Macao 
TCA and various “soft-power” cooperation could be considered as a rather strong European 
“centrality” in Macao through permanent mechanisms of intervention, Beijing has always been 
aware of the overwhelmed and uncontrolled Latin European linkage of Macao, for instance 
blocking Macao associate observer status in the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries 
(CPLP) and the application of membership in the Latin Union (Henders 2001:358). At domestic 
level, the perceived strong “centrality” was countered by a strong presence of Chinese interests 
at local community level in parallel with a weak Portuguese colonial government, while the 
“intermediacy” effect was always limited by the lack of economic impact of Macao on the 
European Union, China, or even the South China region (Hook and Neves 2002:132). Because 
of this, even though Brussels enjoyed a permanent contractual relationship independently with 
Macao to boost up her presence and linkage, the established dominance of Beijing in Macao 
had imposed de facto restrictions on the exercise of EU presence and linkage. The gateway 
dream of both Lisbon and Brussels, therefore, could never be realised and the cityport status 
was a more realistic option from the side of the European Union and Portugal. Interestingly, 
the cityport status became a kind of “consensus” governing the future port role and port 
functions of Macao after the handover of sovereignty. Table 4.8 summarised the port geography 
and port role of Macao after the handover of sovereignty back to Bejing: 
























Table 4.8 The port geography of Macao after 1999 (with the EU included) 
The Sino-European Port Diplomacy after the Handover: A Cityport with A 
Group of Designated Audience 
With the resumption of sovereign of Macao on 20th December 1999, the status of Macao 
changed from a Portuguese enclave in China to a Special Administration Region under the 
framework of OCTS. In its first communication setting the policy agenda to Macao, the 
European Commission defined the role of Macao as “a bridge between Asia and Europe”, in 
particular in the areas of 1) “democracy, human rights, individual freedoms and related issues”; 
2) Economic and trade issues, including WTO”; 3) cultural issues, as a regional hub for training 
and exchange” (European Commission 1999). It was also stated that a residential “EC-Macao 
Cooperation Officer” would be appointed to oversee the cooperation between the European 
Union and Macao, yet in 2014 the appointment was yet to be finalized and had not been 
mentioned in subsequent reports20. 
 
20 The last available public source to discuss about the appointment was made in 2014 which was 
written as such: “In addition, both sides noted the progress made over the appointment of a Technical 
Co-operation Officer for Macao and discussed Macao’s request for a legal co-operation assistance 
programme.” See International Business Publications, Macao Electoral, Political Parties Laws and 
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Similar to that of Hong Kong (which would be reviewed in next chapter), the external relation 
competence of Macao was defined by the Basic Law of Macao (MBL), and the degree of 
autonomy was also similar to that in Hong Kong (Neves 2002; Mendes 2011; 2014). However, 
compared to the “Asia’s World City” discourse which focused on the all-rounded 
characteristics of Hong Kong external networks and vibrant commercial and financial activities, 
the early years of Macao external relations were focused on becoming a gateway between 
Europe and China. Quoting Edmund Ho, the first Chief Executive of the MSAR, “Macao has 
conditions to link Europe and China, especially the Pearl River Delta, and the SAR Government 
has taken much effort in this direction” (Ho 2001; also cited in Neves 2002:66). This role was 
also highly praised by senior Chinese officials and being recommended by various European 
institutions, academics and professionals (European Commission 1999; The Eminent Persons 
Group on Macau 1999; Neves 2002:66). Indeed, such differentiation between the two SARs 
was more visible in the comparative audit of European port diplomatic to the two SARs, even 
though there was a lack of differentiation in terms of the EU representative office, the 
programme nomenclature and the institutional setup. 
Utilising the Cityport Status: European Port Action in Macao 
Prior to the discussion of EU port action in Macao, it would be better to audit the “official” 
programmes conducted and acknowledged by the EU-Macao Joint Committee. Table 4.9 had 
summarised the programmes conducted after 1999 with their nature of the cooperation (EU-
Macao Joint Committee 2018): 
  
 
Regulations Handbook: Strategic Information, Regulations and Procedures (Washington: International 
Business Publications, 2016), p.73 
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Year of Implementation Programme Nature of the 
Programme21 
1999 – 2001 Training for the Tourism 
Industry 
Training; Tourism 





1999 – 2001 Services Development 
Programme 
Training; Industrial 
2001 and 2002 Asia-Invest Programme Investment 
2002 – 2007 EU-Macao Legal 
Cooperation Programme 
Training 
2006 – 2007 MIGRAMACAU Training; Social Services 







2010 – 2013 The 2nd EU-Macao 
Cooperation Programme in 
Legal Field 
Training 
2010 – 2014  Training Programme in 
Translation and 
Interpretation in Chinese 
and Portuguese 
Training 






2013 – 2016 Learning Programme in 
Translation and 
Interpretation in Chinese 
and Portuguese 
Training 
2016 – 2019  The 3rd Macao SAR-EU 
Cooperation Programme in 
Legal Field 
Training 
2016 – 2020  Training Programme in 
Translation and 
Interpretation in Chinese 
and Portuguese 
Training 
2016 – 2020 Horizon 202 Science and Technology 
Table 4.9 The list of EU programmes offered under the EU-Macao TCA (1999 – 2018) 
Shown in the above table, while the official position of EU commitment to Macao was to 
“diversify its economy, improve the sustainability of its economic development, and promote 
bilateral trade and investments22” (EEAS 2018:7), the programmes offered by the EU under the 
TCA were concentrated in the field of training, especially cooperation in legal field and 
translation and interpretation. In fact, only a handful of programmes were designed with a 
specific focus on promoting trade, investment or industrial cooperation. These functions were 
indeed outsourced to the two chambers of commerce in the two SARs, namely the European 
Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, and the relatively new and established under the 
 
21 The nature of the programme is compiled by the author, based on the category of cooperation stated 
in the EC-Macao TCA in 1992. A programme might cover more than one area of cooperation. 
22 Similar commitments were made in nearly all the EU-Macao Annual Report, the version adopted 
here was in 2018 report when the thesis collected its primary data from the archive. 
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encouragement from the EU Office in Hong Kong and Macao, the Macao European Chamber 
of Commerce – and their contributions were well-recognised by the EU-Macao Annual Report 
(EEAS 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018). Within the limited cases related to industrial and 
commercial cooperation, these programmes were never focused at Macao but a greater 
audience such as the Asia-Pacific region. In fact, when the EU was named as the “Official 
Partner” of Macao’s annual Global Economic Tourism Forum in 2018, it was never a move 
initiated by the EU but by the MSAR government, and it was serving the greater discourse of 
EU-China Tourism Year 2018 initiative (EEAS 2018:7). Moreover, compared to other 
investors in the region, the European companies found it less attractive to invest directly in 
Macao and bidding for the projects like transportation, construction and energy initiatives, and 
the EU already enjoyed a relatively large trade surplus since 2009 by the sales of luxury goods 
serving for the gambling and tourism industry (EEAS 2018). Therefore, in formulating its port 
actions towards Macao, EU economic interests were rather trivial despite the emphasis placed 
in the annual reports. 
Instead of strengthening Macao’s economic centrality (through more direct investment to 
strengthen EU market share in Macao) and intermediacy (through Macao as a stepping stone to 
establish commercial network in China and Asia), the EU opted for a strategy to utilise the 
existing resources to strengthen her institutional “centrality” and political “intermediacy” in the 
region. Referred to Table 4.9 again, most of the EU-Macao cooperation programmes were 
training programmes in the field of legal cooperation, translation and knowledge about EU 
institutions and cultures. Indeed, the European Union took the first two categories of 
programme as “flagship projects of EU-Macao cooperation” (EEAS 2018:7) and cooperation 
on “legal and regulatory affairs, research and innovation, and continuing cooperation on 
trafficking in human beings” were a priority of EU-Macao cooperation (EEAS 2016:10; 
2017:10). In terms of academic cooperation, while the EU developed similar initiatives and 
strategies in Hong Kong and Macao, such as utilising social media for educational purpose or 
organising “Model EU” conferences for the tertiary institutions in Hong Kong and Macao, the 
annual reports of Macao always highlighted those culture-oriented and communication-based 
initiatives such as photo exhibition titled “Bridging Time” (EEAS 2014), “short-film challenges” 
(EEAS 2015; 2016) and a regular radio programme on EU-related topics was introduced since 
2015 (EEAS 2016; EEAS 2017; EEAS 2018). As highlighted by Ms. Maria Castillo, the then-
Head of the European Union Office, in the agreement signing ceremony in 2012, the EU-Macao 
Academic Programme was “a bridge deepening relations between Macao and the EU in wide 
range of fields, from law, culture to social sciences” and consolidated “Macao’s status as an 
Asian City with rich European heritage” (University of Macao 2012). The statement partially 
showed that EU ambition in these programmes was to promote Latin European culture to reach 
a regional audience instead of just Macao’s community. 
The above EU port actions could be explained by the priority of European objectives and a 
careful selection of means that not to upset Beijing. In terms of objectives, it was always in 
priority for Lisbon and Brussels to strengthen the continental legal system and Portuguese 
languages in Macao (Edmonds 1993; Edmonds and Yee 1999; Henders 2002; EEAS 2010; 
2013; 2017). From Portuguese perspective, the well-functioned continental legal system would 
be an important signifier of Portugal’s glorious retreat. From EU perspective, a well-functioned 
continental legal system was seen as a kind of improvement of Macao’s capacity in rule of law 
and public administration (EEAS 2013; 2017; 2018), which could further protect EU’s interest 
in the city. In fact, the European Union had actively assisted Macao legal reform to internalise 
the continental system since 2001 by providing training to legal experts, judges as well as civil 
servants which were responsible for drafting and translating legislations, i.e. the birth of the 
legal cooperation programme (European Commission 2001; 2002). The knowledge transfer of 
this kind not only protected EU’s interests through an enhanced legal system in Macao, on the 
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other hand strengthened EU’s institutional centrality by subtle influence on the sense of the rule 
of law in Macao through these legal cooperation programmes. In fact, one objective of these 
programmes was to make sure that the Macao legislation and practice could be in line with the 
EU practice in different areas (European Commission 2004). The objective of those translation 
training programmes was straightforward, i.e. the continuation of Portuguese as an official 
language in daily administration and legislation, given the fact that there were always in need 
of bi-lingual experts in Macao. In terms of the means, the workshop-type cooperation in judicial 
and Latin European culture had softened the image of foreign intervention to Macao domestic 
politics, which was always sensitive in the eyes of Beijing since the transition period (Yee and 
Lo 1991; Edmonds 1993; Edmonds and Yee 1999; Chan 2003). Even though a weak 
conditionality concept was hinted in some EU-Macao annual reports (EEAS 2017), the EU 
preferred to exercise its “structural power” through organising practical workshops and cultural 
programmes which emphasised Macao’s European “heritage” (instead of adding new things to 
Macao), or through local academic partnership such as the University of Macao in EUAP-
Macao, so as to evade from Beijing’s criticism. 
To sum up, the lack of economic interests and the small size of Macao economy was never a 
motivation for the EU to develop its port diplomacy and port action towards Macao. Instead, 
through various programmes in the fields of legal cooperation to cultural heritage representation, 
the European Union continued Portuguese decolonisation strategy in Macao by highlighting 
the (Latin) European components embedded in Macao’s social and cultural system. Compared 
to the case of Hong Kong (which would be discussed in next chapter), both Macao and Beijing 
were ready to accept this role. In fact, the first official overseas visit of two Chief Executives, 
Edmund Ho and Fernando Chui, was Portugal, and they also visited Brussels during their 
second year of office. In addition, the orientation of these programmes not only addressed the 
local audience but also the regional audience such as those in South China region, for example 
the proposed Greater Bay Area. In the case, Macao was a kind of normative cityport: the 
institution generating power (centrality) was maintained, if not enhanced, through continuous 
training programmes in the field of legal cooperation and cultural exchange; and the 
intermediacy, from EU perspective, was protected through a softened image of EU presence in 
Macao in order to avoid Beijing’s criticism. 
Chinese Port Responses to EU Port Action: Taking Advantages of EU Programmes for 
Her Own Agenda 
The last section discussed the EU port action and its utilisation of Macao cityport status. It 
somehow concluded that the EU port diplomacy in Macao was viable if not effective, as both 
Macao and Beijing appeared to welcome EU initiatives in the port. As mentioned earlier in the 
chapter, in the case of Macao, the cityport status seemed to be a kind of consensus shared 
among Beijing, Lisbon and Brussels. This section would further elaborate how such consensus 
was consolidated by the strategic moves of Beijing and how Beijing utilise the cityport status 
of Macao for her own diplomatic agenda. 
While the relationship between Macao and the European Union was always highlighted in the 
Yearbook edited by the MSAR Government, its relative importance had decreased since 2003, 
and more references were made to Portuguese-speaking countries. Compared to issues 
published in 2002 (Macao Yearbook Editorial Committee 2002:205 – 206), the 2003 issue 
lengthened the description of Macao’s relations to Portuguese-speaking countries, by 
highlighting Macao as “an ideal location for business communication of Portuguese-speaking 
countries and mainland China to initiate and conduct economic and business negotiations” 
(Macao Yearbook Editorial Committee 2003:199). A “new” policy objective had also been 
included since 2003, namely “to transform Macao into an economic and cultural conduit 
between mainland China and Portuguese-speaking countries” (ibid.), which did not appear in 
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the 2002 issue. Eventually, the policy objective dropped the “economic and cultural conduit” 
and replaced it by the phrase “a business and trade cooperation and services platform 
between/for23  China and Portuguese-speaking countries”, a role that Beijing had attached 
“importance” to it (Macao Yearbook Editorial Committee 2004:177; Macao Yearbook Editorial 
Committee 2018:177). On the contrary, the 2003 Yearbook had lengthy description on various 
projects and visits conducted between Macao and the European Union in that year (Macao 
Yearbook Editorial Committee 2003: 193 – 195), but such lengthy discussion was dropped 
from the “Macao and the European Union” section since 2004. (Macao Yearbook Editorial 
Committee 2004:175 – 176). The changes in description could always be explained by the 
editorial choice of the editorial committee, yet such changes could also be a kind of reflection 
in MSAR changing position in external relations. The change of Macao’s position could also 
be seen from the different interpretation on the first two official visits by two Chief Executives 
of MSAR24.  For instance, the first visit of Ho was under the context of the criticism of Macao 
handling of Falun Gong, a religious group that was outlawed by Beijing. Ho’s visit was 
perceived as “an effort to consolidate relations with the EU” (Europa Publications 2003:365). 
The second visit of Ho and the first visit of Chui to Portugal, however, not only emphasised the 
Macao-Portugal relations, but also added a component stating the role of Macao as a platform 
for cooperation between China and Portuguese speaking countries (Macauhub 2006; 
MacaoMagazine 2010). 
Based on the official documents and media report, it was widely perceived that, at least within 
Chinese and Macanese community, Macao had changed her focus of external relations from 
Portugal and the EU, to Portugal and Portuguese-speaking countries. Discussed by Mendes et. 
al. (2011), the changing role of Macao in Chinese foreign policy could be understood by Beijing 
changing strategy in foreign policy, which included the development of “multilevel and 
sophisticated diplomacy” since the mid-1990s and the “charm offensive” approach from the 
2000s onwards (Mendes et. al. 2011:4 – 5). The “Macao Forum”, formally known as Forum for 
Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries, was one 
of such “sophisticated” mechanism (ibid:9 – 12). Analysed by another paper from Mendes 
(2014), the “Macao Forum” was never a multilateral institution nor a potential international 
organisation, but an “institutionalisation of China’s bilateral relations with the other member 
states” (Mendes 2014:238). Compared to other formal cooperative regional regimes like BRICS, 
ASEM, ASEAN, the Macao Forum lacked consensus in expectations, a coherent decision-
making logic, a balanced institutional framework among all participants (ibid:239). Moreover, 
the diversity of Portuguese-speaking countries was larger than people could expect, from 
geographical position to the command of Portuguese language by the citizen. In viewing such 
complicated, if not messy, characteristics of the Lusophone world, Macao, “a unique enclave 
and the meeting point of Lusophone cultures within China, with a hybrid legal framework in 
foreign relations”, was the only place available to China that could comfortably control and 
have the ability to hold such forum (ibid:239). To achieve so, Beijing needed Macao to 
demonstrate “its (Lusophone) cultural and linguistic legacy” without any “negative connotation 
of colonial memories” (ibid:239). 
This strategic position, accidentally, met the EU port action in strengthening Macao’s 
Portuguese institutions and cultural heritage. The consensus to turn Macao as a normative 
 
23 The “for” phrase in describing the platform first appeared in Yearbook 2018. However, since it was a 
lone case, the thesis could not prove whether it was a kind of grammatical change or substantial change 
of meaning. 
24 Edmund Ho made his first official overseas visit with the destination of Portugal in May 2000 and to 
the European Union in June 2001 and a second visit to Europe in June 2006. Fernando Chui made his 
first official overseas, also with the destination of Portugal, in July 2010 and to the European Union in 
January 2011. 
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cityport that produced and circulated the Lusophone institutions and culture, to different 
audience though, made Beijing and Macao welcome EU’s initiative to strengthen Macao’s 
institution generating power. In addition, insofar the programmes or criticisms did not 
fundamentally challenge Beijing’s control over Macao, they were largely tolerated so that the 
intermediacy of Macao would not be cut off as if the Portuguese Macao during mid-17th century. 
For instance, Beijing expressed more tolerant towards some EU prioritised human right issues 
such as anti-human trafficking and anti-corruption, but not political sensitive issues like the 
recommendations from UN Committee Against Torture, anti-discrimination legislation and 
freedom of association and collective bargaining (EEAS 2018:3). In terms of Chinese response 
to European port diplomacy, Beijing took the normative cityport as a kind of normative 
entrepot. By allowing the EU to fill Macao’s centrality with Latin European normative goods, 
Beijing carefully internalised these normative goods for her own centrality, and then shipped 
back to the Lusophone world through the established Portuguese network, i.e. the intermediacy 
of Macao since she was built as a European settlement. 
Implications to EU Structural Port Diplomacy and Chinese Response in the Future 
Prior to the discussion of the implications to EU structural power and Chinese responses, the 
thesis would like to recall the port geography of contemporary Macao in the eyes of the 
European Union and China: 
 Beijing Brussels 
Level of centrality Medium Medium 
Level of intermediacy Medium Medium 
Type of ports Cityport Cityport 
Table 4.10 The centrality-intermediacy analysis of Port Macao in contemporary days 
Keukeleire et. al. (2009) proposed five factors contributed to the effectiveness of the exercise 
of structural power, which was summarised in Chapter 3: 
1) Intensity and the quality of the dialogues that could successfully turn political 
declaration into operations;  
2) A long-term strategy that aimed to formally or informally institutionalise the 
continuous dialogue and negotiation;  
3) A comprehensive approach to develop a close relationship with various levels of 
partners and actors, and to cover various levels of relevant structures;  
4) The degree of embeddedness of structural power in other forms of diplomatic actions 
and external relations conducted by the actor itself and its diplomatic allies;  
5) The idea of legitimacy in the eyes of the third-party state and an appropriate 
provision of “carrot and sticks” to the state concerned.  
While Keukeleire et. al. (2009) did not proposed any negative factors hindering the effective 
implementation of soft power, one could, based on the above factors, draft a list of potential 
negative factors as follows: 
1) The resistance to turn political declaration into operations;  
2) The possibility to interrupt the continuous dialogues and further structural diplomacy;  
3) The lack of spill-over effects across various levels of relevant structures and different 
actors;  
4) The degree of isolation from other forms of diplomatic actions and external relations 
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conducted by the foreign actor;  
5) The idea of legitimacy to reject further structural power implementation and the cost 
implied of such action.  
To further consolidate the factors mentioned above, the thesis proposed three specific 
considerations to evaluate the effectiveness of structural power at civilian ports: 1) whether 
there was a consensus on the expected type of civilian ports between them; 2) what kind of 
resources available to them to implement their respective structural port diplomacy and 
responses; 3) the relative strength in centrality and intermediacy enjoyed by the actors at the 
port. In the case of Macao, there was an obvious consensus between Beijing and Brussels which 
continued Port Macao as the Sino-European condominium developed since 1949. Therefore, it 
was easier for both parties to accept continuous presence of each other at the port, such that the 
EU could continuously make impact to the legal and cultural structural of Macao through 
various programme and institutionalised dialogues under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement. 
However, owing to the limitation of resources available to the EU vis-à-vis those available to 
China, as well as the limited network of Port Macao in reaching the regional and national level, 
the EU structural power was limited to Port Macao only with little expectation to make impact 
to the rest of China. This attitude could be shown by the nature of programmes and cooperation 
organised by the EU, which focused on consolidating the continuous presence of continental 
characteristics of Macao in the field of legal institutions and cultural practices. Table 4.11 
visualised the breakdown of resources and capacity enjoyed by Beijing and Brussels 
respectively: 
 Beijing Brussels 
Economic resources and 
capacity 
High High 
Cultural resources and 
capacity 
Medium Medium 
Political resources and 
capacity 
Low Medium 
Institutional resources and 
capacity 
High Low 
Table 4.11 The breakdown of resources and capacity enjoyed by Beijing and Brussels at Macao 
On the other hand, given the domination in terms of resources available and the relative strength 
(especially in political capacity) enjoyed by Beijing, Beijing acknowledged the EU structural 
port diplomacy and turned it for her own use. Instead of fencing EU structural power off, 
Beijing responded to it by turning the content of EU structural power, i.e. the continuation of 
Portuguese colonial legacy and continental European culture at Macao, to an asset that 
strengthened Macao’s role in connecting the Lusophone community. This win-win situation 
further strengthened the consensus on the expected port functions of Macao by both parties, 
which led to a harmonious atmosphere when Macao was compared to the next case, Hong Kong. 
Chapter Summary and Preview 
This chapter extended the theoretical discussion of the previous three chapters by introducing 
the first case study of Macao, which was the first European settlement on Chinese soil.  Table 
4.12 summarised the development of the role of Macao from different stakeholders’ 
perspectives: 
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Macao at 1557 Coastal town Coastal town Non-port 
Macao at early 17th 
century 
Coastal town / 
Outport 
Hub Non-port 
Macao at mid-17th 
century 
Non-port Coastal town Coastal town 
Macao at 1757 Coastal town Outport Outport 
Macao after 1842 Coastal town Coastal town Coastal town 
Macao after 1949 Coastal town Cityport / Coastal 
town 
Coastal town 
Macao after 1999 Cityport Cityport Cityport 
Table 4.12 The port role of Macao in different period 
By discussing various stages of Macao from a Portuguese settlement to a Special 
Administrative Region, this chapter outlined how the port geography of Macao had changed in 
accordance with the expectation of Chinese, Portuguese and European authorities. As the 
earliest European settlement in Macao, the enduring European heritage allowed both Portugal 
and the European Union to apply some normative influence to the city, strengthening their 
respective “centrality” throughout history and eventually becoming one of the front-liners of 
EU normative and structural powers. However, the relatively small size of Macao in political 
and economic sphere limited the potential of shipping EU normative and cultural content to 
Macao and being spilled-over to the rest of China. It should also be noted that European 
involvement in the case of Macao was originally an active strategy made by Portuguese 
authority, such that the European Union could rely on the EC-Macao TCA in formulating and 
implementing the policy initiatives in Macao. Such a mechanism was lacking in the case of 
Hong Kong, a case to be covered in the next chapter. 
On the other hand, European port diplomacy in Macao, to some extent, was welcomed by 
Beijing. The de facto decolonisation of Macao in 1966 gave Beijing a rather autonomous space 
to test its external relations initiatives in Macao owing to the embedded “centrality” towards 
Beijing, in geographical sense and political sense. The international personality of Macao was 
orchestrated and supported by Beijing and Lisbon, and such support continued in the case of 
European port diplomacy in Macao, for instance various legal cooperation, cultural 
programmes and translation training. The bottom line was always that such programmes never 
challenge Beijing authority in Macao and incited any humiliation in relation to the colonial 
history of Macao. Indeed, as discussed in the last section, the European heritage built by 
Portugal and nurtured by the European port action turned to be a valuable asset for Beijing to 
re-divert these normative shipping to other strategic partners – in the case of Macao it was the 
Lusophone world. The cityport status of Macao, which was built by the consensus of major 
stakeholders, was fully utilised for their own diplomatic agenda. 
However, the relative harmony in Macao was a rare occasion in Hong Kong. Rather than a 
Sino-European condominium that allowed both parties to take advantage of Macao’s centrality 
and intermediacy, the case of Hong Kong went opposite, i.e. a contested space where both 
Beijing and Brussels struggle to contain each other. Especially the OCTS was the only 
framework that governed the differential treatments, the OCTS would be reviewed in detailed 
in the next chapter.   
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Chapter 5: Hong Kong as a Contested Port Metropolis – The Role 
of Hong Kong in Sino-European Port Diplomacy25 
The previous chapter opened the first empirical discussion on the role of port in Sino-European 
diplomacy. While Portuguese Macao was the first European settlement on Chinese soil, it 
received less diplomatic attention compared to British Hong Kong which was established as a 
Crown Colony and free port. The “treaty port model” later became a dominant paradigm 
governing diplomatic relations between European states and the Manchurian imperial court. 
Different European states began to take their share in China by either establishing a colony 
through bilateral treaty or renting a place in China for settlement. The British Hong Kong 
eventually took away the intermediacy of Macao and became the centre of foreign trade and 
commercial activities for Europeans (Coates 2009; van Dyke 2012; Ho 2012) The importance 
of the role of Hong Kong in serving the British interests were well-protected to the extent that 
British wished to keep Hong Kong after the end of World War II despite the international 
consensus to end the extraterritorial rights in China. 
While the importance of Hong Kong in international politics was a well-researched topic (Tang 
1998; Ting 1998; Shen 2016; Shen and Chan 2017), the port features and the port geography 
of Hong Kong was an underexplored dimension. In fact, the concept of OCTS on one hand 
continued the treaty port legacy of British Hong Kong created since 1842, on the other hand it 
also institutionalised the concept of centrality and intermediacy through the Basic Law of Hong 
Kong (HKBL). As a result, revisiting the institutional framework of HKSAR would be an 
important showcase on how communist China and the capitalist European world battle with 
each other through the self-created treaty port. It also helped us to understand how an 
institutionalised port metropolis affected the Sino-European relations and the respective port 
actions. 
Similar to last chapter, this chapter would be structured into three main sections. The first 
section reviewed the historical role of Hong Kong in Sino-European relations through its port 
geography. It was then followed by a discussion of the contemporary institutional framework 
of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and how the framework institutionalised the port 
legacy of British Hong Kong. The last section discussed the policy perspective made by the 
European Union and China in Hong Kong against each other, so as to conceptualise the 
implications of Sino-European port diplomacy in Hong Kong. 
The Creation of Legacy: The Treaty Port System and a European Cityport 
Contrary to most of the narrations about the importance of Hong Kong in international political 
economy, the historical role of Hong Kong was not comparable to Macao and Shanghai during 
the imperial period ruled by Ming court and the Manchurian court – until 1842 when Hong 
Kong was declared as a British colony. As reviewed in last chapter, Macao was a Portuguese 
hub / European outport, and served as a nodal point of the sea lanes of communication from 
Goa to Nagasaki from the mid-16th century to early 17th century. Shanghai, which would be 
reviewed in next chapter, was an important urban port and eventual a cityport for internal 
 
25 Early versions of this chapter had been presented at three difference conferences: 1) Chan, Wilson 
2015. “The “Revival” of European Port Diplomacy: the Role of Hong Kong in Contemporary Europe-
China Relations.” Presentation at IAPSS World Congress 2015, 14 – 18 April. London.; 2) Chan, 
Wilson. 2015. “Paradiplomacy and its Constraints in Quasi-Federal System – A Case Study of Hong 
Kong SAR and its Implications to Chinese Foreign Policy.” Presentation at ICPP Milan 2015 
Conference, 1 – 4 July. Milan.; 3) Chan, Wilson. 2017. “Making Use of the Port Metropolis – The 
Renewed European Port Diplomacy and the Role of Hong Kong in Sino-European Relations.” 
Presentation at Ports and Port Cities in Indian Ocean Connections: 2017 Annual Conference of the 
Centre of Global Asia, NYU Shanghai, 22 August. Shanghai.      
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market and tributary trade. However, early naval documentation complied by James Horsburgh 
(1811; 1826) and Alexander Daltymple (1806) suggested that the main function of “Hong 
Kong”, or precisely Tytam Harbour, was to provide water or food supply to ships travelling 
through the “Macao route” to Canton. Along the Chinese coastal line from Macao to Shanghai, 
Hong Kong was never regarded as a developed commercial port like Canton and Amoy, or safe 
enough for maritime transport like port Macao. Therefore, when Macao became the outport 
for Europe since 1757, Hong Kong was a coastal town supporting the economic functions and 
the livelihood of the European communities in Macao, owing to the geographical proximity to 
the European outport. The European traders had little interests and economic generation 
capacity attached to the “fishing village”, and the “fishing village” by that time was never 
occupied a critical role along the major sea lanes of communication in the region. In fact, from 
the Chinese perspective, Hong Kong was a kind of non-port town owing to the maritime ban 
issued by the Ming court. Table 5.1 summarised the port geography of Hong Kong prior to the 
arrival of British navy in 1841, the outbreak of first Anglo-Chinese War: 
 Chinese authority European authorities 
Level of centrality Low Low 
Level of intermediacy Nil Low 
Type of port Non-port  Coastal town 
Table 5.1 The port geography of Hong Kong prior to 1841 
The Creation of British Gateway through the Treaty Port System: Early Form of 
European Port Diplomacy to China 
Discussed in the last chapter as well as the previous section, prior to the establishment of British 
Hong Kong as a Crown Colony and a treaty port, European traders were mostly based in Macao 
during the off-season and Canton when the trade season began. Hong Kong, as a coastal town 
near the “Macao route”, provided a passive and assisting role to European traders arriving in 
China. As Fairbank and Teng (1941; also Fairbank 1963) suggested, interactions between 
Chinese imperial court and European merchants were limited by the traditional tenet of Chinese 
diplomacy, with only the envoys from tributary states allowed to contact the imperial court in 
Beijing. European merchants, who never submitted themselves as a tributary state, were 
required to conduct their business through the “Canton System.” (ibid) Under the Canton 
System, all the European activities, no matter economic activities like trading with Chinese 
merchants or living issues such as hospitality and social contacts with Chinese community, 
were handled and supervised by the Gong Hong, a guild formed by Chinese merchants in 
Canton backed by the local authorities. Rent-seeking behaviours, such as bribery, extra ground 
rents or customs, were normal under such monopolisation of trading prices and volumes 
(Henders 2007; Carroll 2007b). With the increasing business transactions between China and 
Europe from the late 18th century, the European traders demanded a fairer and direct trade 
relations, while the Manchurian imperial court and local authorities were hesitant to breach the 
Chinese norms. The reason behind, according to Fairbank and Teng (1941), was twofold: from 
the local officials’ perspective, the Canton System created extra economic incentives to their 
offices such that they could benefit from the customs duties collected through foreign trade as 
well as direct bribery from the European merchants; from the imperial court perspective, the 
Manchurian court depended on the Han Chinese officials who always perceived foreigners as 
a threat rather than opportunity, and they always found themselves superior to the barbarian 
states. As a result, the Manchurian court rejected further liberalisation of trade and balanced 
diplomatic relations with Europeans. 
Such a mismatch of mindset between Europe and China, particularly Britain, became more 
salient in early 19th century when Canton authorities decided to take down illegal opium trade 
in Whampoa. Prior to the conflict, the British envoys in Canton had called for a trading post to 
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be established as close as possible to Beijing, preferably on the eastern coast of China instead 
of the south-eastern coast where Macao, Hong Kong and Canton were located. However, after 
the conflict in Whampoa, some British officials and traders in China had changed their mind 
against setting up a trading post on the eastern coast. Instead, many reports and lobbying 
activities were made to London, suggesting that the British Empire should consider to capture 
Hong Kong and turned it into a free port (Carroll 2007b:20 – 21; Eitel 1895; Le Pichon 2006). 
Ernest John Eitel, a German Protestant missionary to China who later joined the British colonial 
government in Hong Kong, declared that the “lion’s paw” should put down on Hong Kong and 
as a free port Hong Kong would be “the most considerable mart east of the Cape” (Eitel 1895; 
Cited in Carroll 2007b:21). Such economic interests, trading rights and diplomatic 
representation eventually turned to the first Anglo-Chinese War, commonly known as the 
Opium War. The war was temporarily stopped with the victorious British naval forces capturing 
Hong Kong Island in 1841 through the Convention of Chuenpi, a convention never signed by 
both authorities. Since both contracting parties were disagreeing with the content of the 
Convention of Chuenpi, the war finally came to an end in 1842, with the result that the 
Manchurian imperial court was forced to sign the Treaty of Nanking which ceased the Hong 
Kong Island “in perpetuity” to Britain. The Treaty of Nanking thus created a Crown Colony 
and a free treaty port at the south-eastern coast of China. With the subsequent treaties signed in 
1860 and 1898, the territory of this free port covered what it is now known now as Hong Kong26.  
By turning Hong Kong into a Crown Colony under British direct rule, it also implied that the 
treaty port system was firstly introduced to the Chinese soil. The treaty port system took the 
assumptions of the Westphalian system of formal sovereign equality and diplomacy. The 
hierarchical tributary system was void and new commercial and diplomatic agreements were 
based on “voluntarist” negotiations with each party sitting on equal footing, although the 
Manchurian imperial court would find itself being forced to enter such contractual relations 
with European powers. Compared to the Chinese-led Canton system, the treaty port system was 
characterised by “opium traffic, extraterritoriality, the treaty tariff, and the most-favoured-
nation clause” (Fairbank, J. K. 1969b:3). Taking the Treaty of Nanking as the example, the 
treaty granted the right of British government to negotiate a fixed treaty tariff with the Qing 
government (Article 10). The Canton system and the role of gong hong were abolished and 
British merchants were free to trade at various trading posts and with different merchants 
(Article 5) under the agreed one-off tariff paid to the Qing government. Western diplomatic 
norms like diplomatic protection and rules of communication between British and Qing 
officials (Article 1, 2 and 11) were introduced. The Treaty of Bogue, a supplement of the Treaty 
of Nanking, gave the British nationals and company’s representatives the status of 
extraterritoriality, such that wherever they were being caught within the ports or other places 
in Chinese territories they could only be brought to British court and had trial under the British 
legal system (Article 6 and Article 9 of the Treaty of Bogue). This supplementary treaty also 
guaranteed British nationals the right to privileges granted to other foreign countries by the 
Manchurian government (Article 8 of the Treaty of Bogue). 
From the British perspective, the establishment of a British Crown Colony, instead of 
settlement like Macao or later Shanghai, gave the British a nearly unchallenged political 
centrality in Hong Kong: the British legal system was introduced, the British nationals enjoyed 
extraterritorial rights, and the colonial government, which was appointed directly by London, 
would be able to govern121eterritrt at their discretion. In addition, since Hong Kong was now 
a Crown Colony ruled by a fellow European state, other European countries and the United 
 
26 The Kowloon Peninsula was ceased in perpetuity after the second Anglo-Chinese war in 1860 
through the Treaty of Peking. The New Territories was leased to Britain in 1898 for 99 years under the 
Convention between Great Britain and China Respecting an Extension of Hong Kong Territory. 
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States either completely ignored or viewed the non-treaty ports as less significant for their 
national interests (van Dyke 2012; Ho 2012). The establishment of the free port of Hong Kong 
soon became the centre of European economic and political interests. Both legal and illegal 
transactions had shifted away from the non-treaty ports like Macao, Whampoa and Lintin. Less 
than 30 years after the First Opium War, 23 open ports were established, covering from Shin 
King to Hainan. (Dennys 1867) Although in terms of economic centrality Hong Kong remained 
relatively underdeveloped by the time it was turned to a treaty port, the maritime space enjoyed 
by British Hong Kong, i.e. the intermediacy of British Hong Kong, was well-connected to the 
sea lanes of communication created by the European powers. From the European perspective, 
British Hong Kong became a port that functioned in accordance to Western standards of 
commercial activities and social habits, although the Europeans never fully owned the port. In 
the case of China, while the creation of the Crown Colony meant a blow to her sovereign control 
over Hong Kong, the treaty port status of Hong Kong also allowed the Chinese merchants to 
get access to the European maritime space to trade with European powers outside the Canton 
System, such that they would regard the intermediacy of Hong Kong as valuable to their 
economic activities. Table 5.2. summarised the port geography of British Hong Kong in various 
perspectives: 
 Chinese authority British authority Other European 
authorities 
Level of centrality Low Medium Low 
Level of 
intermediacy 
Medium High High 
Type of port Outport Gateway Hub 
Table 5.2 The port geography of Hong Kong from 1842 
Utilising the British Port Metropolis to Achieve Diplomatic Interests: The Post-war Era 
Sino-European Port Diplomacy from the British and European Lens 
Although the Europeans and Americans ended the treaty port system in China and abrogated 
their extra-territorial rights in China after the Second World War, the British government 
refused to concede her sovereign right over Hong Kong (Chan 1973; Chan 1977). The 
insistence of the British government could be explained as follows: on the one hand the British 
government believed that the concession of Hong Kong would be portrayed as British weakness 
against communism; on the other hand the government tied British economy to the continued 
existence of British Empire and Hong Kong was an essential component of the lion’s paw 
(Bullock 1984; Feng 1994; Clayton 1997). In fact, the natural economic growth of Hong Kong 
as a British gateway had slowly evolved to a British port metropolis after the end of World 
War II. From a British point of view, keeping Hong Kong under the British belt as a Crown 
Colony maintained a favourable trade deficit and export to China, such that the new Chinese 
government would keep sterling to buy British goods. In addition, Hong Kong was a member 
of the Sterling Area and a free market in Far East, which allowed London to settle dollar debts 
outside the central reserves and became a source of dollar securities for London bankers 
(Schenk 1994a; 1994b). The relative cheapness to run Hong Kong compared to the economic 
benefits received by London made her try to maintain the colonial and free port status of Hong 
Kong. The high level of centrality in terms of both economic generating capacity and political 
capacity, as well as the established maritime network which could be eventually useful during 
the Cold War period, proved that British was right not to give up the first port metropolis on 
Chinese soil.  
In the view of British private sector and her European counterparts, the free port status of Hong 
Kong became the most important trading hub between semi-closed China and the rest of the 
world. British and European firms took advantages of the relative unchecked business 
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transactions in colonial Hong Kong to trade with communist Chinese government, which had 
restructured its foreign trade relations shortly after it took power from the KMT regime. For 
instance, as revealed by Frank King, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Cooperation had 
been “heavily involved in financing China’s trade through the Bank of China’s Hong Kong 
office, and indeed facilitated the export of key commodities throughout the Korean War period” 
(King 1991; Cited in Clayton 1997:99). The overwhelming British mercantile interests of 
engaging China through Hong Kong was, however, counter-balanced by British diplomatic 
interests, especially the Anglo-American relations and the overall Cold War framework. While 
the British and also the French opted for a modus vivendi between them and communist China 
and were the first to recognise the regime shortly after its establishment, any political settlement 
in the Far East region between the free world and the communist world was out of question 
from an American perspective (Clayton 1997). Hong Kong, therefore, was caught in the 
contradictions of British foreign policy with China and the United States. The British 
government on the one hand was willing to sacrifice Hong Kong economic and political 
stability so as to align with the American containment policy against China, as evidenced by 
the implementation of the trade embargo during the Korean War, or after the Tiananmen 
Incident in 1989. On the other hand, the post-war British government always tried to use Hong 
Kong to leverage American foreign policy and took it as to project her imperial image in Asia 
and the world. As noted by David Clayton (1997:205 – 207), the British government considered 
that revising British policy towards China not only meant Britain lost her face to fellow 
Americans, but also lost opportunities to influence American foreign policy towards China by 
luring her commitment to protect the only viable outpost of the capitalist bloc at the South-
eastern coast of mainland China. Such rationale indeed met Chinese interests over Hong Kong 
as the place to acquire important supplies and foreign investment from the West. As a result, 
even though the communist Beijing was formally cut off from the access of the centrality and 
intermediacy of the British Hong Kong, the Chinese communities could still access a fraction 
of the centrality and intermediacy of the civilian port, turning it as an important outport for 
Chinese economy and social survival. Citing David Clayton again, China was “reverting to the 
Canton system of trade” as a controlled means of contacts with the West (Clayton 1997:100), 
but  this time it Hong Kong collectively played the role of gong hong in this reinvented Canton 
system. On the other hand, the implicit leeway made available by the British government also 
made Hong Kong a true port metropolis, and a European gateway by connecting the 
communist China on one hand, the Hong Kong model became an important institutional model 
of future Chinese reform on the other hand. Table 5.3 summarised the port geography of Hong 
Kong during the Cold War period: 
 Chinese authority British authority Other European 
authorities 
Level of centrality Low High Medium 
Level of 
intermediacy 
Medium High High 
Type of port Outport Port Metropolis Gateway 
Table 5.3 The port geography of Hong Kong during the Cold War 
One highlight, in relation to European port diplomacy, should be made before the discussion 
of the post-handover situation of Hong Kong. Compared to relatively mature foreign policy 
capacity nowadays, the European Communities, the ancestor of the European Union, was 
never an influential foreign policy actor in international world. Before the formal conclusion 
of the EU-China TCA, the bilateral negotiation between Beijing and London was completed 
and the joint declaration was announced. Therefore, it might be tempted to say the European 
Union was indeed a free-rider to British diplomacy towards China. The thesis did not address 
this issue here but the lack of presence of the European Union was critical to the European 
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port diplomacy and Chinese port responses in the future. In fact, it was also the intention of 
London not to “Europeanise” the Hong Kong issue, as compared to the position of Lisbon 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
Institutionalising the Legacy: The Sino-British Negotiation and the One Country 
Two Systems in Port Perspective 
Compared to a growing literature on EU-China relations which was discussed in Chapter 3, the 
role of Hong Kong, was once studied during the early years of their handover of sovereignty. 
A special issue about the contemporary EU-China relations has a specific article discussing the 
role of Hong Kong and Macao (Hook and Neves 2002). In this pioneer contribution, Hook and 
Neves suggested that the role of Hong Kong and Macao could be categorized by two main 
issues: those brought by “the complex legacy of extra-territoriality” and those brought by their 
institutional roles as “Special Administrative Regions within the Chinese state” (Hook and 
Neves 2002:113). Hook and Neves identified three types of issues emerged in Hong Kong and 
Macao which might affect the Sino-European relations:  
1. The socio-political turmoil stirred up by the Cross-Strait tension, political 
developments, Church and nationality;  
2. The political-economic issues in relation to the triangulation of trade between the 
European Union and China; and  
3. The legal protection of EU products and residents in Hong Kong and Macao. 
While Hook and Neves acknowledged the impact of extraterritoriality in shaping the Europe-
China relations, they did not state the mechanism in details but turned their discussion to other 
issues such as Taiwan undecided sovereign status and the impact of United States foreign policy 
(Hook and Neves 2002:133-134). The thesis argued that, from the port perspective and port 
geography, the OCTS was indeed a macro port settlement agreed by 1) British and Chinese 
authorities and 2) the capitalist world, including the European states and the communist China. 
One important signifier of the second settlement was that on one hand the Western world 
endorsed the innovation of OCTS, on the other hand conducted regular checks against the 
implementation of the OCTS in Hong Kong (as well as in Macao), making themselves as a kind 
of stakeholders in the post-handover Hong Kong. In addition, compared to the case of Macao, 
the OCTS was the only institutional feature that linked the European Union external relations 
to Hong Kong. Therefore, a closer look of the features of OCTS under the lens of port 
geography, might shed lights on the overall setting of European port diplomacy in the post-
handover period. 
Institutionalising the Colonial Centrality and its Modification from Beijing: The 
Constitutional Structure of HKSAR Government 
The status and the autonomy enjoyed by Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region under 
“One Country, Two Systems” was always in dispute between the pro-democratic camp and the 
pro-establishment camp and, between local community and Beijing authority. In addition, the 
legal foundation of “One Country, Two Systems” had its domestic and international source 
which further complicated the status of Hong Kong in international politics. The “domestic” 
source of “One Country, Two Systems” could always refer to the Chinese constitution revised 
in 1982, followed by Deng’s announcement of the “One Country, Two Systems” initiative in 
1978. According to Article 31, Beijing could “establish Special Administrative Region when 
necessary” and the establishment of such Special Administrative Region” shall be “prescribed 
by law enacted by the National People’s Congress in the light of the specific conditions” 
(Central People’s Government 2004).         
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In fact, devolving power to regional and local level of government was not new to Beijing. 
Since her first constitution the concept of ethnic minority autonomous regions was stipulated 
under Article 3 of the 1954 Constitution (Article 4 of the 1982 Constitution) which stated that 
“regional autonomy (applied) in areas where a minority nationality live in a compact 
community’ and ‘all national autonomous areas (were) inseparable parts of the People’s 
Republic of China” (Central People’s Government 1954). Subsequently, five autonomous 
regions were established at Inner Mongolia (Mongols), Xinjiang (Uyghur), Guangxi (Zhuang), 
Ningxia (Hui) and Tibet (Tibetan). According to Zhuang (2012), there are 155 ethnic 
autonomous areas among the regional, prefectural and county levels, which allow 44 ethnic 
minorities in China to enjoy a certain degree of self-governing and autonomy. Nonetheless, the 
implementation of self-governing in Hong Kong was not based on ethnic equality, as most of 
the Hong Kong population were ethnic Han, but rather on a strategic move for future unification 
between mainland China and Taiwan. The innovation of “One Country, Two Systems” 
suggested by Deng was targeted at Taiwan’s population and the KMT government in Taiwan 
(Yuen 2014). The subsequent implementation in Hong Kong and Macao was merely a 
showcase for Taiwan people, which was also an important mission for Hong Kong in 
contributing to Chinese “foreign” policy. 
Such guaranteed features were later translated to various articles in the HKBL, the so-called 
“mini-constitution” of Hong Kong (Central People’s Government 2015). The perceived 
characteristics of Basic Law as a “mini-constitution”, a rather distinctive international identity 
from China, and the autonomy enjoyed in domestic politics compared to that of the autonomous 
regions, might tempt us to conclude that Hong Kong is operated under a quasi-federal system 
like Zanzibar in Tanzania or the delegative system like Aland in Finland (Shen 2013). However, 
Beijing always insisted that China was not practising federal system as other countries like 
United States, nor the Basic Law had the constitutional feature that give balanced rights and 
obligations between Beijing and Hong Kong (“Lian Xisheng: Fan Jibenfa Erdong Jieguo Jiushi 
Zainan” 2015). From Beijing perspective, the HKBL was a legal document that empowered the 
HKSAR government to govern the “domestic affairs”. The sources of power and the legality of 
the HKBL, was delegated from the National People’s Congress and always came from Beijing 
devolution (Horlemann 2003; “Lian Xisheng: Fan Jibenfa Erdong Jieguo Jiushi Zainan” 2015). 
Key ideas like resumption of sovereignty and authorisation of autonomy from Beijing have 
been spread within the text of the Basic Law (Horlemann 2003). The Chinese constitution and 
the Basic Law provided enough safeguard for Beijing to potentially step into the legislations 
and decisions of Hong Kong. For instance, the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress could annul “local regulations or decisions that contravene(d) the constitution” 
(Article 67, no. 8), the State Council could also alter “inappropriate decisions and orders issued 
by local organs of state administration at different levels” (Article 89, no. 14) (Central People’s 
Government 2004). Under the Basic Law, the ultimate power of interpretation and amendment 
was vested in the hand of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (Article 
158 and 159 of the HKBL), and no amendment could contravene the basic policies regarding 
Hong Kong (Article 159 of HKBL). Finally, Beijing could intervene directly to Hong Kong bu 
declaring the state of emergency (Article 18 of HKBL). 
The above legal issues might at first glance irrelevant to the port geography of HKSAR. 
However, given the lack of formal presence until 1984 when Beijing and London formally 
agreed on the future of British Hong Kong, Beijing was required to borrow the colonial legacy 
of Hong Kong to enhance her centrality, such that the overall constitutional design was to retain 
the key features of the colonial system (Ma 2007; Gittings 2016). For instance, Article of 5 of 
HKBL promised the capitalist system would be maintained and the socialist system of PRC 
would not be implemented for 50 years; Article 8 of the HKBL also kept the common law 
system and the basic legal practice would continue after the handover. The kind of 
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constitutional promise made by Beijing to local audience as well as international stakeholders 
on one hand wished to pacify the confidence crisis during the transition period, on the other 
hand it actually retained British centrality at Hong Kong and utilised by Beijing. As Ma (2007) 
argued, Beijing leaders always found the colonial system, which was highly efficient, apolitical 
with limited democratisation, as a workable system for the future HKSAR under Beijing 
authoritarian rules. Nevertheless, in order to secure Beijing centrality in the port metropolis, 
the legal articles mentioned above provided the Beijing a constitutional safeguard towards her 
“borrowed” centrality. As Holerman (2003) suggested, the lack of controlling mechanism and 
lack of constitutionalism in China made the autonomy of Hong Kong rather arbitrary and 
subjected to Beijing’s discretion. As a result, Beijing developed a strong institution generating 
capacity in Hong Kong through borrowing the autocratic features of colonial Hong Kong, yet 
the liberal substance was replaced by Beijing institutional culture. 
Institutionalising the Colonial Intermediacy and its Modification from Beijing: The 
Granted Autonomy and International Identity of HKSAR 
Apart from the direct borrowing of the British legacy in strengthening Beijing centrality in 
Hong Kong, the OCTS also institutionalised the de facto international character and maritime 
network, i.e. the intermediacy of Hong Kong, enjoyed in the colonial period through various 
articles in the HKBL. In terms of the division of labour, Article 13 of the HKBL defined the 
scope of responsibility of Beijing and that of Hong Kong. For instance, Beijing was responsible 
for handling matters in relation to foreign affairs and national defence of Hong Kong, and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs would set up an office, i.e. the Office of the Commissioner of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China in the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (FMCOPRC), for handling such matter. On the other hand, Article 13 
also authorised “the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to conduct relevant external 
affairs on its own in accordance with this Law”. In addition to the generic division of labour, 
Chapter VII of the HKBL further stipulated the power and autonomy enjoyed by the HKSARG, 
its officials and its relations to external parties. The Basic Law framework allowed Hong Kong 
to develop relations with other international entities, concluded international agreements and 
participates in international organisations in appropriate field, under the name “Hong Kong, 
China” (Article 151 and Article 152 of HKBL). Former agreements to which Beijing was not a 
party but being implemented in Hong Kong continued to be valid (Article 153 of the HKBL). 
Hong Kong could issue its own passports, concluded visa abolition agreements with foreign 
states, applied immigration controls against persons from foreign states and regions, and 
established official and semi-official economic and trade offices overseas (Article 154, 155 and 
Article 156 of HKBL).  
In terms of external representation, Beijing reserved most of the power related to sovereignty 
and diplomacy, for instance government officials could only serve as the members of delegation 
of Beijing in attending diplomatic negotiation (Article 150 and 152 of HKBL). The application 
of international agreements that China was a party and the establishment of foreign consular 
and official and semi-official missions in Hong Kong had to be decided and approved by 
Beijing, although those formal ties between Hong Kong and rest of the world were maintained 
(Article 157 of HKBL).Though not being included in the Chapter VII, the international 
economic and financial characteristics of Hong Kong, such as the status of free port (Article 
114 of the HKBL), a separable custom territory (Article 116 of the HKBL), independent 
shipping and civil aviation policy (Article 124 to Article 135 of the HKBL) – which all were in 
the interests of foreign states and companies, had been maintained. These articles not only 
strengthened the argument made in the last section that Beijing wished to borrow the well-
established economic centrality of Hong Kong as a port metropolis, but also the economic 
network, political affiliation and international identity, i.e. the defining features of one’s 
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intermediacy, of British Hong Kong. Combining the two arguments made above, Beijing very 
first port strategy was to absorb the high level of centrality and intermediacy established by the 
Britain before the handover. Table 5.4 summarised the change of port geography, from the 
Chinese perspective, before and after the handover: 
 British Hong Kong HKSAR 
Level of centrality Low High 
Level of intermediacy Medium High 
Type of port Outport Port metropolis 
Table 5.4 Chinese perspective on the port geography of Hong Kong before and after the handover 
Explaining the European Port Actions before the Handover: An Accidental Consensus 
on the Port Role of Hong Kong 
As shown in Table 5.4, it might be tempted to say that Beijing would largely follow the British 
practice, at least in the aspects of economic and social system, established before the handover 
of the sovereignty from London to Beijing. The status of port metropolis was important for 
Beijing further economic liberalisation and internationalisation. As a result, after the conclusion 
of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984, the international communities had largely 
endorsed the innovation of OCTS. From the perspective of Britain and other European states, 
the Sino-British Joint Declaration had laid down the fundamental principles in the future 
governance of Hong Kong after 1997, and such declaration was assumed to have international 
legal effect, albeit both London and Beijing did not explicitly say so (Tsoi 2014; “Tanzhiyuan: 
Lianhe Shengmeng yi Wancheng Lishi Renwu” 2014). Therefore, the remaining task of the 
Western world was to make sure that the OCTS would be implemented in accordance to their 
understanding, i.e. preserving the status of Hong Kong as an opened and free port after 1997. 
The end of British administration undoubtedly weakened the centrality of Britain in her port 
metropolis, such that both London and Brussels could only rely on the “international legal 
effect” of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, or developed their own institutional framework to 
monitor the implementation of OCTS which affected the port geography of Hong Kong after 
the handover. 
As a result, the Western world had developed their own mechanism to monitor the port 
geography of Hong Kong after the handover. For instance, the Hong Kong Policy Act was 
passed by the US Congress in 1992, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Office was 
required to prepare half-year reports in evaluating the situation of Hong Kong, and the reports 
were required to be submitted to the UK Parliament for debate. Within Brussels, the European 
Commission Office (the EU Office after the Treaty of Lisbon was enforced) in Hong Kong and 
Macao was required to produce an annual report of the two SARs to Brussels. In case of some 
serious political events such as the Umbrella Movement in 2014, the European Parliament 
would organise public hearings and invite politicians or social activists to come and give verdict 
on the political development of Hong Kong. Nonetheless, these reports and actions would 
always be criticised by Beijing. In fact, in his early assessment of the implementation of “One 
Country, Two Systems”, Jean-Philippe Béja suggested Beijing dilemma on the situation of 
Hong Kong was that on the one hand Beijing wished the “One Country, Two Systems” formula 
to be well-recognised by the international community, on the other hand she was extremely 
cautious of “over-internationalisation” of Hong Kong affairs (Béja 2008). The port metropolis 
status of Hong Kong, from Beijing perspective, was both an asset and liability. 
To sum up the European port diplomacy before the handover, given the expected preservation 
of the original port metropolis status, both London and Brussels would perceive the port 
geography of British Hong Kong would largely maintain. As a result, Hong Kong was served 
as a gateway for both London and Brussels, and there was always a wishful thinking that Hong 
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Kong could be the normative role model to facilitate the liberalisation of China in the near 
future. Table 5.5 summarised the port geography of Hong Kong after the handover: 
 Chinese authority British authority European 
authority 




Type of port Port metropolis Gateway 
Table 5.5 The port geography of Hong Kong after the handover 
Sino-European Port Diplomacy in Hong Kong after the Handover: Protecting 
and Utilising the Gateway for Normative Power Europe 
The strategic importance of maintaining such port status of Hong Kong was well acknowledged 
by European leaders. During his first visit to Hong Kong and Macao in 2005, European 
Commission President Barroso deliberately commented on the Commission’s strategy towards 
Hong Kong and Macao, by stating that the “European Commission should develop, broaden 
and deepen cooperation” with Hong Kong and Macao (European Commission 2006:2), which 
resulted in a policy change towards Hong Kong and Macao. Indeed, one consultant for EU-
China trade relations did suggest that the European Union was morally liable to Hong Kong 
and should have stepped up to monitor the implementation of the Joint Declaration and the 
Basic Law (van der Geest 2007). 
As a result, the European Union had reshaped her policy towards Hong Kong after the visit 
from President Barroso in 2005. A new Commission communication, namely “The European 
Union, Hong Kong and Macao: Possibilities for Cooperation 2007-2013”, was proposed to the 
Council and the European Parliament (European Commission 2006). While the communication 
continued to emphasise the economic benefit from a good EU-Hong Kong relation, the 
Commission paper kicked off its recommendation to closer cooperation by a rather interesting 
notion: 
“Increasingly, mainland Chinese companies are using Hong Kong as a base and a source 
of knowledge – a gateway for business opportunities in Europe.” (ibid:5; emphasis added 
by author) 
It was not unsurprising that Chinse business and political leaders took the relative free 
environment of Hong Kong as their business headquarters and their channel of information 
about the Western world, a political role assumed since the Cold War period (Shen 2016). 
However, it was interesting for the European Union to see it as an opportunity for “greater 
engagement” (ibid). In fact, when the Commission summarised their proposal, the instrumental 
role of Hong Kong (and Macao) for “deepening cooperation with mainland China” was 
emphasised as the indirect mutual interests (ibid:2). Such interests may refer to the indirect 
investment through Hong Kong to China, as emphasised in the 2013 annual report (European 
External Action Service 2013), but also the public diplomacy and epistemic influence suggested 
by the Communication proposal. In fact, in response to the change of policy, two new 
programmes were launched: EUBIP and the EU Academic Programme. While the first one 
aimed to provide business information and investment opportunities for Chinese and European 
companies, the target audience of the EU Academic Programme was solely on the Chinese 
community in Hong Kong as well as in mainland China. Therefore, the EU Academic 
Programme was inclined to be the EU port action direct to China, which the thesis should 
closely examine. 
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Strengthening EU Centrality in Hong Kong: EU Academic Programme as a kind of 
Structural Power 
While the establishment of European Union Centres could be dated back to 1988 in the United 
States and Canada, such unified European studies-oriented centre did not appear in Hong Kong 
until 2012 (EU Academic Programme 2012). Prior to the establishment of the Programme, as 
identified by the Call for Proposal in 2011, “only a few academic programmes on European 
Studies (were) available” and “the lack of expertise in European Studies” limited the EU 
visibility in Hong Kong (European Commission 2011). In fact, apart from the European 
Documentation Centre in the Hong Kong Baptist University, there was no EU-specific centre 
in Hong Kong before 2012. The European Commission, in response to the “Possibilities for 
Cooperation 2007-2013” communication, decided to fund a unified centre from 2012. It was 
worth noting that the Call for Proposals document expressed the Programme’s relation to China: 
the universities in Hong Kong had hosted “an important (and increasing) group of mainland 
Chinese students with a non-negligible dissemination and spill-over effect” (ibid:3). Therefore, 
the “wider public” which the Programme aimed to address might not only included those 
academic and professionals in Hong Kong, but also those mainland students and entrepreneurs 
happened to be in Hong Kong but joining programme’s activities. Apart from topic-specific 
seminars and students-outreach activities, two types of programmes were organised by the EU 
Academic Programme: the intellectual property rights related activities and cultural diplomacy. 
While the first part was. always the problem between EU-China trade dialogue, the latter one 
combines the cultural focus in previous European Studies programme with political objectives. 
In fact, while the above programmes and seminars looked to be distant from the discussion of 
port status and port diplomacy, the effort to strengthen the EU presence in Hong Kong indeed 
was a diplomatic action to strengthen the centrality, i.e. institution generating capacity of the 
EU after the handover. One of the major objectives, which contributed 35% - 45% of the overall 
budget, required the bidder to promote greater understanding of the European Union, by 
providing “information workshops and training modules targeting groups such as journalists 
from local, regional and national media” and publicising “articles in the main Hong Kong’s 
national and regional newspapers” (ibid:8). The term “national”, in this context, could only 
mean mainland China-based journalists and mainland China-linked newspapers, rather than 
simply Hong Kong-focused media. It was also worth to note the latest series of programmes 
suggested by the EU Academic Programme, the “ -look” (sound of “outlook”) gave a soft 
promotion of European culture and lifestyle, for instance biking, green city or European 
Citizens’ Initiatives. 
Though the EU Academic Programme positioned itself as “a teaching/learning platform about 
EUROPE for everyone” (EU Academic Programme 2013), the use of cultural attraction indeed 
echoed Joseph Nye’s idea of soft power (Nye 1990; 2004; 2008). The status of a European 
gateway and Chinese port metropolis, became a platform for the European Union to ship its 
European values to China through the high institution generating capacity and broader reach of 
Hong Kong maritime network in China, especially compared to that of Macao. In fact, the last 
dimension added to the EU Academic Programme was the idea of “green” and “smart city” on 
urbanisation, a critical problem China need to face in the coming decades. It was indeed quite 
interesting to see workshops on urbanisation being hosted in Hong Kong, a renowned 
cosmopolitan city which had nearly completed its urbanisation process. The workshops of this 
kind to be hosted in Hong Kong could only be explained to two elements: 1) the relatively free 
and internationalised atmosphere in Hong Kong attracted international scholars to share their 
experience and expertise in the related subjects; 2) the high level of intermediacy allowed the 
workshops to reach both the local and national audience, i.e. the policy experts and academics 
in mainland China. By mixing the European culture attraction into the solution of urbanisation, 
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those Hong Kong workshops could provide an epistemic influence over Chinese knowledge on 
the idea of urban and rural division, projecting the European society as an ideal solution for the 
future China. By projecting the EU experience as a kind of solution to local and national 
problems of China, the EU could maintain its strong centrality over the port even though the 
Western powers were formally being driven out from the governance of the HKSAR. A study 
conducted by Kenneth Chan focused on the public opinion in Hong Kong on the image of the 
European Union, suggesting that the positive but lacking of knowledge attitude in Hong Kong 
towards the European Union supported a more extroverted European Union (Chan 2007). In 
addition, these programmes also bridged Europe and China through Hong Kong and made 
Hong Kong as part of the normative power platform for the EU to promote its values to Beijing 
in a more indirect manner. As Chan (2007) suggested, it was in EU interests to make sure that 
Beijing governed Hong Kong according to “One Country, Two Systems” (Chan 2007). As 
mentioned in last section, the preservation of OCTS was indeed the preservation of the port 
geography of Hong Kong, i.e. a viable European gateway to China. 
Defending Her Centrality through Curtailing Intermediacy: Beijing Port Responses in 
Hong Kong after the Handover 
The above section focused on how the EU had utilised the port status of Hong Kong to ship its 
normative values to China. As Béja (2008) suggested, the port status of Hong Kong was always 
an asset as well as a liability to Beijing. The liability part was that an (over-)internationalised 
Hong Kong could always be a loophole to be explore by the Western world so as to intervene 
Chinese domestic politics. In fact, the geopolitical characteristics of Hong Kong, in relation to 
Chinese mainland, were aware by the British colonial government from the very beginning. 
John Carrol (2007a), a renowned historian on the history of Hong Kong, suggested that the port 
role of Hong Kong was indeed a combination of military base and hub for people and capital 
exchange. For instance, the Stonecutter’s Island was the last British naval base in Asia and 
always served as the port for the British and American navies for supply. Intelligence services 
were allowed for Britain and her allies but the colonial government always wished to curtail 
China’s influence, especially after CCP formally took power after 1949. As the result, rather 
than a free flow of people and capital, colonial Hong Kong indeed had imposed strict control 
over the flow of people and capital directly from mainland, reflecting the geopolitical and 
security concerns of British government in relation to CCP China (Grantham 2012). 
After the handover, Beijing also shared this attitude, but the direction of influence was reversed. 
Since the reveal of “Document 9”, Western analysts suggested that the primary security 
concerns of Beijing were no longer tangible attacks but cultural and ideational influence from 
the West, thus setting a new and top-ranked National Security Commission to tackle the risks 
arousing from Western ideas (Panda 2013). As a port metropolis with strong Western presence, 
the domestic political culture of Hong Kong was a kind of threats to Beijing authoritarianism. 
In fact, major institutional characteristics of Hong Kong communities, including the desire for 
Western constitutional democracy, embracing universal values, vibrant civil society, economic 
and political neoliberalism, practising West’s idea of journalism and the recent historical 
nihilism against Chinese official history, were on one hand constituted European centrality, and 
port diplomacy objectives, in Hong Kong; on the other hand a direct challenge of Beijing 
“sovereign story” (Lam 2018). Suspected by Lam (2013), the inclusion of Hong Kong to 
National Security Council meant that Beijing had adopted a hard-line approach towards Hong 
Kong, using the excuse of national security to intervene in Hong Kong. The “securitisation” of 
Hong Kong not only curtailed the freedom enjoyed by local communities, but also a possible 
move that weakened EU structural power in Hong Kong, thus the centrality that the EU could 
enjoy. This securitisation not only in form of putting Hong Kong under the national security 
agenda, but also a direct action by building a naval base in Central, the CBD of Hong Kong and 
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connected them with the existing PLA facilities in Central. Reviewed in Chapter 2, a common 
form of port diplomacy was a naval port call or port visit, which helped a state to project her 
naval power so as to scare off potential enemies or represent a better friendship between allies. 
While it was politically incorrect to position PLA-N port or visit to Hong Kong as a kind of 
“maritime diplomacy”, the meaning of such maritime action was indeed well-perceived by pro-
Beijing politicians (Zheng 2014). No matter the objective of such naval visits was to strengthen 
the image of Beijing or deter further foreign intervention from the Western world, the 
securitisation strategy could be considered as a move to respond to the growing normative 
challenges from local community as well as the international communities. In fact, the latest 
National Security Act deliberately mentioned that Hong Kong (and Macao) had the “shared 
duties” to preserve the national security and the “responsibility” to ensure the National Security 
Act was observed (National People’s Congress Standing Committee 2015). 
A Battle of Port Geography? The Implications of European Port Actions and the 
Chinese Responses 
Robert Cox, one of the founders of critical theory of IR, once used the idea of “war of position” 
in defining the strategy to strengthen the social foundations of a new state through creation of 
new intellectual and institutional resources to the existing society (Cox 1983). This term might 
also be useful to understand the potential role of Hong Kong in Sino-European port diplomacy. 
The discussion of the respective EU port actions and Beijing responses revealed that both 
diplomatic actors wished to strengthen their position in the civilian ports, through strengthening 
their centrality in the port metropolis. The European Union, through its cultural flagship 
branded under an academic programme, aimed to project its structural power to Hong Kong 
and mainland China, in particular the next generation of Hong Kong and Chinese communities. 
As acknowledged by the Commission paper (2006), the mainland students and entrepreneurs 
in Hong Kong might serve as an engine for the spill-over effect, making Hong Kong as the 
most suitable place for educating and promoting EU values to China. 
On the other hand, Beijing continued her cautious approach towards Hong Kong port status of 
a Chinese port metropolis and a European gateway. On one hand, it was rather difficult, and 
also not beneficial, to shut down the linkage between Hong Kong and the rest of the world, as 
these links were still essential for China’s internationalization and economic development. On 
the other hand, the liberal Hong Kong which was well embedded in the liberal world order 
dominated by the United States, and to some extent Europe, had triggered Beijing’s concern 
over her security. For instance, Beijing always worried that the potential spill-over effect of the 
Hong Kong model, no matter in form of governance model or revolution model, back to 
mainland China. Owing to such security concern, Beijing began to “securitise” the port status 
of Hong Kong as a kind of threat to national security, so as to justify her hardliner approach to 
Hong Kong. However, the further securitisation of port status by Beijing, either in form of 
strengthening her centrality at the expense of European centrality, or curtailing Hong Kong 
intermediacy, would always be harmful to EU interests in her gateway to China. 
However, if we separated Britain from the European Union, the situation was more complicated. 
For instance, compared to the public hearings done by the United States (2014), the United 
Kingdom (2015) and the European Parliament (2015) on the Umbrella Movement in Hong 
Kong, the public hearings from Strasburg received the least coverage among three. In addition, 
any comment from US Consul General or UK Member of Parliament would receive instant 
criticism by Beijing’s representatives in Hong Kong or pro-Beijing media (FMCOPRC 2013; 
Philip, Ng and Watt 2014). Therefore, Beijing cautious approach might not be directly against 
the “European” port actions but against her traditional Anglo-Saxon rivalries. Nonetheless, the 
potential negative spill-over effect might still harmful to EU centrality in Hong Kong, making 
the structural foreign policy less effective. 
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Implications to EU Structural Port Diplomacy and Chinese Responses in the Future 
To begin with, the thesis would like to recall the three specific considerations to evaluate the 
effectiveness of structural power at civilian ports: 1) whether there was a consensus on the 
expected type of civilian ports between them; 2) what kind of resources available to them to 
implement their respective structural port diplomacy and responses; 3) the relative strength in 
centrality and intermediacy enjoyed by the actors at the port. From the analysis above, the thesis 
showed that there were discrepancies on the role of Hong Kong in terms of expected role 
functions and the type. While Beijing wished to maintain the port metropolis status of Hong 
Kong after the handover such that Beijing could take the capacity and network developed in 
Hong Kong since 1842, such approach also attracted the exercise of EU structural power 
especially when the EU decided to upgrade its presence and centrality in Hong Kong. While 
Beijing was in upper hand in terms of centrality owing to the fact that the EU had no other legal 
or institutional framework except the soft international “agreement”27 between Beijing and 
London – and the Britain would have left the European Union by 2020, the British colonial 
legacy allowed the European Union to take an upper hand in some areas of resources and 
capacity. Table 5.6 deconstructed the centrality enjoyed by Beijing and Brussels respectively: 
 Beijing Brussels 
Economic resources and 
capacity 
High High 
Cultural resources and 
capacity 
Medium Medium 
Political resources and 
capacity 
Low Medium 
Institutional resources and 
capacity 
High Low 
Table 5.6 The breakdown of resources and capacity enjoyed by Beijing and Brussels at Hong Kong 
As shown in the above table, the European Union, borrowing the British colonial legacy, 
enjoyed relative strength and resources in the aspect of political values, while Beijing enjoyed 
her upper hand in formal institutional capacity. As the result, many programmes organised by 
the EUAP and EU Office in Hong Kong and Macao were a blend of economic resources, 
cultural resources and political values, for instance seminars on intellectual property rights, 
human rights, green urbanisation or smart city, and cultural programmes like -look or Speak 
Dating Event. However, given the high degree of intermediacy enjoyed by the European Union 
in Hong Kong, not only the call for proposal and the actual programmes organised by the EUAP 
and the EU Office targeted audiences from both local and national. As a result, the seminars 
organised in Hong Kong were much in line with Beijing overall development agenda and EU 
business interests in mainland China, for instance the protection of intellectual property right 
was always a concern of EU business in entering the Chinese market. 
While the above content of EU structural port diplomacy may be welcomed by Beijing, Beijing 
was always sensitive of the potential “structural changes” that could possibly have spill-over 
effects to mainland China, given the high degree of intermediacy of Hong Kong to mainland 
China as well. As a result, while Beijing was generally silent towards the presence of the EU 
and its soft structural diplomatic programmes like those seminars on intellectual property rights 
or green cities, she would always ready to utilise her institutional resources and capacity to 
curtail the potential spill-over effects of EU structural influence to political and institutional 
structures – especially when the United States and United Kingdom were involved. The top-
 
27 While it was generally perceived in the West that the Sino-British Joint Declaration was a kind of 
international agreement with legal effect, the Chinese government rejected such claim and regarded it 
as a historical document. 
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down introduction of the National Security Act in Hong Kong by the National People’s 
Congress in May 2020 could be the best illustration on how Beijing perceived the potential 
risks against her national security when Hong Kong was continuously exposed to foreign 
structural power. Although it was never the European Union as the first-tier of victims, the 
collateral damage towards EU structural foreign policy and structural power would be an 
inevitable outcome in the future.          
Chapter Summary and Preview 
This chapter continued the empirical study of Sino-European port diplomacy by focusing Hong 
Kong, the first treaty port established by Europe. Table 5.7 summarised the change of port role 
of Hong Kong from imperial period to 1997 when the sovereign title was formally transferred 
back to Beijing: 
 Chinese authority British authority European 
authorities 
Hong Kong in 
imperial period 
Non-port Coastal town Coastal town 
Hong Kong in 1842 Outport Gateway Hub 
Hong Kong during 
Cold War 
Outport Port metropolis Gateway 
Hong Kong after 
the handover 
Port metropolis Gateway Gateway 
Table 5.7 The changing port geography of Hong Kong in different period 
Compared to the case of Macao, the port role of Hong Kong was more straightforward as British, 
the dominant maritime power from 19th century to the early 20th century, had colonised Hong 
Kong through the Anglo-Chinese War and the arrangement was made through international 
treaties. As a result, British, as well as the Europeans, upheld a high level of centrality 
(intermediate level for other Europeans) and intermediacy in Hong Kong. Even though British 
dominance was dropped and replaced by the United States, the port status of Hong Kong was 
actively maintained by London as a bargaining chip to U.S. as well as an image-building 
exercise. On the other hand, Beijing also benefited from such port metropolis status of Hong 
Kong, and utilised the port status of Hong Kong for her national interests. In fact, the benefits 
received from Beijing in Hong Kong also made her to institutionalise the colonial legacy under 
the framework of OCTS. By borrowing the colonial legacy in terms of centrality and 
intermediacy, Beijing successfully turned Hong Kong as a Chinese port metropolis after the 
handover. The Western world, given the promise made by Beijing through the Joint Declaration 
and the subsequent HKBL, adopted the OCTS as an institution to defend the port geography 
and their respective port role in Hong Kong. In defending the port geography and port status, 
major political entities in the Western world had also developed their mechanism to monitor 
the port status and port geography of Hong Kong after the handover. 
The turn of EU port diplomacy after 2005, therefore, could be viewed as an extension of such 
defensive mechanism to a proactive approach to strengthen the centrality of EU enjoyed in 
Hong Kong. Through developing cultural flagship programme under the name of academic 
exchange, the EU had shipped its normative objectives to Hong Kong as well as China, by 
utilising the gateway status of Hong Kong in linking up the mainland China. On the other hand, 
the growing concern over foreign intervention made Beijing to develop her securitisation 
strategy against Hong Kong. While the main audience might not be the European Union, the 
securitisation strategy could also damage the port role of Hong Kong previously enjoyed by the 
Western world. An implicit battle over the port geography could be foreseen. 
The next chapter would discuss the last empirical case, i.e. Shanghai, which combined the 
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characteristics of Macao, as an international settlement, and Hong Kong, as a treaty port 
established by the British Empire. It was also the first port to be returned to China and 
experienced the regime change from KMT to CCP. The port geography of Shanghai would be 
in the past and the present would be studied, aiming to shed light on how the legacy of Shanghai 
International Settlement impact on the current por geography of Shanghai Municipality. The 
chapter would also discuss how the institutional legacy had contributed, as well as limited, the 
port diplomatic option available to the EU and China. 
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Chapter 6: Shanghai as pan-European Settlement in China – The 
Role of Shanghai in Sino-European Port Diplomacy 
Following the discussion of Macao, the first European settlement in China, and Hong Kong, 
the first European colony in China, this chapter would turn to the final case to be studied in the 
thesis. Unlike Hong Kong and Macao, Shanghai was not colonised by a single Western Power 
like Portugal in Macao or Britain in Hong Kong. Instead, most of the European states took 
advantage of Sino-British bilateral treaty and formed their own concessions in Shanghai. 
Except for the French Empire which withdrew herself from the Shanghai International 
Settlement, most of the Western powers, as well as some Chinese merchants, agreed to 
participate in the co-governance regime, i.e. the Shanghai Municipal Council. In addition, while 
Hong Kong and Macao were barely mentioned as an important port in early Chinese history, 
Shanghai was embedded into the Chinese trading system although it was not designated for 
foreign trade at the very beginning. The level of centrality and intermediacy was different from 
that of Hong Kong and Macao respectively. 
Apart from the different level of development, Shanghai was also the first port to be returned 
to China among the three cases the thesis studied. The de jure possession of sovereignty over 
Shanghai was transferred back to the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China, under 
two separate bilateral agreements with Britain and the United States in 1943. Followed by the 
defeat of Imperial Japan in 1945, both the de jure and de facto sovereignty of the whole of 
Shanghai, including the settlements established by Imperial Japan, was also taken back by the 
Nationalist Government. Since then, Shanghai became one of the most important ports for 
Chinese economic development, no matter in the hands of Nationalist Government or the 
Communist Government, and the Western world continued their interests over Shanghai when 
it was re-opened as a major port under Communist Government. 
Similar to previous two chapters, this chapter would be structured into three main sections: the 
first section outlined the port geography of Shanghai created during the International Settlement 
period, which laid down the legacy of port geography of Shanghai in the contemporary era. The 
second section turned to the contemporary port institutions of Shanghai after 1985 when China 
decided to open her door again to the Western world. A particular focus would be put on the 
recent Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone. The third section focused on the European Union’s 
policy and political actions in Shanghai and how Beijing authority responded so as to maximise 
her interests. The chapter concluded by summarising the lesson and implications learnt through 
research findings on contemporary EU-China relations, notably the interaction between the 
uniqueness of Shanghai port status and the effectiveness and limitations of European port 
diplomacy in Shanghai. 
The Creation of Legacy: From an Outport of China to a Treaty Port Metropolis 
of the West 
It might be self-evident nowadays to recognise Shanghai as an important economic motor of 
contemporary Chinese economic development, especially given the fact that Shanghai was the 
busiest port in the world, bypassing other internationally renowned ports like Singapore and 
Hong Kong. However, Shanghai was not a designated port for foreign trade during Ming and 
Qing Dynasty. As Bergere (2009:22) put it, “Shanghai seemed the most modest and least 
attractive of five new treaty ports.” Nonetheless, Shanghai occupied a rather unique role 
compared to Hong Kong and Macao, which was an urban port for tributary and intra-regional 
trade for China. 
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From an Urban Port to Cityport of China: The Role of Shanghai Prior to the Arrival of 
the West 
The comment from Bergere (2009) on the position of Shanghai in Chinese economic 
development required some discussion. Indeed, prior to the arrival of the British and the turning 
of Shanghai into a treaty port, Shanghai never occupied an important role for foreign trade and 
commercial activities. As shown in the chapter on Macao, Canton was the main trading centre 
dedicated to European trade since the Ming Dynasty, and the position of the provincial capital 
monopolising European trade continued under the Manchurian imperial court. Geographically 
speaking, Shanghai did not produce a good shelter as Amoy and Ningbo did, which were also 
opened as treaty ports after 1842. Jean Pierre Edmond Jurien de La Gravière, a renowned 
French admiral, once mocked the geographical position of Shanghai “as low as that of 
democracy.” (Bergere 2009:23) As the comment was made during the imperial period, it 
implied that Shanghai may be a good agricultural land, but never an excellent seaport for navy 
and commercial ships. 
However, the lack of good geographical position did not imply that Shanghai was a “fishing 
village” like Hong Kong or a “smuggling centre” like Macao, and that it had no economic 
importance to China. Instead, Shanghai was a market town for local and internal trade, 
especially serving as a facilitator for the North-South trade through the Great Canal. While the 
town planning of Shanghai was not as systematic as those political and economic cities in 
northern China, implying that the socio-economic development of Shanghai was rather distant 
from official administration, Shanghai nevertheless served as a facilitating hub to support the 
economic development of surrounding regions. Since Ming Dynasty, Shanghai had benefited 
from the production of cotton and other agricultural products from the fertile Jiangnan region. 
The development of local craftsmanship allowed Shanghai to export woven fabrics and other 
textiles to other part of China, in exchange of rice, tea and other merchandises and then re-
export to the northern part of China. With the gradual lift of maritime trade ban, Shanghai also 
benefited from tributary trade with Ryukyu, Japan and the West, although the main commercial 
activities remained at Ningbo and Canton respectively (Bergere 2009). In terms of port 
geography, the vibrant internal market and participation of internal and tributary trade turned 
Shanghai into a traditional type of urban port, which had a medium level of centrality due to its 
vibrant economic activities and low level of intermediacy as its participation in external 
maritime network was limited. 
The role of Shanghai in foreign and maritime trade was boosted in late 18th century when the 
navigation of the Great Canal was blocked by floods and rebellions. Tribute was required to be 
rerouted and Shanghai became the starting point of this new tributary trading network, and the 
new economic position of the city attracted cross-regional capital investment such as ship-
building and banking industry. As a result of rapid economic development, the Manchurian 
government had eventually upgraded Shanghai from a district capital to a capital of a circuit 
(dao) with a permanent official (daotai) residing inside the city, responsible for the 
management of maritime and river trade as well as the related levies from it (Bergere 2009). 
However, the upgrade of administration did not necessarily tighten the control over the city or 
increased public investment. Instead, the economic and social governance of the city was rather 
bottom-up, with native-place associations and professional guilds formed by merchants from 
different regions in China serving as middlemen between imperial officials and port society. 
The economic and social dynamism enjoyed in Shanghai was one of the essential reasons why 
Shanghai was picked as one of Chinese ports to be opened – at least in the eyes of William 
Jardine who put up the proposal to British government (Nield 2015). Compared to the urban 
port period in Ming Dynasty that focused on internal trade, the maritime network 
fundamentally shifted to an inter-regional trade focus. From a maritime perspective, such 
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change was a boost to the port’s intermediacy as it was now connected with both internal 
markets, despite the relative drop of traffic due to floods and rebellions, as well as regional 
maritime trading network. An upgrade of administration also consolidated the political 
institutions, which could support the new economic activities and position. With reference to 
the theoretical framework, Shanghai indeed was a cityport which enjoyed a medium level of 
centrality and intermediacy even before the arrival of European powers in the 19th century. 
Table 6.1 summarised the port geography of Shanghai before the arrival of the European powers: 




Level of centrality Medium Medium 
Leve of intermediacy Low Medium 
Type of port Urban port Cityport 
Table 6.1 The port geography of Shanghai under the Ming court and the Manchurian court 
Establishing a European Hub at Chinese Cityport: The Impact of the Treaty Port System 
in Shanghai 
The Treaty of Nanking included Shanghai as one of the five ports to be opened for foreign trade. 
With the notifications from British Consul Captain George Balfour and a symbolic agreement 
with local merchant leaders, the British merchants began to settle inside the walled city. It 
should be noted that such agreement fundamentally differentiated the treatment of Shanghai 
from Hong Kong, where the latter was a Crown Colony with the sovereign rights of Hong Kong 
transferred to Britain in perpetuity, but the sovereign right of Shanghai, at least under the treaty 
text, remained in the hands of the Manchurian imperial court (Tai 1976; Nield 2015; Jackson 
2016). The Treaty of Nanking, as well as the establishment of “concessions” and “municipal 
government”, created extraterritoriality arrangement between the Manchurian court and 
European states, despite a premium paid to central and local authorities to obtain some rights 
like land purchase and house ownership (Tai 1976; Jackson 2016). In fact, the Chinese term of 
“concessions” was referred to “zujie” which could be directly translated as “leased places”. 
Contrast to the idea of “settlement” which was commonly used in conceptualising the situation 
in Macao where a nominal ground rent was paid by the foreign communities, the concept of 
“zujie” was understood as places “where foreigners might live and deal directly with individual 
Chinese owners in buying or leasing land” (Clifford 1991:17, cited in Jackson 2016:4). 
The concept of “concessions” was a Chinese initiative to keep her “centrality” in Shanghai 
while keeping the treaty text respected. After the consolidation of the Treaty of Nanking and 
the Treaty of Bogue in 1842 and 1843 respectively the Chinese local authority actively 
constructed a British settlement through the Land Regulations in 1845 (Tai 1976). Under the 
Land Regulations of 1845, the British community was granted specific living zones outside the 
walled city where they could enjoy their own languages, religion and their own legal system. 
On the contrary, no Chinese merchants could have right to acquire land or establish building 
inside the “British settlement”, yet the Chinese merchants maintained an overriding property 
rights through the collection of “rent” from foreign merc–ant (Bergere 2009:28 - 29). Foreign 
merchants, if they wished to obtain permanent rights to live, were required to pay adequate 
compensation to Chinese original owners. Despite the fact that the negotiation of settlement 
arrangement was conducted between British Consul and the Chinese local authority, the Land 
Regulation did not bar any non-British foreign merchants and diplomats from residing within 
the settlement. In this case, the Chinese authority intended to adopt a classical Confucian 
strategy in managing “barbarians”, namely segregation, collective responsibility and partial 
integration –ibid:30; Tai 1976:10 - 11). The settlement, therefore, was intended to be open to 
all foreign merchants, including the later comer French and American merchants. 
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The strategy was both successful and unsuccessful. On one hand, the British community found 
itself slowly incorporated into the local business culture, for example the establishment of the 
British Guild to collectively negotiate with the British Consul and the local Chinese authority. 
In addition, a Committee of Roads and Jetties was formed by all “rent-payers”, regardless of 
their nationality, to coordinate public works within the settlement. On the other hand, the lack 
of proper conflict resolution mechanism within the settlement resulted in more concessions 
built outside the walled city. As Tai (1976) and Jackson (2016) suggested, the British Consul 
always found himself as the legitimate authority to exert jurisdiction over cases related to buy 
and rent land or property inside the settlement. However, the assertion of authority was not 
agreed by non-British Consul as they could never accept British exclusive jurisdiction over 
their national subjects. The clashes over jurisdiction, together with an increasing business 
interests over Shanghai, forced the European Powers and the Americans to look for new 
settlements in Shanghai.  The French Consul decided to negotiate a separate concession and a 
new concession, Concession Française de Changhaï, was created in 1849, where the French 
merchants began to enjoy their exclusive extraterritorial rights within the settlement. On the 
contrary, while the Americans were initially granted an exclusive right to buy land for public 
hygiene and missionary use under the Treaty of Wangxia in 1844, the American Consul did not 
exercise their exclusive rights but de facto created a socially-American area in Shanghai (Tai 
1976). This area was subsequently combined with the British concession to form the Shanghai 
International Settlement in 1863. 
The gradual development of Shanghai since 1843 thus created “a town with two faces”, where 
the Chinese merchants and locals lived behind the walled city and the foreigners in the 
settlement next to it (Bergere 2009:32). From the Chinese perspective, except for “leasing” land 
outside the walled city of Shanghai, the political order and economic activities were largely 
maintained. The Treaty of Nanking, despite forcing Shanghai to be a treaty port to all foreigners, 
allowed Shanghai to be connected to the maritime network established by the dominant British 
Empire from the Indian Ocean to East China Sea. From the British perspective, the newly 
created British settlement allowed the British to enjoy extraterritorial rights and semi-
permanent place for settlement in Shanghai, despite the fact that the right to permanent 
settlement was subject to Chinese merchants (and authorities). This new settlement was 
eventually becoming a model settlement for the rest of Europe, which could provide them with 
a place of their own in Shanghai. The vibrant economic market in Shanghai since the Ming 
Dynasty also allowed the Europeans to get access to Chinese internal market and resources 
through Shanghai, thus connected to the Chinese hinterland even though they were indeed 
formally settled outside the walled city. Together with the maritime network that had already 
been established by the Europeans, Shanghai turned into a hub for all Europeans, i.e. a low but 
intact level of centrality of each concession within a high level of intermediacy covering both 
the internal Chinese market and the regional trading network  - except for the British whose 
centrality was further protected by international treaties. Table 6.2 summarised the port 
geography of Shanghai after the Land Regulation of 1845: 
 Chinese authority British authority European 
authorities 
Level of centrality Medium Medium Low 
Level of 
intermediacy 
Medium High High 
Type of port Cityport Gateway Hub 
Table 6.2 The port geography of Shanghai in 1845 
Constructing a European Gateway: Early European Port Diplomacy to China 
Isabella Jackson, a scholar who researched on the treaty port period of Shanghai, once 
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commented on the importance of Shanghai’s role in shaping port governance and port 
diplomacy between China and Europe (Jackson 2016:43). In fact, Shanghai was always 
regarded as a model treaty port and wished to be promoted to rest of the treaty ports “borrowed” 
by foreign communities. The creation of Shanghai International Settlement with a new 
governing body Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC) had always been undermined as a 
diplomatic solution not only for China and Europe, but also as a pragmatic power sharing 
solution between Britain, the dominant European power in China, and the rest of European 
states28. The importance of SMC was undermined and never investigated under the lens of port 
diplomacy and port geography. 
As discussed in the last section, the primary objective for the Chinese authority to create 
concession in Shanghai was to turn the foreign communities into something contained and 
governable, so that Shanghai could on the one hand become a free port in accordance to the 
treaty demands, on the other hand the Chinese local authority could maintain its political order 
while allowing economic contacts with foreign community. From other European perspective, 
the governance of Shanghai Settlement created by the Land Regulation of 1845 was dominated 
by the British Consul and merchants. Many foreign communities therefore decided to create 
their own concessions, through negotiation with the local authority or grew “naturally” across 
the original border since 1845. The new concessions created by France and the United States 
in 1849 and 1848 respectively were examples of such expansion of the Shanghai Settlement 
(Tai 1976). However, the successive armed rebellions initiated by the Small Sword Society and 
the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom had occupied the Shanghai walled city where most of the 
Chinese residents in Shanghai lived. The implications of these rebellions were twofold: first, 
the original local authority established by the Manchurian imperial court could no longer 
govern Shanghai as well as protect the foreign concessions established around the walled city; 
second, the influx of refugees created tremendous pressure for each concession in terms of 
effective governance and business network maintenance. In 1854, major foreign stakeholders 
in Shanghai created the SMC to coordinate the governance of different foreign concessions. A 
para-military patrol was also set up so as to protect the foreign concessions from the armed 
conflicts initiated by the Chinese communities during the civil war between the Manchurian 
imperial court and the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom (Jackson 2016). In 1862, France decided to 
drop herself from the SMC in order to maintain the independence of her own concession outside 
the British and American concessions. A year later, the British concession and American 
concession combined together to form the Shanghai International Settlement (Tai 1976; Nield 
2015; Jackson 2016). Therefore, the creation of Shanghai International Settlement and the SMC 
was firstly a response to European crisis of centrality which was threatened by armed raids in 
Shanghai. While the creation of the SMC might have been initiated as a solution to unexpected 
crisis, the governance model of SMC was highly diplomatic and reflected how diplomatic 
objective could be translated to co-governance. Jackson (2016) has summarised the SMC model 
into three different features. 
First of all, the role of national government was limited in SMC. Although the opening up of 
Shanghai as a free port was a result of intergovernmental treaty between China and Britain, the 
role of government in daily governance of Shanghai International Settlement was highly limited. 
In theory, the Chinese local authority and diplomatic representatives of the respective foreign 
community were nominally accountable and provided diplomatic protection to any foreign 
residents in China. In practice, however, the SMC was responsible to all residents living and 
officials working within the Shanghai International Settlement (Jackson 2016). The role of 
 
28 It would be more interesting if we took the Chinese translation into the account, which was directly 
translated as Shanghai Public Concession. From Chinese perspective, the Shanghai Settlement was not 
for “international” but just for “public” which blurs the difference in nationality. 
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Chinese government and foreign diplomatic representatives was highly limited and the idea of 
“publicness” indeed prevailed in SMC. For instance, the SMC was elected by the rent-payers 
who rented or owned property within the International Settlement. Members of the SMC were 
in theory held politically accountable to their “constituencies” – which meant the national 
communities and companies they represented rather than the consular offices in the 
International Settlement. However, in reality electoral competition was rare and both the 
qualifications of being a candidate or a voter wer– stringently defined - only 3% of the residents 
living in the International Settlement were eligible to run the offices (Brickers 2003; Jackson 
2016). This echoed the earlier views that the International Settlement was said to be common 
to all, or managed like the later motto of SMC, omnia juncta in uno (all joined in one), despite 
the fact that half of the qualified voters were British (ibid). 
Second, the SMC was highly depoliticised in name but political in reflecting the actual 
geopolitical context in China and Asia. While the International Settlement reflected the idea of 
publicness in its Chinese translation, the SMC was named “a council responsible for public 
works”. Of course, one of the major functions of the SMC was to oversee administrative issues 
aroused in the community such as public hygiene or transportation. Yet, the SMC was also 
responsible for political works such as maintaining public order and education inside the 
International Settlement (Jackson 2016). While the naming of SMC in English was close to 
nowadays understanding of city council which bared the administrative and political 
responsibility, the Chinese name did not reflect such a notion. In formulating the SMC, 
although reservations were always made to specific nationalities as a tacit consent agreed 
amongst all national communities in Shanghai, the reservations were made to reflect the 
changing geopolitical context in China and Asia such that both business interests and 
diplomatic interests were addressed in the SMC. According to the research conducted by 
Jackson (2016), the pattern of election results was similar to the changing domination of 
European powers in China and Asia. For instance, between 1873 and 1914 the SMC was 
typically formed by 7 Britons, 1 American and 1 German. The German representative was 
replaced by a Russian representative when the First World War broke out in 1914, and a 
Japanese representative was also elected to reflect the rising Japanese interests in Shanghai as 
well as the rising power status in Asian regional politics after the triumph of Russo-Japanese 
War. The decline of Tsarist Russia and the reorientation of Soviet diplomacy were also reflected 
in the composition of SMC by the drop of Russian representative, and to reflect the new regional 
strategic balance an extra representative was added from the side of United States in 1919 and 
Japan in 1928 respectively. Foreign representation remained stable (5 Britons, 2 Americans and 
2 Japanese) until 1941 when wartime tensions between China and Japan, or Allied and Axis 
Powers in general, were escalated under Japanese occupation of Shanghai, leading to the void 
of electoral system and a new Provisional Council was established. The newly appointed system 
which the representatives were nominated by consular-generals, i.e. foreign government 
representatives resided in China, the Provisional Council also reflected the changing 
geopolitical balance worldwide and in Asia, by introducing new Swiss and Dutch membership 
as well as the coming back of German representative to the new Provisional Council, and a 
certain degree of internationalism was maintained in order to promote the genuine neutrality of 
Shanghai International Settlement, which perhaps also served at the best interests of European 
powers and Japan. While Bickers (2003) argued that before the emergence of total war between 
the Allied and Axis Powers shortly after the Pearl Harbour Attack in December 1941, good 
relations were maintained amongst nationals from both sides in daily management of Shanghai 
International Settlement, reflecting “the ongoing strength of the rhetoric of internationalism”, 
such internationalism may actually represent more than a genuine rhetoric, but a diplomatic and 
strategic choice or compromise. (Jackson 2016) As a result, even though the British voter 
population could in theory turn the SMC under British sole control, the British never dictated 
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the political or policy agenda, but reluctantly made concessions and compromise towards other 
nations’ demands, including those from Chinese merchants and authorities. Even though 
business interests, rather than political interests and representation, were the key to formulate 
the co-governance system, the SMC indeed reflected. 
However, the internationalist logic in SMC was also a consequence of nationalist agenda, which 
was perceived by Jackson as the third feature of SMC. From Jackson’s perspective, the most 
noticeable example was the invitation of Chinese representatives to the Conseil municipal, the 
governing body of French sole concession, and the SMC. The inclusion of Chinese element in 
the International Settlement was indeed an agreed term when the International Settlement was 
established in 1863, yet the proposal was not fully implemented, except a largely symbolic 
consultation with the Daotai when the decisions of the SMC may affect the Chinese residents 
in the International Settlement. The reluctance to share power remained even when the Chinese 
guilds offered help to secure local order in 1905, in exchange of representation in SMC. When 
the extension of the boundaries was required, European Powers, starting from French to British 
who were dominated in the respective French Concession and Shanghai International 
Settlement, were willing to share powers with Chinese, in the name of responding to “public 
opinion” (Goodman 2002). Symbolic representation was granted not because the European 
Powers really embraced internationalism but for their specific agenda. For example, the SMC 
internationalism was used to contain the rising Japanese influence in Shanghai after the Russo-
Japanese War and the World War I. Since 1930 when the last extra Japanese representative and 
5 Chinese representatives were added to the SMC, the formation of SMC remained largely 
stable even though the imperial Japan became more and more influential in the Asian maritime 
order. Successive demands were made by the Japanese merchants in Shanghai yet the British 
rent-payers, with the support from London and European merchants in Shanghai, turned down 
the request by playing with the regulations (Jackson 2016). As a result, the national composition 
of SMC remained unchanged against the changing context, and a balance of power through 
internationalism in SMC became the strategy for Britain to maintain her domination of the 
management of SMC. Indeed, as viewed from the case of education resources distribution, even 
though there may be genuine power sharing and cooperation among different national 
representatives, “the Council and its committees divided along the national lines where interests 
conflicted.” (ibid:51) Various displays and organizations such as Shanghai Volunteer Corps 
combined internationalism with nationalism and business interests.  Rather than being regarded 
as a monolithic power with a single diplomatic and political domination such as British in the 
case of colonial Hong Kong or Portuguese in the case of Macao, Shanghai was actually run by 
“a body of people with increasing reach into the daily lives of the residents”, and this body of 
people were elected by civilian interests, supported by diplomatic and national interests, and 
able to co-govern the International Settlement with other national representatives. The creation 
of SMC, from the perspectives of non-British Europeans, allowed them to build up their own 
capacity within the Shanghai International Settlement, through the co-governance system and 
internal lobbying under the framework of SMC. Compared to the early days in Shanghai, the 
institution generating capacity of other Europeans was boosted within the Shanghai 
International Settlement. On the other hand, Britain, despite the power-sharing nature of SMC, 
remained a dominant party and took advantage of other European efforts in maintaining 
Shanghai as a viable port for foreign trade. From this perspective, British did not trade off her 
control over Shanghai but maintained a strong presence in the port. As a result, the co-
governance system under the SMC framework on one hand helped to stabilise British position 
in Shanghai, but also upgraded the port role of Shanghai from hub to a European gateway.  
The Chinese counterpart also took advantage of such internationalism with nationalist 
characteristics, through the introduction of Chinese representatives who had a cosmopolitan 
background yet also linked closely with the Manchurian imperial court. In fact, in order to assert 
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their parity to the foreign communities in Shanghai, the Chinese merchants and residents in 
Shanghai had modelled the management of representative election towards the foreign system 
(Jackson 2016). Notable Chinese representatives in the SMC were high-educated business elites 
with overseas study experience or working closely with foreign traders, making them 
comfortable to speak in the languages, literally or politically, of European powers in Shanghai, 
yet they were also having close ties with local community or even worked for the government 
before. This unique background of Chinese representatives allowed them to simultaneously 
represent Chinese business interests within Shanghai International Settlement, but also bridging 
the imperial court’s interests – which was in principle barred from the Shanghai International 
Settlement after 1843, to the management of the SMC, To some extent, the Chinese business 
and political sector used the SMC as a way to maintain Chinese governance over the lost 
territory. Through the SMC co-governance system, the Chinese authority maintained a certain 
degree of “centrality” in Shanghai International Settlement, such that the Chinese community 
could still take advantage of Shanghai as a hub to conduct business activities. Table 6.3 
summarised the port geography of the SMC period: 
 Chinese authority British authority European 
authorities 




Type of port Cityport Gateway 
Table 6.3 The port geography of Shanghai under the SMC co-governance system 
Constructing the Legacy under Chinese Control: The Shanghai Municipality and 
the “Revival” of Shanghai Treaty Port 
The end of World War II resulted in the end of most of the extraterritorial rights of European 
states in Chinese soil, except for Britain and Portugal which maintained their respective control 
over Hong Kong and Macao. The sovereign control of Shanghai was therefore returned to the 
KMT government, which, after 1949, was transferred to the CCP who was the victor of second 
Chinese civil war. 
The “liberation” of Shanghai by the Chinese Community Party did not return Shanghai to its 
dominant economic position – a cityport which contributed nearly half of China’s annual 
foreign trade in 1930s (MacPherson 2002). On the contrary, the socialist and anti-imperialist 
government decided to expunge Shanghai “imperialist” history through the nationalisation of 
its economic resources. The door to foreign trade was closed and economic growth was 
suppressed. As Kerrie L. MacPherson suggested, between 1949 and 1987, the central 
government was estimated to have taken 87 percent of total local revenue from Shanghai, 
leaving Shanghai vulnerable in economic development terms compared to other urban units 
with similar size (MacPherson 2002:39). MacPherson also found that the trade volume of Hong 
Kong, which was hit by the anti-Chinese sanctions imposed by the Western world in 1958, was 
still higher than the foreign trade volume of Shanghai, showing that the maritime network of 
Shanghai was severely damaged if not suppressed (ibid). It was not until later in the 1970s that 
Shanghai regained its economic momentum and achieved a rapid and sustainable growth, when 
China started to open herself to international trade. While Shanghai was not the first batch of 
ports and cities that opened to “market-socialism” reform and open-door policy, Beijing 
attached important economic goals to Shanghai since it was opened for foreign direct 
investment in 1984. As Keller et. al. (2012) suggested, the primary economic objective of 
Shanghai “was to attract capital investments and technology transfers from foreign countries, 
as well as to help spur growth of the region, by means of tax and profit incentives” (Keller et. 
al. 2012:11). The result of the reform was rather salient: Shanghai became the world busiest 
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port since 2010, bypassing renowned container ports such as Singapore, Hong Kong and Busan. 
According to the latest statistics provided by the World Shipping Council, Port of Shanghai 
handled more than 42–million TEUs in 2018 - more than a double of the volume handled by 
Port of Hong Kon that handled 19.6 million TEUs in the same year (World Shipping Council 
2019). Shanghai. In addition, as mentioned in the introduction chapter, Shanghai was also made 
into one of the Pilot Free Trade Zone by Beijing to attract foreign capital and investment and 
the stock market of Shanghai was one of the most active market in mainland China which 
connected to Hong Kong stock market. Judging from the economic performance, Shanghai 
became a port metropolis if we judged by traditional port studies and port economy. 
Nonetheless, in the case of Sino-European port diplomacy, the role of Shanghai had more to 
reveal. 
Mentioned in the last section, Shanghai slowly developed as a major Chinese cityport and 
European gateway since 1843, and a co-governance system was developed by European (and 
subsequent American and Japanese) merchants and Chinese community in Shanghai. The 
continuous growth of Shanghai was ended by World War II and the second Chinese civil war. 
While it was unrealistic (as well as politically incorrect) to say that the contemporary Shanghai 
carries all the legacy of Shanghai International Settlement, both Beijing and the European states, 
to some extent, interacted with each other in a similar way to the pattern developed since mid-
19th century. In fact, by turning Shanghai as a Pilot Free Trade Zone, Beijing established a 
unique area where the European merchants could enjoy greater economic freedom and 
commercial autonomy than in other places within China. Such arrangement could be analogical 
to the Shanghai International Settlement where the Europeans could enjoy special economic 
(and political) rights in China. The only difference, but a critical one, was that the rule is now 
set by Beijing but not protected by bilateral international treaty. 
Geographical Construction of the Legacy: A Spatial Representation of Chinese Port 
Responses to Early European Port Diplomacy 
It should be noted that even though the place carried the same name Shanghai, the geographical 
coverage of current Shanghai Municipality was more than that of the Shanghai International 
Settlement. The Shanghai International Settlement, which was originally located at the west 
bank of the Huangpu River, constitutes of 4 out of the 18 districts of contemporary Shanghai 
Municipality, namely Huangpu District, Jing’an District, Hongkou District and Yangpu District, 
and all of them were named as “core districts” of Shanghai Municipality, in relation to “outlying 
districts” such as Pudong New Area, Minhang and Baoshan, which had recently been developed 
and dedicated to specific development (Yang 2002). Table 6.4 summarised major economic 
activities of Shanghai Municipality according to Yang (2002): 
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District29 Major Economic Activities 
Huangpu* Commerce and tourism 
Jing’an* Commerce, real estate, food and beverages, 
finance and securities, tourism, and other 
social services 
Hongkou* Commerce, recreation services, suitcases, 
clothing, lamps and lanterns, auto parts, 
jewellery making 
Yangpu* Machine tool, diesel engine, power station 
and supplementary products, electric cable, 
waterworks, commerce 
Pudong New Area Automobile, communications and 
information equipment (including 
computer), steel products, petrochemical and 
sophisticated chemical products (including 
biological and modern medicine), power 
station complete-set equipment and large 
mechanical and electronic equipment, 
household electronic appliances, finance and 
insurance, commerce, tourism, and 
agriculture 
Minhang Electrical equipment, clothing, chemical 
materials and products, metal and plastic 
products, trade, and real estate 
Baoshan Steel manufacturing, port (i.e. storage and 
transportation) 
Table 6.4 Major economic activities in each district of Shanghai Municipality 
From the above table, we could deduce that the original “functions” of Shanghai International 
Settlement disappeared. The civilian port “functions” were removed from the original 4 districts 
and the new port functions were located to the outlying districts like Pudong New Area. Instead, 
the original Shanghai International Settlement was turned into the places for core economic 
activities of Shanghai which signified the “centrality” of Shanghai. The intermediacy-related 
activities, for instance telecommunication, tourism or export processing zone, were all located 
in the Pudong New Area, an economic zone developed under the CCP instructions. In fact, 
under the socialist model of city development, the spatial-functional distribution already 
constituted a response from Beijing towards the legacy of Shanghai International Settlement, 
i.e. the early form of European port diplomacy, and how Shanghai could be used to connect the 
rest of the world including European states. As economists Wei, Leung and Luo (2006) 
suggested, Shanghai indeed did not have much autonomy in encouraging foreign direct 
investment compared to Canton and Fuijian (see also Wei and Leung 2005). The centrality of 
Shanghai should be well-protected as the political and economic importance attached to it was 
huge, ranging from subsidising other special economic zones to an important signifier of 
Chinese nationalism and economic success. As a result, Shanghai on the one hand needed to 
remain connected to its legacy as a historic free port so as to create symbolic attraction to 
European merchants, on the other hand the European legacy should never overshadow the 
efforts of new Chinese government in reviving Shanghai (and Chinese) economy. 
With such strategic thinking in mind, the legacy of Shanghai International Settlement was 
created with new spatial-functional meaning. For instance, Arkaraprasertkul, an anthropologist 
as well as an architect, suggested that the urban planning of Lujiazui, an outlying district 
 
29 The district marked with * covered the original area of Shanghai International Settlement. 
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focused on international finance and trade, was indeed a negotiated result of Chinese 
nationalism and globalisation, with “a strong visual connection to the old Puxi”, i.e. the old 
Shanghai city and Shanghai International Settlement (Arkaraprasertkul 2010:251). Yusuf and 
Wu (2002; see also Yusuf 2001; Arkaraprasertkul 2010) on the other hand suggested that the 
spatial-functional distribution of Shanghai Municipality reflected the geographical narration of 
“pragmatic nationalism”, such that the old Shanghai city depended on the connectivity and 
economic development of the new outlying districts–like Pudong New Area - which were 
planned by the CCP but not the Western legacy. To sum up, Beijing did borrow the legacy of 
the Shanghai International Settlement, but internalised it as a kind of centrality of Shanghai 
Municipality, i.e. the economic generating power as well as institution, in terms of (pragmatic) 
nationalism, generating power, through spatial-functional rearrangement as well as 
geographical narration. Therefore, the high level of centrality in port metropolis Shanghai was 
more than its economic functions but an ideational one. 
In addition to borrowing the legacy of Shanghai International Settlement to strengthen Chinese 
centrality of Shanghai, the legacy of treaty port was borrowed to rebuild the intermediacy of 
Shanghai. In fact, many researches on economic development in China suggested that treaty 
port history was one of the factors that contributed to rapid economic and social development 
of the city or region, especially on economic growth and sector diversification, social freedom 
and gravity of foreign investment (Keller et. al. 2012; Jia 2014). For instance, by examining the 
long-term development of China’s treaty port and comparing them with China’s normal cities, 
Jia (2014) found that the legacy of treaty port encouraged population growth as well as per 
capita economic well-being. The research also suggested that the service and commerce sector, 
that developed since the treaty port period and continued after the open-door policy, was one 
of the main drivers for rapid economic growth and population growth. As in Shanghai, the 
treaty port legacy became obvious in determining its economic activities as well as the pattern 
of trade and investment. 
In fact, Wang and Ducruet (2012) suggested that Shanghai continued to play the role of outport 
of China even when China did not open herself to external trade. Shanghai, before the Open-
door Policy, had already established its intermediacy through serving the Yangtze River Delta 
(YRD) region. Statistics showed that Shanghai handled more than 70% of the YRD’s traffic, 
maintaining its previous position as the most important port of the region of even in China. 
Even though Shanghai was not the first batch of Special Economic Zones created for foreign 
investment and trade, it has launched experimental shipping exercises in 1974 and 1977, 
through accommodating foreign bulk cargo ship to US ports and upgraded their trailers and 
forklifts from Japanese providers, becoming the first Chinese port to handle international 
standard containers (ibid; Yang– Luo and Ji 2016:357 - 361). By the time when Open-door 
Policy was announced, Shanghai was ready to handle trading routes from Japan and Australia. 
With the gradual development of port facilities and increasing trade in China, Shanghai 
extended its internal maritime network from the close YRD to a larger Yangtze River Basin 
(YRB) and even Beijing, and gradually connected to the world but not simply as an import port 
for China (Wang and Ducruet 2012; Wan et. al. 2014). 
From an investment perspective, the original districts forming Shanghai International 
Settlement attracted most of the foreign direct investment (FDI) during the early stage of Open-
door Policy (1979 – 1984) and subsequently these investments moved to the new port area, i.e. 
the Pudong New Area and the free trade zones (Wei, Leung and Luo 2006). In fact, since 1991, 
the new area accumulated approximately 40% of the FDI to Shanghai (ibid.). It should also be 
noted that compared to rest of the provinces opened to foreign investment like Guangdong, the 
composition of FDI in Shanghai was much more internationalized or diversified. While Hong 
Kong contributed in the largest proportion to FDI in Shanghai and Guangdong, the relative 
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proportion was much smaller in Shanghai. Taking the accumulated statistics from 1979 to 2000, 
i.e. one year before China’s entry to WTO, as an example, Shanghai attracted 58% of FDI from 
non-Hong Kong sources while that in Guangdong contributes for only 28% (ibid:238). In terms 
of composition, majority of the non-Hong Kong sources of investment come from Japan, the 
United States, Taiwan an– Singapore (ibid:238 - 239). 
Focused on the legacy of treaty era to contemporary Shanghai trade pattern, Keller, Li and 
Shiue developed the gravity model to examine the pattern of trade during the treaty port era and 
compare the pattern with contemporary pattern of Shanghai (K–ller et. al. 2012:27 - 31). Their 
conclusion confirmed that while Shanghai and China as a whole changed a lot from an imperial 
regime to a Communist regime, trade patterns conducted in Shanghai during the two different 
periods of time were largely remained similar and contemporary bilateral trade between 
Shanghai and foreign countries followed its historical pattern (ibid.). Besides, their research 
also showed that the past foreign presence, in terms of FDI and foreign population, contributed 
to a distinct legacy on contemporary export and its pattern. In fact, academic works on Shanghai 
economic reform suggested that many policies initiated by Zhu Rongji, the mayor of Shanghai 
from 1988 to 1991 and the chief policy architect of the creation of Pudong New Area, were an 
extension of the treaty port system and bias to foreign investors, so as to attract support around 
the world. For example tax holidays or future rights to invest in public facilities were granted 
to foreign investors who were serving the area, foreign companies were allowed to set up banks 
and provide financial services in Shanghai (Yang 2002; Wan et. al. 2014). To further upgrade 
the port software of Shanghai and its capacity to attract foreign capital to China, the State 
Council set various targets on financial liberalisation and logistics reforms in 2009 and 
eventually established the Shanghai Free Trade Zone (Shanghai FTZ), the first special customs 
zone that covered the original “bonded zones” in Pudong New Area and upgraded the area in 
alignment with international logistics and financial practices (ibid.) As Wan et. al. (2014:4) 
observed, the Shanghai FTZ was introduced against the context of rising China’s manufacturing 
costs with weak global demand, and the unnecessary complicated regulatory process was 
viewed as one of the reasons to deter further foreign capital and domestic investment. Again, 
Beijing not only borrowed the legacy of the Shanghai International Settlement to strengthen its 
centrality in Shanghai, but also took it as a foundation to strengthen its intermediacy, forming 
the first true port metropolis in China. Table 6.5 summarised the contemporary port geography 
of Shanghai Municipality from Chinese perspective: 
 Chinese authority 
Level of centrality High 
Level of intermediacy High 
Type of port Port Metropolis 
Table 6.5 The port geography of Shanghai from Chinese perspective 
The SMC Legacy to Europe: A Weakened Co-governance System through the Chamber 
of Commerce 
If the legacy of Shanghai International Settlement was well-utilised by Beijing to construct her 
new port diplomacy to the world including Europe, the same construction of legacy might also 
be observed in the case of the European Union. Without doubt, the era of extraterritoriality and 
treaty port ended after World War II, and the SMC could never be repeated in contemporary 
Chinese governance. However, some of the features on treaty port governance remained in 
managing and influencing the development of Shanghai. Compared to the situation in Hong 
Kong and Macao where the European Union had its independent External Action Service 
Office, the European Union had established one and only one Delegation Office in Beijing, 
serving as the ambassadorial representation of the European Union to mainland China. It should 
be noted that, however, when describing the functions of the EU delegation, the EU office gave 
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a rather reserved, if not reluctant, image of their works in China. According to the official 
website of the Delegation of the European Union to China, the functions of the Delegation 
include conducting “official relations between China and the European Union”, as well as “a 
natural point of contact between the EU and the Chinese authorities as well as others in China” 
(Delegation of the European Union to China 2016). However, the website also emphasised the 
“intergovernmental” nature of EU representation in China, which was not shown in the 
description on the EU Office to Hong Kong and Macao. For instance, the description shown in 
the Delegation Office highlighted that “in all matters pertaining to the European Union, the 
Delegation work(ed) closely with the diplomatic missions of the EU Member states, 
particularly the one representing the EU presidency, which change(ed) every six months” (ibid.) 
In addition, the Delegation also highlighted their limitations of duties, such as they were not 
the office “dealing with trade promotion, consular matters, or other issues which (had) 
traditionally been handled by the Member State embassies, consulates or national tourism 
offices (ibid.). The intergovernmental nature of European representation was salient in the case 
of Shanghai. While there were 22 EU Member States which established their consular offices 
in Shanghai, the European Union had no representation office in Shanghai but only in Hong 
Kong (European Union External Action 2015). It was understood that in diplomatic norms the 
establishment of office was based on reciprocity which the European Union might find it 
difficult to offer to China in exchange of a new representation office in Shanghai, such rules 
were always flexible. For instance, EU had its working offices in some disputed areas such as 
West Bank in Israel, Kosovo in Serbia and Taipei in China, and these offices were never 
matched under the rule of reciprocity (ibid.).  
On the contrary, compared to the “European” Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong which 
regarded itself as “a “Chamber of Chambers” with its membership comprising 15 European 
Chambers based in Hong Kong and 1 in Macau (European Chamber of Commerce in Hong 
Kong n.d.), the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China was established in 2000 with 
the aim to establish “a common voice for the various business sectors of the European Union 
and European businesses operating in China” (European Union Chamber of Commerce in 
China n.d.). While both Chambers targeted to represent EU business interests in the territory, 
the recognition of status was different among two “European Chambers” in China. Rather than 
a “Chamber of Chambers” serving for the collective interests of EU Member States’ chambers 
in China, the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China was a company-based chamber 
whose primary membership was companies operating in China. Originally formed in Beijing 
by 51 companies as an “independent, members-driven, non-profit, fee-based organisation”, the 
European Union Chamber of Commerce expanded to 1,600 member companies and 7 chapters 
in different cities or regions in China (European Union Chamber of Commerce 2017). In 
addition, the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China received both official 
recognition from Brussels and Beijing. For instance, its voice was recognised by the European 
Commission as “the official voice of European business in China”, and a similar recognition 
was made by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Ministry of Commerce and the China Council for 
the Promotion of International Trade (ibid). As an advocacy organisation, the European Union 
Chamber of Commerce in China produced various working papers and position papers with the 
propose of “relaying the concerns of European business directly to the Chinese Government”, 
as well as “keeping European Union authorities and Member State governments abreast of 
developments in the Chinese business environment (ibid:1). 
The Shanghai Chapter was one of the local chapters established by the European Union 
Chamber of Commerce in China. Established in April 2002, the Shanghai Chapter was the 
largest chapter of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, consisting of almost 
600 companies (European Union Chamber of Commerce in China 2016:2). In terms of its 
advocacy structure, the Shanghai Chapter, similar to other chapters, was composed of different 
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sectoral working groI policy desks and fora, bridging the national and regional authorities in 
China to European companies in Shanghai. Apart from contributing to the annual position paper 
of the Chamber and other advocacy initiatives at national level, the Shanghai Chapter also 
actively drove local advocacy efforts to influence local and regional development, for instance 
in 2014 the Shanghai Chapter had published its own position paper, which was the first position 
paper published at local level (European Union Chamber of Commerce 2015:1-2). Following 
the pathway of Shanghai Chapter, many local chapters published their own position papers that 
focus on their respective cities and regions. 
One of the important foci of the Shanghai Chapter was to make European contribution towards 
the establishment and further reforms of the Shanghai FTZ. Being invited by the Shanghai 
Municipal Commission of Commerce (SOCFCOM), The Shanghai Chapter was consulted for 
the future measures being introduced in the Shanghai FTZ prior to its official opening. (ibid:28) 
Subsequent consultation was also arranged for issues like the construction of the Negative List30 
or other drafted legislations (ibid.:28 – 29; European Union Ch–mber of Commerce 2016:25 - 
29). The exchange of ideas had extended from the SOCFCOM to higher level of government 
organisations such as the Shanghai FTZ Administration and the Shanghai Development and 
Reform Commission (European Union Chamber of Commerce 2016). The Shanghai Chapter, 
similar to those merchants’ associations during the SMC period, regarded itself as a vocal 
stakeholder of the Shanghai FTZ. For instance, in the position paper, the Shanghai Chapter 
demanded at least 8-week consultation period for the Chapter to provide oral or written 
comments on any drafted regulations on the operation of Shanghai FTZ (European Union 
Chamber of Commerce 2015; 2016). The Shanghai Chapter also asked for a bold reform on 
government functions and administration in Shanghai FTZ, and publicly voiced the lack of 
substantial reforms in the FTZ for 3 years, especially on financial liberalisation and inter-border 
flow of foreign capital (European Union Chamber of Commerce 2016:29; Ren 2017). With the 
primary objective to defend the European interests in Shanghai, the Shanghai chapter asked for 
further reforms including greater tax incentives or the advancement to free port initiative as the 
future roadmap, so as to “re-establish foreign companies’ confidence in the project” (European 
Union Chamber of Commerce 2016:29). Mainland journalist expert suggested that it was rather 
a “rare display of frustration”, which suggested that the advocacy from the Shanghai Chapter 
was rather significant in shaping Chinese perception over the opinion from Brussels (Ren 2017). 
Indeed, while different European chambers had submitted their proposals over the Shanghai 
FTZ, little reports were made on individual chamber commitment except the Shanghai Chapter. 
This kind of advocacy actions and consultations with Chinese officials should never be 
overemphasised nor underestimated. Rather, the thesis suggested, the European Union was 
following the footstep made by the European companies during the SMC period, although the 
power structure between China and Europe was reversed under the Shanghai Municipality. 
Without a formal and official representation in Shanghai, the European Union had to rely on 
the European companies at Shanghai to exert influence over the management of the civilian 
port, a move that had been practiced since the SMC was created. It was also interesting to see, 
given the context of the inter-governmental nature of European interests in Shanghai (and 
China), the Shanghai Chapter as a kind of “transnational non-state actor” that represented the 
supranational ideal of the European Union in Shanghai. Nonetheless, owing to the reverse of 
power structure after the CCP took over the sovereign title and administrative right, the role of 
Shanghai Chapter was passive and weak under the consultation process. As a result, the 
European Union could never project a strong centrality to reconstruct the whole legacy of 
Shanghai International Settlement at their own hand. Instead, just like the Chinese merchants 
 
30 The Negative List was a list of industries which foreign investment was either prohibited or under 
greater restriction or scrutiny.  
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in the SMC period, the weak representation of the EU in the new co-governance structure was 
to remain relevant and protect the access of the Shanghai port metropolis, i.e. the access to the 
intermediacy of contemporary Shanghai, so that the new Shanghai civilian port could be a hub 
for protecting EU economic interests in China. Table 6.6 summarised the port geography of 
Shanghai from European perspective: 
 European authority 
Level of centrality Low 
Level of intermediacy High 
Type of port Hub 
Table 6.6 The port geography of Shanghai from EU perspective 
The Shanghai Legacy: Contemporary EU Port Diplomacy and its Implications 
to EU-China Relations 
As mentioned in the introduction, it was not practical to duplicate the whole treaty port structure 
and management owing to the changing international political context after WWII, as the 
concept of forced extraterritoriality became impossible in contemporary politics. However, 
preferential treatment against foreign investment was always possible especially for developing 
countries, through selective relaxation of regulations in certain cities or regions. The Shanghai 
FTZ was an example of this kind which the Chinese government wished to make use of the 
geo-economic position of Shanghai to foster her economic and political objectives. The foreign 
countries, in this thesis the European Union and its Member States, also took advantage on such 
self-imposed “extraterritoriality” to advance their economic and political interests. 
In fact, by reviewing the Chinese and European Union commitment in developing the Shanghai 
FTZ, the thesis argued that both parties know the limits of their commitment and the potential 
cost and benefit of turning Shanghai into a true “free treaty port”, i.e. the free port status is 
guaranteed by domestic regulations with international commitment and recognition. Compared 
to the previous cases of Hong Kong and Macao, Shanghai “free treaty port” status was never 
guaranteed to its foreign audiences by bilateral declaration (the Sino-British Joint Declaration 
and the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration), international commitment  (the WTO membership 
and the EU-Macao Trade and Cooperation Agreement), or strong institutional framework (One 
Country, Two Systems). Rather than hard domestic regulations or international commitment, 
the Shanghai FTZ administration incorporated foreign ideas and demands through soft 
coordination, which in the case of Shanghai was through selective consultation exercises. 
As mentioned in the earlier section, Beijing did realise the potential economic and political 
impact of the liberalization of Shanghai: on the one hand, the geo-economic privilege naturally 
enjoyed by Shanghai, including a well-established seaport linked with various hinterlands in 
East Asia and the historical reputation of Shanghai as a city of fortune and economic prosperity, 
was a valuable asset for Chinese development and in attracting foreign investments to China; 
on the other hand the attractiveness and the history of Shanghai also inevitably led to protests 
at local level and the rise of local protectionism, as well as potential economic and political 
backfire at central level (Lee 1998; Wan et. al. 2014; Wei, Leung and Luo 2015; Ren 2018). 
As discussed in the previous two sections, the socialist philosophy of city development and the 
discourse of “pragmatic nationalism” required Beijing to strike a balance between borrowing 
the legacy of the Shanghai International Settlement for her economic stake and the impact of 
embracing too much of the Western legacy in Shanghai. Indeed, when considering whether 
Shanghai could take more aggressive reform and turn the FTZ into a genuine free port, one of 
the concerns from Beijing was that whether the uncontrolled flow of foreign capital would 
create financial crisis in Beijing, given that the stability of Renminbi was always the top priority 
of Beijing financial policy (Wei, Leung and Luo 2015; Ren 2018). Although Beijing aimed to 
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make Shanghai a true global port city, i.e. the 4th generation port suggested by Wan et. al. (2014), 
the high level of intermediacy would also expose China’s vulnerability and anxiety of foreign 
intervention, as demonstrated in the case of Hong Kong. 
The difficulty in choosing developmental pathway of Shanghai by Beijing could possibly 
become a way for the European Union to exert its influence over the decision-making process, 
or even taking the spill-over effect to impact on the rest of China. Indeed, it was rather obvious 
from the EU perspective that the Shanghai FTZ was not simply a project influencing the port 
geography of Shanghai but an example for national economic reform. The establishment of the 
European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, as mentioned in earlier section, was 
mobilised as an advocacy as well as a monitoring organisation on Beijing commitment towards 
economic liberalisation, and such objective was undoubtedly shared by the Shanghai Chapter. 
Repeatedly mentioned in the position paper and media briefing sessions, the Shanghai Chapter 
considered the Shanghai FTZ as a role model for further economic liberalisation in China, rather 
than a simple industrial park or development zone that was readily duplicated in other Chinese 
cities. The free port initiative, for example, was strongly supported by the Shanghai chapter as 
a “bold reform” that the European companies are looking for. Undoubtedly, the final decision 
remained at the hand of Beijing, and Shanghai administration, and the European Union (and its 
Member States) could never return to its dominant position enjoyed during the treaty port era 
that dominated the policy-making and decision-making process. Yet, such advocacy could, at 
least from the recent development of Shanghai FTZ, turned Shanghai into a more open place 
for foreign investment and allowed the European companies to slowly penetrate some business 
areas which had originally been under the Negative List. 
The European Union position, based on the analysis of the advocacy made by the Shanghai 
Chapter of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, was twofold. The first EU 
position was always economic-driven, especially in Shanghai where the Member States had 
more presence and history compared to Brussels. Brussels always wished to Shanghai as a well-
developed economic hub for European business interests though advocating a free centrality, 
i.e. the liberal economic reform in Shanghai economic generation capacity, and open 
intermediacy, i.e. an unrestricted economic connection to domestic industries and market, 
regardless of any sophisticated change in central administration or Sino-European relations. 
The second position, which was a step forward, was to tie European values of market economy 
and liberalisation of trade and investment in Shanghai with the institutional reform within 
Shanghai, so that the Shanghai FTZ could be a role model of the rest of the China that embraced 
economic liberal and institutional liberal reform. However, to achieve such objective, the EU 
was required to upgrade its centrality in Shanghai, i.e. turning the economic hub to a soft-power 
gateway. An upgrade of such institution generating power, however, meant more EU active 
influence, if not intervention, to Chinese economic policy and social reform. As reviewed in 
Chapter 3, the red-line for any differential treatment offered by Beijing was sovereign integrity 
and policy autonomy in domestic affairs. Any foreign moves which aimed at changing the pace 
of Chinese reform, no matter in economic aspect or social aspect, would be heavily criticised 
by Beijing. As a result, the second position of the EU could never be realised and the role of 
Shanghai remained as an economic hub for EU business interests, but never a soft-power 
gateway to transfer EU structural power to China. After all, the Shanghai Chapter might be a 
heavy-weighted advocacy organisation in Shanghai, but never an official arm equipped with 
diplomatic resources and bargaining power. The slightly mismatch of Beijing and Brussels 
position in economic development in Shanghai and China could be best illustrated by how the 
Shanghai FTZ was recently developed. While the European companies continued to complain 
for the lack of progressive reform in Shanghai FTZ and decided to leave, Beijing maintained 
her position and evaluation of Shanghai FTZ as a successful initiative to attract foreign direct 
investment under her control. The widened expectation gap indeed was also a good reflection 
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on how the European Union and China view each other, and Shanghai became a lively 
illustration of such a gap in practical manner. 
Implications to EU Structural Port Diplomacy and Chinese Responses in the Future 
Similar to the previous chapters, the thesis would apply the three specific considerations to 
evaluate the effectiveness of structural power at civilian ports: 1) whether there was a 
consensus on the expected type of civilian ports between them; 2) what kind of resources 
available to them to implement their respective structural port diplomacy and responses; 3) the 
relative strength in centrality and intermediacy enjoyed by the actors at the port. Table 6.7 
deconstructed the centrality enjoyed by Beijing and Brussels in Shanghai respectively: 
 Beijing Brussels 
Economic resources and 
capacity 
High High 
Cultural resources and 
capacity 
High Low 
Political resources and 
capacity 
Extremely high Extremely low 
Institutional resources and 
capacity 
Extremely high Extremely low 
Table 6.7 The breakdown of resources and capacity enjoyed by Beijing and Brussels at Shanghai 
Compared to Macao and Hong Kong, Shanghai could be perceived as a kind of “deviant case” 
as the EU did not possess other capacity and resources apart from its economic investment in 
Shanghai. Unlike the EU Office in Hong Kong and Macao which was supported by independent 
personnel and budget line from the EEAS, there was no official or direct EU representatives in 
Shanghai. The European Union could only rely on non-official resources like the Shanghai 
Chapter of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China. Given the lack of official 
resources and capacity, the Shanghai Chapter could only leverage on its economic presence and 
lobby for a better institutional arrangement of Shanghai FTZ, so as to produce a model FTZ for 
the rest of China (by leveraging the high intermediacy of Shanghai) on one hand, on the other 
hand protect the remained capacity, resources and interests shared by the EU and its Member 
States in Shanghai. 
On the contrary, given the dominance of literally everything in Shanghai, Beijing did not 
consider the lobbying from the Shanghai Chapter as a threat to any local or national structures. 
In fact, as shown in the geographical reconstruction of Shanghai since the Open Door Policy, 
Beijing had reconstructed the legacy of Shanghai International Settlement for the sake of her 
cultural propaganda and economic development. In addition, Beijing also used Shanghai as one 
of the testing cases for any liberal or capitalist economic reform such as the Pilot FTZ and its 
subsequent reform in regulations. Rather than a kind of responses to EU structural port 
diplomacy, Beijing’s port actions in Shanghai was driven by solely her internal needs. The 
economic presence of the European Union was just an asset for Beijing to justify her success 
in economic reform since the Open Door Policy.     
Chapter Summary and Preview 
This chapter served as the last chapter of the three case studies offered in the thesis. Table 6.8 
summarised the change of port role of Shanghai from imperial period to contemporary days: 
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 Chinese authority European authority 
Shanghai in Ming Dynasty Urban port Non-port 
Shanghai in early Qing 
Dynasty 
Cityport Non-port 
Shanghai after 1845 Cityport Hub (Gateway for Britain) 
Shanghai under SMC 
period 
Cityport Gateway 
Shanghai after the Open-
door Policy 
Port metropolis Hub (Gateway as the next 
step) 
Table 6.8 The port role of Shanghai in different period 
By discussing the economic and political characteristics established during the Shanghai treaty 
port era, this chapter suggested that the legacy of its treaty era war largely remained and 
contributed to the development of Shanghai in contemporary era. Given the irreversible change 
of contemporary international politics, the concept of extraterritoriality was no longer viable, 
and the EU influence in Shanghai was limited and only represented by the Shanghai Chapter of 
the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, a model that the European states 
developed since the SMC period. From Beijing perspective, the legacy of Shanghai 
International Settlement was both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, the colonial legacy 
was a kind of economic asset to Beijing in attracting foreign investment and commodity trade. 
On the other hand, it might stir up unnecessary political instability or nationalistic discourse. 
As a result, Beijing, in considering the development pathway of Shanghai, had to balance 
between the economic openness of Shanghai and the potential foreign invention from, for 
instance the structural power of the EU. From the perspective of the European Union, the 
wishful thinking was always turned Shanghai from an economic hub to a soft-power gateway, 
which aimed to leverage the economic centrality and its high degree of intermediacy, for the 
sake of promoting institutional liberalisation in Shanghai and the rest of China. Nonetheless, 
the Shanghai Chapter, an unofficial diplomatic agent of the EU, could never fulfil such role nor 
such spill-over was allowed by Beijing. As a result, the Shanghai Chapter could only defend 
the EU interests and tried to maintain Shanghai at least an economic hub for the EU and its 
Member States to pursue their economic interests in China. 
After the discussion of three empirical cases, the thesis would state its conclusion in the next 
chapter. Lessons would be drawn from the empirical studies and used to re-evaluate the 
theoretical framework suggested in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. After the evaluation, it would also 
discuss some of the foreseeable changes in Sino-European relations and its impact towards the 
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Chapter 7: Bringing the Ports and Port Diplomacy Back to 
International Politics 
Port diplomacy was at the same time an old and a new subject of international relations as well 
as Sino-European relations. It was an old subject in international relations because the 
importance of maritime domination and the diplomatic use of sea power had been well-
discussed since late the 19th century and remained influential in the 21st century (Widen 2011; 
Le Miere 2014; Germond 2015; Stavridis 2017). It was a new subject in international relations 
because the end of Cold War had fundamentally changed the definition of security. While 
traditional state-to-state naval warfare was, to some extent, unimaginable nowadays, the post-
Cold War global environment gave rise to a new security agenda (Buzan 1991; Krause and 
Williams 1996; Buzan Waever and de Wilde 1997; Germond 2010; 2015) Two interlinked 
trends in globalisatio 153 eterritorializationn and deterritorialisation, had redefined our 
conception of security and what constituted a security issue nowadays (Germond 2010; 2015). 
The re-orientation of new security agenda also demanded new diplomatic initiatives on the high 
seas or new protocol in global civilian port management. For instance, after the September 11 
terrorist attack in 2001, the United States introduced Container Security Initiative (CSI) in 2002 
to strengthen shipping and container cargo security against her homeland ports and ports of her 
business partners (U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2019). Port diplomacy, under such a 
post-Cold War security agenda, had inevitably extended from naval ports to civilian ports. 
Port diplomacy was also at the same time an old and new subject of Sino-European relations. 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the establishment of the Portuguese settlement at 
Macao in 1557 formally opened up the direct maritime contact between European states and 
China, and the establishment of British Hong Kong and Shanghai as a Crown Colony and a 
treaty port respectively in 1842 and 1843 turned a new page of Sino-European relations. 
Maritime trade and port diplomacy were two essential features of Sino-European relations until 
1943 when most of the extraterritorial rights enjoyed by the West were terminated by 
international agreements. Still, Hong Kong and Macao were only returned to Chinese sovereign 
control in 1997 and 1999, effectively ended European colonial presence in China. On the other 
hand, since President Xi announced his ambition to create a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road 
in 2013, Beijing had aggressively invested in port infrastructure located from South China Sea 
to the Mediterranean Sea. In the case of the Mediterranean Sea, Beijing committed herself on 
a “Five Ports” initiative:  Chinese state-owned enterprise would invest and modernise the port 
infrastructure of Venice, Ravenna and Trieste of Italy, Capodistria of Slovenia and Fiume in 
Croatia (Zeneli 2019). Together with Piraeus of Greece which was already owned by China 
Ocean Shipping (Group) Company since 2016, Beijing would soon establish a strong maritime 
network in Europe through her extensive investment in civilian ports. Port diplomacy again 
became the centre of Sino-European relations, although more attention was given to Beijing 
proactive investment in port facilities in Europe, but not the vice versa. 
Against this geopolitical context, the thesis wished to investigate Sino-European port 
diplomacy on Chinese soil. Grounded as a comparative study on three European settlement and 
treaty ports, namely Macao, Hong Kong and Shanghai, the thesis aimed to shed light on how 
port diplomacy at former European treaty ports could potentially impact on contemporary Sino-
European diplomacy. Through this comparative study, the thesis also aimed to develop a 
systematic framework to conceptualise the role of civilian port in diplomacy and its relevancy 
to the exercise of EU structural power to China. The revised port-city paradigm, the thesis 
argued, was helpful to understand the opportunities and limitations of Sino-European port 
diplomacy. 
This concluding chapter was structured into two main sections. The first section would 
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summarise major findings of the thesis and the implications of the findings. The second section 
would, based on the result of the empirical analysis, propose two lessons drawn from the 
empirical analysis, and how these theoretical propositions furthered our understanding on EU 
structural power and the role of civilian ports in international relations and foreign policy. 
Summary of the Research Findings 
To begin with, this section would like to refresh readers’ memory on the research questions the 
thesis wished to answer. The first-level research question, which focused on the ports and port 
system per se, were as follows: 
RQ1: What was the role of ports and port-cities in contemporary EU-China 
relations? 
RQ1.1: Was there any role difference among those ports and port-cities? If yes, 
how could we conceptualise and explain the difference? 
In an attempt to answer the above conceptual questions, the thesis proposed the below 
hypotheses: 
H1: Ports and port-cities in China served as a platform for the EU to exercise its 
normative power and structural power, without jeopardising the economic 
interests of the EU and its Member States. 
H1.1: The role differentiation of ports and port-cities was attributed to their unique 
port geography, which was defined by two dimensions, namely “centrality” and 
“intermediacy”. 
Furthering on the role differentiation and role difference in Sino-European port diplomacy, the 
thesis proposed the following second level research questions and hypotheses: 
RQ2: Was European port diplomacy constrained by the colonial and treaty port 
legacy in China? If yes, how could we conceptualise and explain the relationship 
between European port diplomacy and its colonial and treaty port legacy? 
RQ3 Was Chinese response also constrained by the colonial and treaty port legacy 
introduced by Europe? If yes, how could we conceptualise and explain the 
relationship between Chinese port response and its colonial and treaty port legacy? 
H2: The European port diplomacy was constrained by the colonial and treaty port 
legacy as the legacy was one of factors that defined the availability of diplomatic 
resources (centrality) and network (intermediacy) the European Union could 
deploy at the port. 
H3: The Chinese port response was constrained by the colonial and treaty port 
legacy as the legacy was one of the factors that defined the availability of 
diplomatic resources (centrality) and network (intermediacy) that China could 
deploy at the port. 
In order to test the above hypotheses, the thesis examined three treaty ports that were created 
by the European states during the imperial period of China and retained some characteristics of 
a “treaty port” nowadays. The first two cases, Macao and Hong Kong, retained part of the 
characteristics of a treaty port in two way; internationally, the Sino-British Joint Declaration 
and the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration were diplomatic commitments agreed between 
Beijing and respective European states that the socio-economic features enjoyed by Hong Kong 
and Macao community during the treaty port period would be continued after the resumption 
Bringing the Ports and Port Diplomacy Back-in     155 
 
of sovereign control by Beijing; domestically, the introduction of “One Country, Two Systems” 
created differential treatments to foreign communities and companies in Hong Kong and Macao, 
compared to those foreign communities and companies located in a normal Chinese city. The 
main difference between Hong Kong and Macao, from the European perspective, was that the 
EU had signed the EU-Macao TCA as a bilateral legal agreement governing their relationship, 
while the EU could only rely on a soft monitoring mechanism in governing its relationship with 
Hong Kong. 
On the contrary, Shanghai did not practice “One Country Two Systems” as the port was indeed 
never turned into a colony of a specific European state but an international settlement from 
1863 to 1937. Shanghai was also the first treaty port among the three selected cases on which 
China could resume her sovereign control. However, Beijing gave differential treatment to 
foreign communities and companies through the Pilot Free Trade Zone initiative, turning 
Shanghai to one of the places that embraced “free trade” to foreign companies under the direct 
rule of Beijing. As a result, even though formal treaty port system was no longer viable in 
contemporary China, China and Europe could continuously interact with each other through 
some civilian ports where differential treatments were granted. In fact, Beijing has recently 
announced the creation of free trade port in Hainan in 2018, and introduced legal and 
administrative reform over the Shanghai Free Trade Zone (State Council, People’s Republic of 
China 2018; 2019). Establishing “chartered ports”, i.e. ports that created different treatment to 
the foreign community through domestic legislation or international public/private agreement, 
not only became Chinese foreign policies over developing countries under the Belt and Road 
Initiative, but as a way to enhance Chinese domestic economic reform. 
Role Differentiation in EU Port Diplomacy: Centrality and Intermediacy as an Enabler 
and Obstacle of Port Diplomacy 
Discussed in Chapter 2, traditional geopolitical analysis placed little interests in civilian ports 
and civilian port actions, despite the well-acknowledged importance of commercial network in 
supporting naval power projection (Mahan 1890; Widen 2011; Le Miere 2014; Germond 2015). 
Given the new security agenda, civilian ports, on the one hand, could be more useful in 
achieving diplomatic objectives such as image and alliance building. On the other hand, the 
socio-economic features of civilian ports could also produce security threats to nation-states. 
As a result, the thesis proposed an organic combination of port studies, port geography and 
international relations theory, as the foundation of the theoretical framework to analyse Sino-
European relations at civilian ports. With reference to the revised definition of “centrality” and 
“intermediacy”, the contemporary port role of the selected cases, from the perspective of 
Beijing and Brussels, was outlined in Table 7.1: 
 Chinese authority European authorities 
Port role of Macao Cityport Cityport 
Port role of Hong Kong Port metropolis Gateway 
Port role of Shanghai Port metropolis Hub 
Table 7.1 Contemporary port status of the selected cases 
Through comparing the three cases and the respective port actions that the European Union (or 
its representative on the ground) implemented, the thesis proposed that the role differentiation 
could be further conceptualised by 1) the port geography of the port; 2) the acceptance or not 
about the colonial legacy; 3) the nature of the relations between Beijing and major stakeholders 
in the ports. 
Centrality as the Diplomatic Resources that Could be Deployed by an Actor at the Port 
In Chapter 1, the thesis revised the economic-driven definition of “centrality”, by adding 
political interests and institutions as another dimension of centrality, i.e. “endogenous political 
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interests and institutions generation power”. With the revised definition, the concept of 
centrality not only focused on the economic interests generating power, which could always be 
quantified by economic activities and interests embedded in the port economy, but also the 
capacity to generate political interests and socio-political norms and institutions. In other words, 
the level of centrality of a civilian port implied the level of resources that a diplomatic actor 
could to deploy in port diplomacy: the higher the level of centrality of the civilian port enjoyed, 
the more resources a diplomatic actor could deploy in its port diplomacy against the third party. 
Therefore, the thesis argued that instead of being a neutral vehicle, the port geography of a 
civilian port could determine what port actions were possible and appropriate for a diplomatic 
actor in carrying its port diplomacy, through the embedded diplomatic resources defined by the 
centrality of a civilian port. 
This argument could partially help us to understand the port actions conducted by the European 
Union in Macao, Hong Kong and Shanghai. With the new definition, the centrality of a port 
could be deconstructed to various dimensions according to the definition, i.e. the economic, 
political and institutional generating capacity. Given the concept of institution could be further 
divided into hard institutions such as constitutional or legal arrangement, and soft institutions 
such as culture, four sub-dimensions of centrality could be constructed and Table 7.2 
summarised the centrality of the selected civilian ports, from the EU perspective, as follows: 
 Macao Hong Kong Shanghai 
Economic centrality Low High High 
Cultural centrality Medium Medium Low 
Political centrality Low Medium Extremely low 
Institutional 
centrality 
Medium Low Extremely low 
Table 7.2 Different dimensions of centrality enjoyed by the EU in the selected ports 
From the above table, it appeared that the EU had experienced different strengths and obstacles 
across three different civilian ports, which limited its foreign policy options. For instance, the 
extreme lack of institutional centrality, i.e. no formal diplomatic representatives of the 
European Union, in Shanghai and the absence of any form of EU-China legal documents to 
govern the relationship, left the EU with no viable diplomatic resources but economic power. 
As a result, the traditional business lobbying model might be the best model for EU port 
diplomacy with China in Shanghai. By heavily relying on the non-state business organisation, 
i.e. the Shanghai Chapter of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, the European 
Union could leverage on the remaining intact resources for potential spill-over to other 
centralities. Alternatively, the European Union could actively show its presence in economic 
centrality, defending the only viable diplomatic resources in the port of Shanghai. This kind of 
rationale could be best reflected by the discussion in Chapter 6, which the Shanghai Chapter of 
the European Union Chamber of Commerce positioning itself as a monitoring organisation of 
European Union business interests in China, making bold proposal to the Shanghai government 
in reforming the Pilot Free Trade Zone in Shanghai. 
In comparison, the EU in Macao had a more advantageous institutional centrality (the EU-
Macao TCA) and cultural centrality, but lacked economic interests generating power owing to 
the relatively weak economic diversity and development in Macao. As a result, discussed in 
Chapter 4, the EU had actively utilised the institutional capacity to negotiate with the MSAR 
government and introduced programmes and activities that could utilise the cultural centrality 
of the European Union enjoyed in Macao, such as training programmes in legal field and 
interpretation, and cultural and information sharing programme for investment and industrial 
training. Similar to the case in Shanghai, EU port diplomacy actions could on the one hand opt 
for a potential spill-over effect from cultural centrality to economic centrality so that the EU 
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could potentially take Macao as a stepping stone to invest in the South-eastern part of China, 
but on the other hand the EU could continue and even strengthen its presence in their stronger 
aspects of centrality in Macao, i.e. institutional centrality. 
This argument about centrality therefore explained why the European Union had developed 
more progressive seminars and programmes under the European Union Academic Programme 
in Hong Kong. Given the relatively high level of economic centrality and moderate level of 
cultural and political centrality, Hong Kong was a resourceful port for EU to promote its foreign 
policy agenda which included the protection of intellectual property rights, universal values and 
even urbanisation or smart city as a new policy agenda in Europe and China. The well-
developed presence of the European Union in economic investment, cultural connectivity and 
value affinity gave the European Union, among all three ports, the largest autonomy to develop 
its structural port diplomacy, modelled from the idea of “structural diplomacy” suggested by 
Keukeleire (2003; see also Keukeleire, Thiers and Justaert 2009; Keukeleire and Justaert 2012; 
Keukeleire and Delreux 2015). As stated in the various policy papers and annual reports 
(European Commission 2006; 2011; European External Action Service 2013), the primary 
objective of the EU was clearly to serve as a knowledge gateway in Hong Kong for the sake of 
shipping normative goods to China. 
To sum up, the comparative study among three ports showed the opportunities and obstacles of 
the European Union in formulating its port diploma”y. The EU “representation", no matter it 
was formally represented like the EU Office in Hong Kong and Macao or informally 
represented like the Shanghai Chapter of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, 
had made reference to the potential resources that the EU could enjoy at the port. From the case 
of Macao and Shanghai, it also implied that EU economic centrality was an object to be secured 
as well as an objective to promote: the reliance of the business lobbying model in Shanghai 
might be attributed to the lack of formal institutions in Shanghai, but it could also be (partially) 
understood as the best form to protect business interests through a group of European 
companies in China, which was formally practised during the era of Shanghai International 
Settlement. On the contrary, the improvement of economic centrality was also a major objective 
of EU port diplomacy in Macao, through the potential spill-over from other aspects of centrality. 
However, once the economic centrality was more secured like the case of Hong Kong, EU 
representative at port would shift to the supranational agenda of EU foreign policy, i.e. to 
become a structural diplomatic actor and normative power Europe. 
As a result, the proposed first-level hypotheses H1, 
H1: Ports and port-cities in China served as a platform for the EU to exercise its 
normative power and structural power, without jeopardising the economic 
interests of the EU and its Member States. 
were verified through the comparative study. For the sub-hypothesis H1.1, 
H1.1: The role differentiation of ports and port-cities was attributed to their unique 
port geography, which was defined by two dimensions, namely “centrality” and 
“intermediacy”. 
it was also partially verified as the difference in centrality of a port also implied the diplomatic 
resources available for the EU to carry its diplomatic agenda, implying the role differentiation 
across different ports in China. 
Intermediacy as the Quality and Quantity of a Diplomatic Network Covered for an Actor 
Apart from the revised definition of centrality, in Chapter 1 the thesis also proposed an adaption 
of the concept of intermediacy, which was the degree of acceptance for a civilian port “serving 
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their networks of interests and institutions”. In traditional port studies, the idea of intermediacy 
could be quantified as the intensity of maritime routes that used a civilian port, or the trade 
volume a civilian port handled per a certain period of time. However, in the case of port 
diplomacy, the concept of intermediacy could be both quantitative and qualitative: in terms of 
quantitative measurement, the intermediacy of a civilian port could largely follow the logic of 
traditional port studies such as the degree of embeddedness of a civilian port into maritime 
network and economic transaction; in terms of qualitative measurement, the level of acceptance 
is a relational concept, which depends on the degree of penetration into the sovereign host, as 
well as the quality of the maritime network than a civilian port possessed. With reference to the 
above modification, Table 7.3 summarised the intermediacy of the three selected ports: 
 Macao Hong Kong Shanghai 
Quantity of 
intermediacy 
Low High High 
Quality of 
intermediacy 








Table 7.3 Different dimensions of intermediacy in the selected ports 
From the above table, the level of intermediacy contributed to European port diplomacy in two 
different manners. The quantity of the intermediacy and the quality of intermediacy defined the 
effectiveness of port diplomacy that a diplomatic actor could possibly enjoy. This argument 
could be observed by the expectation management of EU representation in Macao and Shanghai. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, although the description of EU programmes and policy were always 
coined with the ambition to turn Macao into “an Asian city with rich European heritage” 
(University of Macao 2012), the content of programmes and seminars were rather to serve for 
local, or at most sub-state regional needs such as the Pan Pearl River Delta region (Ho 2001; 
Neves 2002; Hook and Neves 2002). In the case of Shanghai, the Shanghai Chapter always 
found itself more than serving the Shanghai Municipality. One mission of the Shanghai Chapter 
was to assist the national advocacy conducted by the European Union Chamber of Commerce, 
by building her local and regional influence in Shanghai as well as contributing to the annual 
position paper of the Chamber. The Shanghai Chapter indeed served as an important advocacy 
model followed by other regional chapters of the Chamber, thus strengthening the overall 
advocacy system enjoyed by the European Union, its Member States and European private 
companies. A similar position was also observed in the case of Hong Kong, which was 
highlighted by the programmes and seminars initiated by the European Union Office in Hong 
Kong (and Macao) that were all aimed at promoting EU presence at local, regional and national 
level (European Commission 2006). As a result, the level of intermediacy possessed by a 
civilian port would also affect EU port diplomacy choices as the expectation of acceptance 
always depended on the eff–ctiveness of the network - which could be measured by the quantity 
of economic and cultural activities as well as the embedded quality of the maritime network. 
Combining the discussion on the role of centrality in port diplomacy, the sub-hypothesis H1.1: 
H1.1: The role differentiation of ports and port-cities was attributed to their unique 
port geography, which was defined by two dimensions, namely “centrality” and 
“intermediacy”. 
was verified through the comparative studies, as the difference in terms of expected objectives 
of port diplomacy was associated to the quantity and the quality of the intermediacy a civilian 
port enjoyed.  
Similar to the European Union, Beijing also enjoyed different level of centrality and 
intermediacy across the three selected ports. Based on the established first-tier hypothesis and 
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sub-hypothesis, H1 and H1.1, Beijing responses to European port diplomacy were also 
empowered or limited by the level of centrality and intermediacy she enjoyed at the civilian 
port concerned. However, when bringing in the Beijing response to analyse European port 
diplomacy, which was the main focus of the second-tier hypotheses, the agreement and the 
disagreement over the port legacy, as well as the nature of relationship with major stakeholders      
Responses Differentiation in Beijing: Centrality, Intermediacy and the Degree of 
Acceptance 
Mentioned in the last section, the centrality and intermediacy of a civilian port enjoyed by 
Beijing also served as an enabler and obstacle of her diplomatic responses at the port. In fact, 
compared to traditional port studies which took the concept of “centrality” and “intermediacy” 
as objective and static, in the field of geopolitics and port diplomacy it was also subjective and 
fluid. On the one hand, the concepts of centrality and intermediacy had their static and objective 
components such as the level of connectivity as measured by trade volume or the intensity of 
trade routes or foreign investments. On the other hand, given that the definition of centrality is 
related to the notion of “power” and the definition of intermediacy involves the notion of 
“acceptance”, centrality and intermediacy were also essentially relational. (Baldwin 1989; Dahl 
1991; Guerreo and Anderson 2011; Lasswell and Kaplan 1950) As a result, port actions and 
port responses were both governed by the resources actors could find and deploy within the 
port geography, and the relationship between the diplomatic actors involved, in this thesis, it 
was the Sino-European relation. 
However, in reality, the geopolitical context was more complicated given the nature of multiple 
realities of the European Union, as well as the colonial history of the selected ports (Allen 1998; 
Meunier and Nicolaidis 1999; Miks 2010; Jørgensen 1998). The problem of multiple realities 
of the EU meant that both EU and its Member States could have their individual presence or 
collective presence at a civilian port. The presence of strong individual EU member states, for 
instance in the case of Hong Kong (British presence) or Macao (Portuguese presence), on one 
hand would change the quantity of the resources that the EU could enjoy and deploy at a civilian 
port, on the other hand the strong presence would also affect the degree of acceptance as Beijing 
was more sensitive to state-to-state level of diplomacy rather than state-to-supranational 
organisation level of diplomacy. The strong individual EU member state presence, and its 
relationship with Beijing, defined the acceptance of the colonial legacy thus the European port 
diplomacy leveraged from it. 
Colonial Legacy in China: Qualifying the “Usefulness” of the Legacy and the Degree of 
Acceptance 
Discussed in Chapter 1, port space was a negotiated space and a product of social and political 
forces (Lefebvre 1991; Elden 2007). These forces included an agreed social and political 
practice within the port space, the flows of material and ideational factors, and new political 
and social actions initiated by new political/social actors. Two implications could be drawn 
here: first, the port geography consisted of agreed practice that defined the nature or the quality 
of the port space; second, new political actors could alter port space at their will but it would 
take time to reshape the port space, as well as a certain degree of authority, to turn a new practice 
into an agreed practice. As a result, the legacy of the port, which had been a consistent and 
agreed practice developed since its formation, defined the nature and the quality of port 
geography of a civilian port, which then further assisted or limited the port actions of the 
political actors. 
The observations might be witnessed from a comparative study of Macao and Hong Kong, 
which shared the similar institutional arrangement under One Country Two Systems, and 
between Hong Kong and Shanghai, which shared a similar British background as an initiator 
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of the port system but different in institutional arrangement. In the case of Macao and Hong 
Kong, the main European presence at ports was Portuguese and British respectively, owing to 
the long history of colonial past. As a result, on the one hand the European Union office at 
Hong Kong and Macao took different initiatives in projecting their presence in Hong Kong and 
Macao, on the other hand Beijing reacted to the programmes and policies differently. For 
instance, Beijing was more open-minded to EU programmes in Macao on legal aspects and 
cultural promotion, as the thesis showed in Chapter 4 in regard to the typology of the 
programme that the EU, Macao and China agreed. Instead, the Chinese also took reference to 
such kind of cultural and social programmes as a way to re-define Macao’s intermediacy as a 
Chinese centre of the Lusophone community, even though most of the local Macau Chinese 
barely spoke Portuguese as their native language. From Beijing’s calculation, the Latin or 
continental European nature and quality of Macao’s intermediacy could potentially become an 
asset of Beijing to connect to the Lusophone community including those strategic partners such 
as Portugal and Brazil for leveraging the European and Latin American politics, or to access 
potential markets such as Angola and Mozambique in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative. 
Even though some of the programmes may touch on the issues of legal aspects such as the EU-
Macao Cooperation Programme in Legal Field, Beijing took them as an opportunity but not a 
threat to her governance in Macao. 
On the contrary, EU programmes seldomly touched on the continental legal system as it was 
never a colonial legacy left by the Britain. In terms of cultural programmes, the EU also 
organised various cultural programmes such as the EU Day of Languages, a.k.a. Speak Dating, 
to promote European cultural diversity as a whole. However, these programmes usually 
overshadowed by Member States’ initiatives such as the French May organised by the French 
representatives in Hong Kong, or the programmes organised by the British Council. The 
diversity in representation was partly attributed to the colonial legacy developed since 1842 
when most of the European merchants left Macao and re-established their network at Hong 
Kong. Albeit there were many cultural practices and visible cultural activities in Hong Kong, 
the long colonial past, the use of language and the political culture, made Hong Kong as a 
member of Anglo-Saxon community, which the leaders of this community, i.e. the UK and the 
US, were an object of the rising Chinese nationalism. The nationalistic discourse against the 
“Century of Humiliation” and the rising Sino-American rivalry in the 21st century, had pre-
empted Beijing to take an open-minded response to the “Western world”, in particular the 
Anglo-Saxon political and social ideals (Kaufman 2011; Wang 2012; Weiss 2014; 2019). That 
could be best illustrated by Chinese netizens’ teaser of Shanghai FTZ as a “new concession”. 
In fact, as discussed in Chapter 6, Beijing was extremely cautious about the colonial past of 
Shanghai International Settlement and its relation to contemporary development of Shanghai 
Municipality. The philosophy of “pragmatic nationalism” in urban planning and the 
geographical distribution of the centrality functions and intermediacy network functions 
reflected the awareness of Beijing in utilising the colonial legacy of Shanghai and the 
nationalistic narration of its centrality and intermediacy. 
Engagement or Containment? A Power Politics that Drives Beijing Responses 
Apart from the acceptance of colonial legacy, the final factor identified by the thesis was the 
power politics between the EU and China. Similar to the treatment made in Table 7.2, Table 
7.4 summarised the level of centrality enjoyed by Beijing in the selected ports: 
  
Bringing the Ports and Port Diplomacy Back-in     161 
 
 Macao Hong Kong Shanghai 
Economic centrality Low High High 
Cultural centrality Medium Medium High 
Political centrality High Low Extremely high 
Institutional 
centrality 
High High Extremely high 
Table 7.4 Different dimensions of centrality enjoyed by Beijing in the selected ports 
For the sake of comparison, the thesis recalled Table 7.2 here: 
 Macao Hong Kong Shanghai 
Economic centrality Low High High 
Cultural centrality Medium Medium Low 
Political centrality Low Medium Extremely low 
Institutional 
centrality 
Medium Low Extremely low 
Table 7.2 Different dimensions of centrality enjoyed by the EU in the selected ports 
By putting the tables side-by-side, we could observe the power struggle between the European 
Union and China at the selected ports. Across the three selected ports, Beijing had utmost 
control of nearly every aspect in Shanghai. It was because Shanghai was always being placed 
as an economic and political important city in China. The party member who lead Shanghai 
government would usually be appointed as a member of Politburo of the Chinese Community 
Party, and some of them may even took leadership position of Beijing, such as Zhu Rongji as 
an ex-Premier or Jiang Zemen as an ex-President of China. The relative strong power against 
the European counter-part allowed Beijing to adopt a bold response to European port diplomacy 
such as business lobbying from the European firms, for instance incorporation of the Shanghai 
Chapter as a consultative partner during the legislative process or routine administration of the 
Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone. However, Beijing strong hands at Shanghai also allowed her 
to reject any unfavourable lobbying or initiatives suggested by the Shanghai Chapter. As a 
result, the European representatives at Shanghai could only take a rather passive position in 
conducting the port diplomacy. 
In the case of Macao, the existence of Portuguese cultural legacy and the EU-Macao TCA might 
provide a possible leverage for the European Union to extend its structural influence into China. 
However, the strong political presence of Chinese network and the high institutional control 
over Macao politics, under the period of political condominium since 1949 and formally taken-
over in 1999, allowed Beijing to control the political values propagandised in Macao such that 
the political structure of Macao society was not easily influenced by EU port diplomacy. 
Moreover, Beijing conceived the Portuguese culture as a kind of diplomatic asset to her foreign 
policy, as well as a more friendly Sino-Portuguese relations developed from the past to presence, 
also served as an enabler for Beijing to take an open position over EU port actions at Macao. 
Finally, the difficult position of Beijing to take full control of the centrality of Hong Kong 
justified the strategy of securitisation of the port Hong Kong, as it was a kind of threat against 
Chinese national security. Given the strong economic presence of the European Union in Hong 
Kong, as well as the strong colonial legacy of Britain in the field of political values, Beijing 
had to rely on the securitisation strategy to either increase her institutional power, to control the 
potential spill-over effect of EU structural power through its port diplomacy. As a result, 
Beijing was very sensitive to any actions taken to modify the institutional framework of Hong 
Kong under One Country Two Systems, as it would be a fundamental challenge to her centrality 
at Hong Kong. The securitisation of Hong Kong was a kind of effective way to protect Beijing’s 
interests in Hong Kong, if not to fundamentally detached Hong Kong from the Anglo-Saxon 
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intermediacy. Through the process of securitisation, Beijing could also mobilise her resources 
at the ports to face the resources available for Europe in conducting its port diplomacy, for 
example a common narration of foreign intervention to disrupt Hong Kong stability and 
prosperity was always found when the European Union or other European states brought up the 
issues of democratisation of Hong Kong. 
Judging from the above findings and discussion, the second level of the hypotheses proposed 
by the thesis: 
H2: The European port diplomacy was constrained by the colonial and treaty port 
legacy as the legacy was one of factors that defined the availability of diplomatic 
resources (centrality) and network (intermediacy) the European Union could 
deploy at the port. 
H3: The Chinese port response was constrained by the colonial and treaty port 
legacy as the legacy was one of the factors that defined the availability of 
diplomatic resources (centrality) and network (intermediacy) that China Could 
deploy at the port. 
were verified. The nature of power struggle between the European Union would define the 
“meaning” of the colonial legacy and prompted the responses from Beijing. From the EU 
perspective, the nature of relationship between Beijing and the creator of the legacy, would also 
limit the degree of acceptance by Beijing, thus constrained the viable options that the EU could 
deploy at a civilian port. 
Implications to EU Structural Power and the Role of Civilian Port: An Overall 
Audit of the Theoretical Framework 
Stated in Chapter 1 and Chapter 3, the thesis aimed to fill in the gap of existing literature on 
EU structural power and the role of civilian ports in international politics and global political 
economy. Given the successful verification of the hypotheses, it was tempted to suggest that 
the ambition was largely successful in terms of empirical analysis. However, what had we learn 
from the empirical analysis and contribute to the theoretical discussion? This section will 
outline two theoretical propositions that the thesis contributed to the existing literature on EU 
structural power and the role of civilian ports in global politics and foreign policy analysis. 
Proposition 1: The Form and Effectiveness of the EU Structural Power and Structural 
Foreign Policy could be Spatial-sensitive 
From the comparative case studies, it was observed that the effectiveness of the EU structural 
power and structural foreign policy was spatial-sensitive. While traditional literature on the EU 
structural power and structural foreign policy did not address the “multiple realties” within the 
recipient state, the thesis showed that EU structural port diplomacy did respond to the spatial 
difference among different ports, so did the responses come from the recipient state. For 
instance, the lack of centrality of the EU in Shanghai forced the EU to give up its structural port 
diplomacy model in Macao and Hong Kong, but replied on chamber of commerce in China to 
push its agenda in economic structural changes. As shown in the recent survey conducted by 
the EU Chamber of Commerce in China, EU structural power was obviously not effective in 
Shanghai under this model, and the European companies began to lose faith towards both China 
and the EU in maintaining a favourable business environment for them (Ren 2017). However, 
even if the EU acknowledged the problem of the Shanghai model, without proper resources and 
capacity at the port had limited its choice of structural port diplomacy, thus hammering the 
effectiveness of EU structural power to turn Shanghai as a future role model of free trade zones 
established in the rest of Chinese territories. 
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The spatial sensitivity of the form and effectiveness of was also observed when the case of 
Macao and Hong Kong were compared. Even though both ports were exposed to long colonial 
history, governed by One Country, Two Systems and possessed undeniable colonial legacy 
within their societies, the micro-port actions proposed by the European Union were different. 
For instance, those micro-actions conducted in Macao had always focused on local, or at most 
sub-regional, level such as the promotion of Macao’s continental culture or strengthening 
Macao’s rule of law. Even there might be some programmes with larger ambitions, those 
programmes were not initiated by the EU but the MSAR government, or the EU was just 
leveraged on Macao facilities to larger audiences such as countries in Asia-Pacific region. 
Macao was never a port that the EU wished to leverage on to promote its structural power 
towards China. On the contrary, the micro-port actions conducted in Hong Kong had an obvious 
structural agenda that targeted both local and, most importantly, national audiences. The 
difference in orientation, as reviewed in the last section, could be answered by the different 
levels of centrality and intermediacy between Macao and Hong Kong. 
In fact, Beijing also responded to EU structural power and structural port diplomacy according 
to the spatial difference among the ports. For instance, Beijing did not consider the presence of 
EU (limited) structural power as a threat to any local or national structures. Instead, Beijing 
actively shaped the port geography of Shanghai for the sake of her own cultural propaganda 
and economic development. On the other hand, given the consensus on the expected functions 
and the port geography in Macao, Beijing took advantage on EU structural power, which aimed 
to sustain Macao’s continental culture and European civil law system, for her own foreign 
policies agenda by turning Macao as the Chinese hub of Lusophone communities around the 
world. On the contrary, given the strong presence of political resources available to the 
European Union, Beijing took an extreme cautious approach against any potential structural 
changes or leverage effect from economic and cultural micro-port actions, through the exercise 
of her institutional dominance over the port Hong Kong. Therefore, it could conclude that both 
the form and effectiveness of EU structural power and structural foreign policy, at least to China, 
were spatial-sensitive – a kind of inattentional blindness in the existing literature on EU 
structural power and structural foreign policy. 
Proposition 2: The Role of Civilian Ports could be Power-dependent  
If the first lesson the thesis drawn to the literature on EU structural power and structural foreign 
policy was the spatial sensitivity of both concepts, the second lesson drawn from the thesis was 
that the role of civilian ports was power-dependent. Recalling the characteristics of global cities 
suggested by Sassen (1991; 2005), a global city would gradually detach from its geographical 
region and became an independent entity in global political economy. Although Sassen did not 
aim to apply this concept to international politics and foreign policy, this definition implied that 
the global city was free from the influence of the nation host of the city or foreign diplomatic 
actors. A similar observation could be obtained when Calder and Freytas (2009) conceptualised 
a “global political city” as “a metropolitan area that serves as a policy hub, major political 
diplomatic community, and strategic information complex of global import” (Calder and 
Freytas 2009:94). In both definitions, the characteristics of the national host and foreign actors 
were missing. 
Focusing on the idea of city-networking, Acuto (2013) global city thesis highlighted the role of 
global cities as “networking actants”, “networking actors”, and “networking networks”. In 
subsequent research conducted by C40 and ARUP, two prominent city-networks in climate 
change issues, concluded that the power level of a city was independent from the level of actions 
of a city could take (C40 and ARUP 2015; Acuto 2017). However, such a conclusion did not 
reflect the complete picture of the story. For instance, C40 and ARUP (2015) defined the power 
level of a city in terms of its administrative, regulatory, infrastructural and financial power. 
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However, if the central idea on the role of global cities was the power to connect, the key 
indicator of power should relate to the capacity to attract and glue different structures, actors 
and networks within the city, as well as the capacity to connect and leverage on different 
structures, actors and networks. i.e. the idea of centrality and intermediacy in traditional port 
studies that the thesis proposed an adaptation in Chapter 3. In addition, one should not conflate 
the level of actions to the type of actions as well as the effectiveness of actions, as the former 
one counted the quantity of actions while the latter ones counted the quality and consequence 
of the action.       
As stated in proposition 1, the centrality and intermediacy enjoyed by the EU and China 
respectively shaped the form and the effectiveness of EU structural power to China and 
Beijing’s response. However, it was also observed that the consensus on port geography and 
expected functions, the resources available to them, and the relative strength in controlling 
various structures and resources, also contributed the dynamics of EU structural port diplomacy 
and Chinese responses. Behind all these components, as reviewed in the last section, was the 
power politics between the EU and China at civilian ports. For example, whether a specific kind 
of resources was allowed to be utilised was largely determined the level of dominance in that 
field. For instance, given the excessive dominance of Beijing in Shanghai, there was technical 
no other way for the EU to utilise Shanghai for its structural port diplomacy but the very weak 
and soft form of quasi-official lobbying. On the contrary, when the European Union enjoyed a 
freer hand in Hong Kong and Macao, the EU could implement various micro-port actions 
especially in the field of economic and cultural exchanges – or even programmes that could 
potentially alter the legal institutions in Macao. On the other hand, as documented in the 
empirical chapters on the selected cases, the evolution of port geography thus expected 
functions involved a series of negotiation and continuous interactions, which also implied the 
existence of power politics. Therefore, it could conclude that the role of civilian port could be 
differentiated by the power politics involved at every state in the formation of port geography 
and consensus. In short, the role of civilian ports was power-dependent - a kind of inattentional 
blindness in the existing literature on the role of cities in international politics and foreign policy.               
Further Research Agenda 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the announcement of the BRI in 2013 resulted in various regional 
initiatives, including the Indo-Pacific Strategy suggested by Japan and India, the recent 
Connecting Europe and Asia Strategy suggested by the European Union, and the newly 
proposed Blue Dot Network Strategy by the United States. These regional initiatives not only 
focus on the economic investments or cultural exchanges, but also took the maritime space and 
the civilian ports seriously in formulating foreign policy. 
The theoretical framework of the thesis allowed both academic and professionals to evaluate 
the impact of these initiatives in a systematic manner. However, the framework required more 
empirical tests for its validity, as one criticism against grounded theory as a research strategy 
was the problem of specificity, i.e. the observations are contextual and specific to certain casual 
mechanisms proposed by the researchers. Even within the Sino-European relations, there were 
more port cases that could be tested against the theoretical framework, such as those ports had 
little colonial legacy such as Shenzhen, or Hainan. In addition, the implementation of the above 
regional initiatives could also be the next set of cases to be observed and tested against. 
Apart from continuous testing by various empirical port cases, another direction for research 
would be to redefine and modify the framework through quantitative data. While the degree of 
centrality and intermediacy was largely qualitative in this thesis, the theoretical framework 
could also be opened to quantitative modelling such as the use of geographical information 
system to visualise the intensity of intermediacy or value survey to further comparison of the 
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political and cultural value embedded in the port community. Owing to the lack of resources 
and time constrain, the thesis did not make use of these potential tools in quantifying and 
visualising the independent variables. 
For decades, civilian port and civilian port diplomacy had been put aside as an important factor 
contributing the maritime power of a state, as well as an important concern in foreign policy. 
Nonetheless, the end of Cold War and the rise of post-Cold War security agenda opened up a 
new space for civilian port to contribute in the formulation of one’s sea power. After all, 
contemporary security threats were tilted towards the exercise of soft power under the 
globalised network. Civilian ports, as economic hubs, cultural hybrids and the front-liners of 
globalisation, would only become more important for a political entity to achieve its diplomatic 
goal through an effective “shipping” of her structural power from her place to another. The 
thesis opened a new discussion on an academic concept of civilian sea power, i.e. “civilian 
power exercised by state and her related civilian actors through civilised activities at civilian 
port” (Chan 2019). Compared to the traditional concept of sea power which focused on the 
naval power projection, the idea of civilian sea power focused on the civilian dimension of sea 
power, which included the combination of economic hard power and normative soft power – a 
kind of “smart power” in foreign policy (Nossel 2012). This concept also took note on the new 
security agenda which the concept of security evolved from traditional military and territorial 
security to economic and societal security. As a result, the power politics should not limit to 
naval activities but also “civilised activities”, which formulated another cornerstone of the idea 
of civilian sea power. Finally the post-Cold War system allowed both traditional actors like 
nation-states, or civilian actors such as state-sponsored multinational companies or 
transactional associations such as the chambers of commerce, sub-state actors such as Hong 
Kong or Macao, or supranational actors like the EU, to be a kind of agent that pursued 
diplomatic objectives and formulated their own diplomacy (or external relations). By including 
these actors in conceptualising the political use of sea power, the structural port diplomacy and 
civilian sea power, which could be conceptualised as  defined as the capacity of a political entity 
to make use of its civilian actors, its civilian assets and civilian activities at commercial and 
civilian ports, for the sake of projecting civilian power and delivering diplomatic objectives 
against the third party, could be a useful dimension to evaluate one’s maritime influence in the 
era of globalisation.   
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